Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so. View "State, Dep't of Health v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Harry Barr a limited writ of mandamus, holding that Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).Barr, an inmate, sought certain documents from James Wesson, the institutional public information officer at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI), pursuant to Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. Wesson produced some records and, as to the remaining, claimed that Barr failed sufficiently to specify which records he wanted and that Barr's requests predated Mobley, thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted Barr a limited writ of mandamus as to prison-kite logs predating Mobley, ordered Wesson to produce the email messages that Barr requested if they exist, denied the writ as to Barr's request for a list of cross-gender employees, dismissed his complaint for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and denied his motion to strike a certain affidavit, holding that Barr demonstrated that he had a clear legal right to access the prison-kite logs and specified email messages if they existed. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

The Penal Code authorizes but does not require, county sheriffs to issue licenses to carry concealed weapons. The Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office rarely issued CCW licenses; the office would not even process a CCW application absent a special instruction Sung, who apparently ran Sheriff Smith’s 2018 re-election campaign and subsequently became the undersheriff, could issue such instructions and could place applications on hold even after licenses were signed by the sheriff. Sung abused that authority to extract favors.Apple executives, concerned about serious threats, met with Sung, who asked whether they would support Sheriff Smith’s re-election. Apple would not give anything of value in exchange for CCW licenses but two executives personally donated $1,000, the maximum allowable amount, to Smith’s campaign. After the election, the applicants were fingerprinted and completed their firearm range qualification tests. Sheriff Smith signed the CCW licenses but they were not handed over. Although Apple had no program for donating products to law enforcement agencies, after a meeting with Sung, an Apple executive (Moyer) emailed an inquiry about donating iPads or computers to the sheriff’s office's “new training facility,” not mentioning Apple’s pending CCW applications. The Office was not setting up a new training center but asked for 200 iPads, worth $50,0000-$80,000. Apple’s team then received their CCW licenses, Apple terminated the promised donation.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a bribery charge against Moyer. A public official may be bribed with a promise to donate to the official’s office. View "People v. Moyer" on Justia Law

Johnson was the councilman in Cleveland’s Buckeye-Shaker neighborhood for 41 years. Jamison was his executive assistant. For years, Johnson used his position to fraudulently claim federal reimbursements for payments he never made. He also secured employment for his children in federally funded programs, although they were not legally eligible to work in such positions. Johnson deposited their earnings into his own account. In addition, Johnson fraudulently claimed a series of tax deductions. He encouraged and assisted his son Elijah in submitting falsified records for Elijah’s grand-jury testimony. Jamison assisted Johnson in these crimes. Johnson and Jamison were convicted on 15 charges, including federal program theft under 18 U.S.C. 371, 666(a)(1)(A) and (2); tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2); and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) and 1519. Johnson was sentenced to 72 months in prison. Jamison was sentenced to 60 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s loss calculations and to sentencing enhancements for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, for using a minor, and for obstructing justice. The district court properly admitted “other acts” evidence of prior misuse of campaign funds. Any other errors in evidentiary rulings were harmless. View "United States v. Jamison" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Plaintiff John Doe was a convicted sex offender who moved from South Carolina to Georgia in 2015. He filed suit in South Carolina in federal court against the Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) Mark Keel, contending in part that because he no longer resided in South Carolina, SLED should be prohibited from continuing to publish his name and information on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry. The question certified to the Supreme Court involved whether South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) permitted the publication of out-of-state offenders on the state’s public sex offender registry. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. View "John Doe v. Keel" on Justia Law

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Appellant’s home carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, K.B. The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Appellant filed a claim to the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in district court.  She failed to timely oppose the ensuing judicial proceeding, and the clerk of court entered default against the funds. Appellant, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized assets. The district court held that Appellant had not shown excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered final default judgment against the seized assets.
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of the motion to strike and the entry of default judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting default judgment to the government. Appellant’s letters are properly viewed as seeking both to lift the entry of default and to be granted leave to file an untimely claim to the assets. So understood, Appellant’s motion should have been assessed under the more permissive good cause standard, as is any other motion to lift entry of default in a civil suit. View "U.S. v. Starling" on Justia Law

In 2009, A.B., 13 years old, pled no contest to charges and was declared a ward of the juvenile court. The juvenile court successfully terminated his probation and wardship in 2014. Eight years later, A.B. and the County Probation Department filed an unopposed petition to have his juvenile court and public agency records sealed, Welfare and Institutions Code section 781. Since his juvenile adjudication, A.B. had not sustained any criminal convictions, had married and had a child, and had remained steadily employed.The court granted the petition, finding that A.B. had been rehabilitated and that A.B.’s offenses were not listed in section 707(b). In addition to sealing its own records, the court ordered the five government agencies listed in the petition to seal and ultimately destroy any of A.B.’s juvenile records in their custody. Three months later, A.B. discovered that several public agencies not subject to the original sealing order had retained and could access his juvenile records. A.B. petitioned to seal these additional records, again unopposed. The juvenile court concluded that it lacked the authority to seal additional records after the initial sealing order, acknowledging that, had the additional agencies been listed in A.B.’s first petition, they would have been ordered to seal their records. The court of appeal reversed. Section 781.1 allows a court to grant a petition to seal documents not addressed in an earlier petition. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Leander Williams pled guilty to non-violent third- and fourth-degree drug offenses. His primary parole eligibility date was approximately eight months after the New Jersey Earn Your Way Out Act (EYWO Act) became effective. During his prison sentence, Williams successfully completed multiple alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs, including an 87-day Alcoholics Anonymous program and a residential program in the "Bo Robinson" for 187 days. After the Bo Robinson program and while remaining in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Williams resided at the Harbor Residential Community Release Program for 90 days for further rehabilitation. Approximately one month before his primary parole eligibility date, a panel of the Parole Board certified that Williams met the “criteria for administrative parole release” under the EYWO Act, which entitled him to automatic administrative parole release. The panel imposed 21 general parole conditions and the “special” condition that Williams participate in an RTP for a minimum term of 180 days. Williams administratively appealed to the Parole Board, arguing that N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 precluded the panel from requiring an RTP as a condition of his administrative parole release under the EYWO Act. The panel upheld the imposition of residential treatment but recommended that the Board reduce his mandated “term” of 180 days to 90 days. Williams appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the Parole Board’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Parole Board could not mandate participation in an RTP for inmates administratively paroled under the EYWO Act. "Although N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.59 generally authorizes the Parole Board to impose parole conditions on adult inmates who have been administratively released under the EYWO Act, an RTP is not among the conditions that can be imposed in that setting." View "Williams v. New Jersey State Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original supervisory jurisdiction to direct the Honorable Judge Stacy Louser (hereinafter “district court”) to amend a portion of a criminal judgment imposing probation as part of a sentence for a class B misdemeanor and requiring the DOCR to supervise the probation. The DOCR argued it does not have statutory authority to supervise probation when the underlying charge was a class B misdemeanor. The DOCR requested the criminal judgment be amended to relieve the DOCR from the obligation to supervise the probation. Without deciding whether the district court has the authority to require a defendant to be supervised by the DOCR as part of a sentence imposed for a class B misdemeanor, the Supreme Court concluded the DOCR did have the authority to provide the supervision and declined to exercise supervisory jurisdiction. View "DOCR v. Louser, et al." on Justia Law