Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court issued a writ prohibiting the Honorable Steven A. Judge Privette from proceeding in the underlying proceeding initiated against Betty Grooms, the circuit clerk of Oregon County, for contempt of court, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order at issue.The subject court order directed Groom to prepare a spreadsheet of court costs assessed in criminal cases after local sheriff departments alleged that they had not received reimbursement for costs incurred incarcerating individuals in their county jails. Judge Privette subsequently ordered Grooms to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition requested by Grooms, holding that Judge Privette lacked authority to hold Grooms in contempt for her alleged deficiencies in complying with the court order. View "State ex rel. Grooms v. Honorable Privette" on Justia Law

Then-New York Governor Cuomo’s “Buffalo Billion” initiative administered through Fort Schuyler Management Corporation, a nonprofit affiliated with SUNY, aimed to invest $1 billion in upstate development projects. Investigations later uncovered a scheme that involved Cuomo’s associates--a member of Fort Schuyler’s board of directors and a construction company made payments to a lobbyist with ties to the Cuomo administration. Fort Schuyler’s bid process subsequently allowed the construction company to receive major Buffalo Billion contracts.The participants were charged with wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud 18 U.S.C. 1343, 1349. Under the Second Circuit’s “right to control” theory, wire fraud can be established by showing that the defendant schemed to deprive a victim of potentially valuable economic information necessary to make discretionary economic decisions. The jury instructions defined “property” as including “intangible interests such as the right to control the use of one’s assets,” and “economically valuable information” as “information that affects the victim’s assessment of the benefits or burdens of a transaction, or relates to the quality of goods or services received or the economic risks.” The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions.The Supreme Court reversed. Under Supreme Court precedents the federal fraud statutes criminalize only schemes to deprive people of traditional property interests. The prosecution must prove that wire fraud defendants “engaged in deception,” and also that money or property was “an object of their fraud.” The "fraud statutes do not vest a general power in the federal government to enforce its view of integrity in broad swaths of state and local policymaking.” The right-to-control theory applies to an almost limitless variety of deceptive actions traditionally left to state contract and tort law. The Court declined to affirm Ciminelli’s convictions on the ground that the evidence was sufficient to establish wire fraud under a traditional property-fraud theory. View "Ciminelli v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Relator's complaint seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) to provide documents in response to submitted public records requests, holding that this action was moot.Relator, an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, sent several requests to the DRC for records and kites. DRC provided a requested record and concluded that the remaining records were electronic kites. Relator then made subsequent requests. The DRC denied the requests and ultimately gave Relator a formal directive to stop the repetitive requests. Relator then filed his mandamus complaint. The Supreme Court denied the writ and awarded Relator $1,000 in statutory damages, holding (1) Relator's requests for the kites were moot because the DRC provided all the requested kites; and (2) Relator was entitled to statutory damages. View "State ex rel. Straughter v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

Alexander Nelson appealed a district court judgment affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking his driving privileges for two years. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded there was not a valid request to submit to a screening test in accordance with N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(3) to support a determination of refusal to submit to testing under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14. The Court therefore reversed the district court judgment and the Department’s decision and remanded to reinstate Nelson’s driving privileges. View "Nelson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

On April 7, 2020, Matthew Wallace was hired by the Centreville Police Department, located in the Town of Centreville, Mississippi. In 2021, Wallace was dispatched with a Town of Centreville certified police officer, to a scene involving multiple juveniles riding all-terrain vehicles in the town limits. An altercation occurred; at some point during the altercation, Wallace went to the patrol unit to retrieve the police-issued pepper spray. Upon returning to the scene, Wallace released the pepper spray. Sometime following the incident, one of the juveniles and his mother filed charges against Wallace for simple assault on a minor. The issue presented for the Mississippi Supreme Court's review centered around a probable cause hearing pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28. Before the hearing, the State petitioned the circuit court to determine whether Wallace was entitled to a probable cause hearing, alleging Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer. At the hearing, the circuit determined that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing. Wallace moved the circuit court for a probable cause hearing for the same underlying incident. The circuit court denied the motion, finding, again, that Wallace was not a sworn law enforcement officer and, therefore, was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28. Wallace appealed. The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer who is not certified pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 45-6-11(3)(a) is not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Mississippi Code Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i). Further, the Court held Wallace was not entitled to a probable cause hearing under Section 99-3-28(1)(a)(i) because he was not a law enforcement officer as defined by Mississippi Code Section 45-6-3(c). View "Wallace v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relator compelling the clerk of the Circleville Municipal Court, Charma Cantrell, to comply fully with a public-records request Relator sent Cantrell under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B), holding that Relator was entitled to the writ in part.Relator, an inmate, brought this action demanding a writ of mandamus ordering Cantrell either to produce all records responsive to his January 2022 records request or explain why such records would not be produced. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relator was entitled to a writ of mandamus on his request to strike the evidence attached to Cantrell's merit brief because it was untimely submitted; and (2) Relator was not entitled to relief on his remaining arguments. View "State ex rel. Adkins v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Appellant Jose Vellon was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment). A violation of this statute constituted an “ungraded misdemeanor.” Vellon was accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Several months later, police charged Vellon with another DUI. As a result of the Second DUI, the trial court entered an order removing Vellon from ARD. Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs, and in October 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Vellon appealed only his license suspension for the First DUI. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting Section 3806, the General Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-under- the-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses had be considered prior offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at different points in time and had never previously been convicted of DUI. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court and reversed that court’s order. View "Vellon v. Dept of Transportation" on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the determination of the Rhode Island-Sex Offender Board of Review that Petitioner posed a level II, moderate risk of reoffense, holding that the trial justice erred in upholding the Board's classification of petitioner at a level II risk to reoffend.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the State presented a prima facie case sufficient to justify the Board's determination that he posed a level II, moderate risk to reoffend. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment below, holding that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the Board's moderate risk classification. View "State v. Decredico" on Justia Law