Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This appeal stemmed from the Mississippi Legislature’s passing and the Governor’s signing of House Bill 1020. The catalyst for the Legislature’s passing of House Bill 1020 was described as the “sweltering, undisputed and suffocating” crime problem in Jackson, Mississippi—a problem that has “crippled the criminal justice system.” While political and social controversy surrounded this bill, the bulk of the bill’s provisions, which are aimed at improving public safety and bolstering judicial resources in Jackson, were not at issue. Section 1 of House Bill 1020, directed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Chief Justice to appoint four additional (and unelected) circuit judges to the existing Seventh Circuit Court District—the district comprised of the City of Jackson and all of Hinds County—for a term ending December 31, 2026. The second challenged provision, Section 4 of House Bill 1020, was a more ambitious endeavor that created a new statutory inferior court, much like a municipal court, to serve the CCID. Petitioners, and Jackson residents, Ann Saunders, Sabreen Sharrief, and Dorothy Triplett (collectively, Saunders) claimed both provisions violated Mississippi’s Constitution. The Hinds County Chancellor J. Dewayne Thomas, who held hearings on Saunders’s challenges, disagreed and dismissed her complaint. Saunders appealed. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the chancellor that the creation of the CCID inferior court in Section 4 of House Bill 1020 was constitutional. But the Court agreed with Saunders that Section 1’s creation of four new appointed “temporary special circuit judges” in the Seventh Circuit Court District for a specified, almost-four-year term violated the State Constitution’s requirement that circuit judges be elected for a four-year term. View "Saunders, et al. v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied as moot Mark Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus and also denied Griffin's request for statutory damages, holding that Griffin's request for a writ of mandamus was moot.Griffin, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution, submitted a public-records request to Allan Szoke, a warden's assistant at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Griffin later brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling production of the records and an award of statutory damages. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) because Griffin had received the requested records, his request for a writ of mandamus was moot; and (2) Griffin was not entitled to statutory damages because he did not clearly and convincingly show that Szoke denied his public-records request or otherwise failed to fulfill his duties under the Public Records Act. View "State ex rel. Griffin v. Szoke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus brought under Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, by Harry Barr, an inmate at the Grafton Correctional Institution (GCII), seeking to compel the warden's assistant at GCI to produce the job description for, and the certification or license held by, Jennifer Whitten, a GCI employee, holding that Barr was not entitled to the writ.In addition to the writ of mandamus, Barr sought statutory damages and also filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction and other motions. The Supreme Court dismissed Barr's complaint for a TRO and a preliminary injunction, granted Barr's motion to amend the evidence and deemed the record supplemented, granted his motion to withdraw his motion for an order pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R.4.01(A), and denied the writ of mandamus and his request for statutory damages, holding that Barr was entitled to some relief. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so. View "State, Dep't of Health v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Harry Barr a limited writ of mandamus, holding that Barr was entitled to relief on his request for certain inmate records predating State ex rel. Mobley v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 201 N.E.3d 853 (Ohio 2022).Barr, an inmate, sought certain documents from James Wesson, the institutional public information officer at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI), pursuant to Ohio's Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. Wesson produced some records and, as to the remaining, claimed that Barr failed sufficiently to specify which records he wanted and that Barr's requests predated Mobley, thus rendering them unenforceable. The Supreme Court granted Barr a limited writ of mandamus as to prison-kite logs predating Mobley, ordered Wesson to produce the email messages that Barr requested if they exist, denied the writ as to Barr's request for a list of cross-gender employees, dismissed his complaint for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, and denied his motion to strike a certain affidavit, holding that Barr demonstrated that he had a clear legal right to access the prison-kite logs and specified email messages if they existed. View "State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson" on Justia Law

The Penal Code authorizes but does not require, county sheriffs to issue licenses to carry concealed weapons. The Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Office rarely issued CCW licenses; the office would not even process a CCW application absent a special instruction Sung, who apparently ran Sheriff Smith’s 2018 re-election campaign and subsequently became the undersheriff, could issue such instructions and could place applications on hold even after licenses were signed by the sheriff. Sung abused that authority to extract favors.Apple executives, concerned about serious threats, met with Sung, who asked whether they would support Sheriff Smith’s re-election. Apple would not give anything of value in exchange for CCW licenses but two executives personally donated $1,000, the maximum allowable amount, to Smith’s campaign. After the election, the applicants were fingerprinted and completed their firearm range qualification tests. Sheriff Smith signed the CCW licenses but they were not handed over. Although Apple had no program for donating products to law enforcement agencies, after a meeting with Sung, an Apple executive (Moyer) emailed an inquiry about donating iPads or computers to the sheriff’s office's “new training facility,” not mentioning Apple’s pending CCW applications. The Office was not setting up a new training center but asked for 200 iPads, worth $50,0000-$80,000. Apple’s team then received their CCW licenses, Apple terminated the promised donation.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal of a bribery charge against Moyer. A public official may be bribed with a promise to donate to the official’s office. View "People v. Moyer" on Justia Law

Johnson was the councilman in Cleveland’s Buckeye-Shaker neighborhood for 41 years. Jamison was his executive assistant. For years, Johnson used his position to fraudulently claim federal reimbursements for payments he never made. He also secured employment for his children in federally funded programs, although they were not legally eligible to work in such positions. Johnson deposited their earnings into his own account. In addition, Johnson fraudulently claimed a series of tax deductions. He encouraged and assisted his son Elijah in submitting falsified records for Elijah’s grand-jury testimony. Jamison assisted Johnson in these crimes. Johnson and Jamison were convicted on 15 charges, including federal program theft under 18 U.S.C. 371, 666(a)(1)(A) and (2); tax fraud, 26 U.S.C. 7206(2); and obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(b) and 1519. Johnson was sentenced to 72 months in prison. Jamison was sentenced to 60 months.The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the district court’s loss calculations and to sentencing enhancements for being an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants, for using a minor, and for obstructing justice. The district court properly admitted “other acts” evidence of prior misuse of campaign funds. Any other errors in evidentiary rulings were harmless. View "United States v. Jamison" on Justia Law

Petitioner applied to the trial court in March 2022 to change his name. On the ground that Petitioner has “outstanding warrant(s),” the trial court denied Harris’s petition.   The Second Appellate District affirmed because there was no abuse of discretion. The court explained that by statute, it was proper for the trial court to check law enforcement records when considering Petitioner’s petition to change his name. The California Legislature has directed courts to use the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS) and Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to determine whether a name change applicant must register as a sex offender. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Plaintiff John Doe was a convicted sex offender who moved from South Carolina to Georgia in 2015. He filed suit in South Carolina in federal court against the Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) Mark Keel, contending in part that because he no longer resided in South Carolina, SLED should be prohibited from continuing to publish his name and information on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry. The question certified to the Supreme Court involved whether South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) permitted the publication of out-of-state offenders on the state’s public sex offender registry. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. View "John Doe v. Keel" on Justia Law

Police officers seized just over $8,000 in a search of Appellant’s home carried out as part of a drug trafficking investigation into her then-boyfriend, K.B. The local police turned over the funds to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, which initiated an administrative forfeiture procedure to claim the funds as proceeds from drug sales. Acting pro se, Appellant filed a claim to the assets, forcing the government to terminate its administrative seizure and open a judicial forfeiture proceeding in district court.  She failed to timely oppose the ensuing judicial proceeding, and the clerk of court entered default against the funds. Appellant, still acting pro se, then sent several letters to the district court and the U.S. Attorney’s Office seeking leave to file a belated claim to the seized assets. The district court held that Appellant had not shown excusable neglect, denied her an extension of time to file a claim, and entered final default judgment against the seized assets.
The Second Circuit vacated the grant of the motion to strike and the entry of default judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting default judgment to the government. Appellant’s letters are properly viewed as seeking both to lift the entry of default and to be granted leave to file an untimely claim to the assets. So understood, Appellant’s motion should have been assessed under the more permissive good cause standard, as is any other motion to lift entry of default in a civil suit. View "U.S. v. Starling" on Justia Law