Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court affirming the decision of the State Claims Board awarding Appellant $25,000 in compensation after finding Appellant was innocent of a crime for which he was imprisoned, holding that Wis. Stat. 775.05(4) does not compel the Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.Appellant pled no contest to first-degree intentional homicide and spent approximately twenty-six years in prison. After his second guilty plea was vacated Appellant petitioned the State Claims Board for compensation, seeking more than $5.7 million. The Board awarded the maximum under Wis. Stat. 775.05(4). Appellant sought judicial review, arguing that the Board should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of the amount awarded. The circuit court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals grafted onto the statute a process the legislature did not sanction. View "Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Justin Hooper and the City of Tulsa disputed whether the Curtis Act, 30 Stat. 495 (1898), granted Tulsa jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by all Tulsa’s inhabitants, including Indians, in Indian country. Tulsa issued a traffic citation to Hooper, an Indian and member of the Choctaw Nation, and he paid a $150 fine for the ticket in Tulsa’s Municipal Criminal Court. Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, Hooper filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over his offense because it was a crime committed by an Indian in Indian country. Tulsa countered that it had jurisdiction over municipal violations committed by its Indian inhabitants stemming from Section 14 of the Curtis Act. The municipal court agreed with Tulsa and denied Hooper’s application. Hooper then sought relief in federal court—filing a complaint: (1) appealing the denial of his application for post-conviction relief; and (2) seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 14 was inapplicable to Tulsa today. Tulsa moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss Hooper’s declaratory judgment claim, agreeing with Tulsa that Congress granted the city jurisdiction over municipal violations by all its inhabitants, including Indians, through Section 14. Based on this determination, the district court dismissed Hooper’s appeal of the municipal court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as moot. Hooper appealed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the federal district court erred in dismissing Hooper's declaratory judgment claim because even if the Curtis Act was never repealed, it was no longer applicable to Tulsa. The Court also agreed with Hooper that the district court erred in dismissing his appeal of the municipal court decision as moot based on its analysis of Section 14, but the Court determined the district court lacked jurisdiction over Hooper’s appeal from the municipal court. View "Hooper v. The City of Tulsa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that government agents searched his cell phone at the border without a warrant on at least five occasions and that agents copied data from his cell phone at least once. Plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the respective heads of each entity in their official capacity (collectively, the government), challenging the searches, as well as ICE and CBP policies regarding border searches of electronic devices. In the district court, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking, among other relief, a preliminary injunction preventing the government from searching his cell phone at the border without a warrant. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a substantial threat he will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the ICE and CBP policies authorize warrantless searches. Further, the allegations in Plaintiff’s verified complaint are evidence of a pattern of warrantless searches of Plaintiff’s cell phone. However, Plaintiff has no additional evidence to establish that he will be stopped by border agents in the future and that the agents will search his cell phone without a warrant. View "Anibowei v. Morgan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault with a weapon and his commitment to the Department of Public Health and Human Service (DPHHS) for the duration of his twenty-year sentence with ten years suspended, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his allegations of error.Defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, and the parties agreed to recommend that Defendant be committed to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) for the duration of his sentence. Defendant was subsequently sentenced to twenty years in DPHHS's custody with ten years suspended. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court unjustly resumed his criminal proceedings due to the lengthy period between his arrest and the date he regained fitness to stand trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss because resuming Defendant's criminal proceedings was not unjust. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming Petitioner's order of removal and denying his application for adjustment of status, holding that a conviction under Mass. Gen. Laws (MGL) ch. 269, 11C is not categorically a firearm offense, as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(c).Petitioner, a citizen of El Salvador, pleaded guilty in Massachusetts state court to defacing or receiving a firearm with a defaced serial number in violation of MGL ch. 269, 11C. The Department of Homeland Security later initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner charging him with removal based solely on his Massachusetts state court conviction. Petitioner moved to terminate the proceedings on the grounds that his Massachusetts conviction did not qualify as a removable firearm offense. The immigration judge sustained the removability charge and denied Petitioner's ensuing application to adjust his status. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The First Circuit vacated the BIA's opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that MGL ch. 269, 11C was facially overbroad when compared to its federal counterpart. View "Portillo v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the district court declaring Appellant eligible to submit a petition seeking compensation based on exoneration under Minnesota's Incarceration and Exoneration Remedies Act, Minn. Stat. 611.362 to 611.368, holding that Appellant was not eligible for compensation based on exoneration.At issue was whether Appellant had established, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that she was exonerated within the meaning of Minn. Stat. 590.11. The district court concluded that Appellant was eligible for compensation based on a finding of exoneration. The court of appeals agreed that Appellant was "exonerated" but remanded for the district court to determine a separate issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was not eligible for compensation based on exoneration. View "Back v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying Appellant's action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Ohio Parole Board to reinstate his parole and hold a new revocation hearing, holding that there was no error.Appellant was released on parole in 2019 after his incarceration for murder and other crimes. He was subsequently arrested for violating the terms of his parole. After a hearing, the Ohio Parole Board revoked Appellant's parole, finding that he had engaged in sexual contact with a woman without her consent. The Tenth District denied Appellant's subsequent petition seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the parole board to reinstate his parole and hold a new revocation hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not show by clear and convincing evidence that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ohio Adult Parole Bd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued a writ prohibiting the Honorable Steven A. Judge Privette from proceeding in the underlying proceeding initiated against Betty Grooms, the circuit clerk of Oregon County, for contempt of court, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order at issue.The subject court order directed Groom to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases after local sheriff departments alleged that they had not received reimbursement for costs incurred incarcerating individuals in their county jails. Judge Privette subsequently ordered Grooms to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition requested by Grooms, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order. View "State ex rel. Grooms v. Honorable Privette" on Justia Law

Then-New York Governor Cuomo’s “Buffalo Billion” initiative administered through Fort Schuyler Management Corporation, a nonprofit affiliated with SUNY, aimed to invest $1 billion in upstate development projects. Investigations later uncovered a scheme that involved Cuomo’s associates--a member of Fort Schuyler’s board of directors and a construction company made payments to a lobbyist with ties to the Cuomo administration. Fort Schuyler’s bid process subsequently allowed the construction company to receive major Buffalo Billion contracts.The participants were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. Under the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory, wire fraud can be established by showing that the defendant schemed to deprive a victim of potentially valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions. The jury instructions defined “property” as including “intangible interests such as the right to control the use of one’s assets,” and “economically valuable information” as “information that affects the victim’s assessment of the benefits or burdens of a transaction, or relates to the quality of goods or services received or the economic risks.” The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court reversed. Under Supreme Court precedents the federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests. The prosecution must prove that wire fraud defendants “engaged in deception,” and also that money or property was “an object of their fraud.” The "fraud statutes do not vest a general power in the federal government to enforce its view of integrity in broad swaths of state and local policymaking.” The right-to-control theory applies to an almost limitless variety of deceptive actions traditionally left to state contract and tort law. The Court declined to affirm Ciminelli’s convictions on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to establish wire fraud under a traditional property-fraud theory. View "Ciminelli v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide documents in response to submitted public records requests, holding that this action was moot.Relator, an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, sent several requests to the DRC for records and kites. DRC provided a requested record and concluded that the remaining records were electronic kites. Relator then made subsequent requests. The DRC denied the requests and ultimately gave Relator a formal directive to stop the repetitive requests. Relator then filed his mandamus complaint. The Supreme Court denied the writ and awarded Relator $1,000 in statutory damages, holding (1) Relator's requests for the kites were moot because the DRC provided all the requested kites; and (2) Relator was entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Straughter v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law