Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Arroyo served in the Illinois House of Representatives from 2006-2019, while also managing a lobbying firm. In 2018-2019, Arroyo’s firm received $32,500 in checks from Weiss’s sweepstakes-gaming company in exchange for his official support for the sweepstakes industry in the General Assembly. Despite never previously expressing a view on sweepstakes gaming, Arroyo began pushing for sweepstakes-friendly legislation and encouraging other legislators and executive-branch officials to support the same. Arroyo concealed his financial arrangement with Weiss.When the government uncovered the bribery scheme, Arroyo pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2). The court sentenced him to 57 months’ imprisonment and ordered that he forfeit $32,500 in bribe money. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Arroyo’s contention that the judge erred by finding his 57-month sentence necessary to deter public corruption. District judges need not marshal empirical data on deterrent effects before considering whether a sentence adequately deters criminal conduct. The judge presumed that public officials are rational actors who pay attention when one of their own is sentenced. That presumption that sentences influence behavior at the margins was reasonable. The court also rejected arguments that the judge erred by deeming several of his allocution statements aggravating and ordering him to forfeit too much money. View "United States v. Arroyo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court upholding the decision of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services Appeals Board (Appeals Board) upholding the decision of the Institutional Disciplinary Committee (IDC) to sanction Appellant for drug use while in prison, holding that there was no plain error.Appellant, an inmate incarcerated under the custody of the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS), was issued a misconduct charge for "Drug or Intoxicant Abuse" in violation of an NDCS rule. After a hearing, the IDC found that Appellant had violated the rule. The Appeals Board upheld the decision, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not commit plain error in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold the IDC's finding that Appellant violated the rule at issue. View "Haynes v. Neb. Dep't of Correctional Services" on Justia Law

Vepuri is the de facto director of KVK-Tech, a generic drug manufacturer. He employed Panchal as its director of quality assurance. KVK-Tech manufactured and sold Hydroxyzine, a prescription generic drug used to treat anxiety and tension. The government alleges that Vepuri, Panchal, and KVK-Tech sourced active ingredient for the Hydroxyzine from a facility (DRL) that was not included in the approvals that they obtained from the FDA and that they misled the FDA about their practices.An indictment charged all three defendants with conspiracy to defraud and to commit offenses against the United States and charged KVK-Tech with an additional count of mail fraud. The district court dismissed the portion of the conspiracy charge that alleges that the three conspired to violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which prohibits introducing a “new drug” into interstate commerce unless an FDA approval “is effective with respect to such drug,” 21 U.S.C. 355(a).The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that a deviation from the approved drug application means that the approval is no longer effective. The approval ceases being effective only when it has been withdrawn or suspended. The indictment does not include any allegations that the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine manufactured with active ingredients from DRL had a different composition or labeling than the KVK-Tech Hydroxyzine with the effective approval. View "United States v. Vepuri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment in his Section 1983 suit arising from those portions of Plaintiff’s imprisonment that occurred as a result of an improper imposition of administrative post-release supervision (“PRS”) by New York State agencies, and subsequent improper imposition of PRS by a New York state court. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in limiting relief to $1 in nominal damages, denying him punitive damages as a matter of law, and granting summary judgment for Appellees on his false imprisonment claim.   The Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court instructed the district court to consider further whether, under Vincent, compensatory damages may still be available to Plaintiff. Further, the court agreed with Plaintiff that material issues of disputed fact preclude summary judgment. Appellees’ Rule 56.1 statement stated that as of May 30, 2000, the maximum expiration date of Plaintiff’s sentence was February 13, 2008, and as of July 30, 2007, it was June 6, 2008. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s failure in the district court to object to Appellees’ statement of material facts does not preclude him from relying on inconsistencies in Appellees’ own evidence to identify a disputed issue of material fact that made it erroneous to enter summary judgment. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Appellees on the false imprisonment claim. Finally, the court held that Plaintiff’s challenge to his post-resentencing confinement is precluded by Appellees’ qualified immunity defense. View "Aponte v. Perez" on Justia Law

A.D. appealed on behalf of her son G.R.D., a court order placing him in the custody of the Division of Juvenile Services (DJS). In September 2022, G.R.D. was charged with committing simple assault on his mother. He was detained at the Grand Forks County Juvenile Detention Center and subsequently adjudicated as a delinquent child. He remained in his mother’s custody and was placed on supervised probation for 12 months and ordered to participate in drug court. In November 2022, G.R.D. was detained based on allegations he violated conditions of probation and committed new offenses. The juvenile court ordered that G.R.D. remain at the juvenile detention center and undergo diagnostic testing. On November 23, 2022, the juvenile court conducted an initial appearance on the probation revocation petition and ordered G.R.D to home detention in the custody of his mother. G.R.D. was alleged to have used methamphetamine within hours of being released into his mother’s custody. On November 28, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing and ordered that G.R.D. be detained for again violating his probation. After a detention review hearing on December 27, 2022, the juvenile court found G.R.D. remained a delinquent child and ordered him into the custody of DJS for up to 12 months. The court also ordered DJS to place G.R.D. in a treatment center as soon as possible. A.D. argued the juvenile court erred by granting the DJS custody of G.R.D. instead of her, and the court’s findings were based on stale evidence. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order. View "Interest of G.R.D." on Justia Law

The Illinois Supreme Court Commission on Pretrial Practices made multiple recommendations to “ensure defendants are not denied liberty solely due to their inability to financially secure their release from custody.” In 2021, the General Assembly passed, and the Governor signed, the Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act, revising the standards for police use of force, conferring new authority on the Attorney General concerning alleged civil rights violations by law enforcement, and imposing new requirements for correctional facilities.The Act rebuilt Illinois’s statutory framework for the pretrial release of criminal defendants, 725 ILCS 5/110, establishing a default rule that all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release on personal recognizance subject to conditions of release, such as electronic monitoring or home supervision. Although the Act eliminates monetary bail it allows the court to order pretrial detention of criminal defendants in specified cases. The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a defendant’s eligibility for pretrial detention. The trial court rejected claims that the Act violated the state’s constitutional single-subject and three-readings requirements and was void for vagueness but entered summary judgment, finding that certain provisions violated the bail, crime victims’ rights, and the separation of powers clauses of the Illinois Constitution.The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The Illinois Constitution does not mandate monetary bail as the only means to ensure criminal defendants appear for trials or the only means to protect the public. The Act’s pretrial release provisions set forth procedures commensurate with the balance between the individual rights of defendants and the individual rights of crime victims. The legislature has long regulated the bail system. View "Rowe v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Stewart obtained his private pilot airman’s certificate in 1978. In 2013, he flew at altitudes and in weather conditions for which he was not authorized. The FAA notified Stewart that it planned to suspend his airman’s certificate. He could: surrender his certificate and begin the 180-day suspension; submit evidence that he had not violated the regulations; discuss the matter informally with an FAA attorney; or request an appeal to the NTSB. Stewart instead sent a letter stating that the agency lacked jurisdiction over private pilots. The FAA suspended Stewart’s certificate and assessed a $5,000 civil penalty for failure to turn in his certificate. Stewart kept flying. When he failed to properly deploy his plane’s landing gear, the FAA flagged his plane for inspection. Stewart did not comply. The FAA suspended the airworthiness certificate for his plane. Stewart kept flying and again landed his plane with the landing gear up. The FAA revoked Stewart’s airman’s certificate and again assessed a civil penalty. Stewart continued flying. The Sixth Circuit affirmed Stewart's convictions for knowingly and willfully serving as an airman without an airman’s certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that capacity, 49 U.S.C. 46306(b)(7), rejecting Stewart’s argument that he was not “without” a certificate because he still had physical possession of his. The statute required Stewart to have FAA permission to fly at the time of the flights in question. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals granting Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus but denying his requests for statutory damages and court costs, holding that there was no error.Appellant, an inmate, sent a public-records request to Appellee, an employee of a private company that contracts with the state of Ohio to house state prisoners. Dissatisfied with the ultimate response, Appellant filed the current action asking for a writ of mandamus ordering Appellee to produce the records requested. The court of appeals granted the writ to a limited extent and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in denying Appellant's request for statutory damages and court costs. View "State ex rel. Atakpu v. Shuler" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Ohio Parole Board and the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (collectively, the State) and denied Appellant's motions to strike the State's merit brief in whole or in part, holding that there was no error.Appellant was found guilty, after a jury trial, of the rape of two women, one of whom he impregnanted, kidnapping, and attempted rape. Appellant subsequently appeared before the parole board eight times and was denied parole each time. Appellant later filed an original action of writs of prohibition and mandamus arguing that the parole board improperly denied parole. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed and denied Appellant's motions to strike, holding that Appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to relief. View "State ex rel. Dodson v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus and issued the writ directed to the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections ordering that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner was entitled to relief on his claim that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted murder that, if awarded, would result in his immediate release from incarceration.In his habeas corpus petition, Petitioner argued that he was wrongfully denied earned sentence credits on his convictions for attempted aggravated murder. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Virginia Department of Corrections misinterpreted Va. Code 53.1-202.3(A) and, as a result, miscalculated his release date. The Supreme Court agreed, granted Petitioner's petition, and ordered that Petitioner be released from custody, holding that Petitioner established that he was entitled to relief. View "Prease v. Clarke" on Justia Law