Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied a writ of mandamus sought by Relator compelling the clerk of the Circleville Municipal Court, Charma Cantrell, to comply fully with a public-records request Relator sent Cantrell under the Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B), holding that Relator was entitled to the writ in part.Relator, an inmate, brought this action demanding a writ of mandamus ordering Cantrell either to produce all records responsive to his January 2022 records request or explain why such records would not be produced. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relator was entitled to a writ of mandamus on his request to strike the evidence attached to Cantrell's merit brief because it was untimely submitted; and (2) Relator was not entitled to relief on his remaining arguments. View "State ex rel. Adkins v. Cantrell" on Justia Law

In 2013, Sergeant Robert Motyka, a Denver police officer, shot Michael Valdez, who was lying unarmed on the ground and surrendering. In the ensuing lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a jury awarded Valdez $131,000 from Sergeant Motyka for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment1 and $2,400,000 from the City and County of Denver (“Denver”) for failure to train its officers. The district court awarded $1,132,327.40 in attorney fees and $18,199.60 in costs to Valdez’s lawyers. The Tenth Circuit addressed three appeals arising from this litigation. Denver challenged the district court's: (1) denial of its motion for summary judgment; (2) reversal of a discovery order and permission for Valdez to present additional municipal liability theories; and (3) jury instructions on municipal liability. Valdez cross-appealed the district court's grant of qualified immunity to Lieutenant John Macdonald, another Denver police officer who shot at him. And Sergeant Motyka and Denver contend that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs. The Tenth Circuit: (1) affirmed the judgment against Denver; (2) affirmed qualified immunity because Valdez did not show the court erred in this respect; and (3) affirmed the attorney fee award but reversed costs, finding the district court did not explain its award after finding Valdez had not substantiated them. The case was remanded for the district court to reexamine whether costs should be awarded. View "Valdez v. City and County of Denver" on Justia Law

In March 2016, Appellant Jose Vellon was arrested for DUI of alcohol pursuant to Subsection 3802(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1) (general impairment). A violation of this statute constituted an “ungraded misdemeanor.” Vellon was accepted into the Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition (“ARD”) Program. Several months later, police charged Vellon with another DUI. As a result of the Second DUI, the trial court entered an order removing Vellon from ARD. Vellon pleaded guilty to the First and Second DUIs, and in October 2017, he was sentenced on both DUI violations. Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (“PennDOT”) informed Vellon that it would be suspending his driving privileges as a collateral consequence of his DUI convictions pursuant to Section 3804 of the Vehicle Code. Vellon appealed only his license suspension for the First DUI. In this appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that, in drafting Section 3806, the General Assembly intended to mandate that, when a defendant is sentenced for two driving-under- the-influence (“DUI”) offenses on the same day, both offenses had be considered prior offenses to each other with each warranting civil recidivist collateral consequences, despite the facts that the defendant committed the DUI violations at different points in time and had never previously been convicted of DUI. To this, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Commonwealth Court and reversed that court’s order. View "Vellon v. Dept of Transportation" on Justia Law

Sonny Kim Thai appealed a trial court’s order denying his petition for termination from the sex offender registry and ordering he could not file another petition for five years. Thai argued insufficient evidence supported the court’s order and the court abused its discretion because it failed to properly weigh all the factors. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was insufficient evidence and reversed the order. View "California v. Thai" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the determination of the Rhode Island-Sex Offender Board of Review that Petitioner posed a level II, moderate risk of reoffense, holding that the trial justice erred in upholding the Board's classification of petitioner at a level II risk to reoffend.On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the State presented a prima facie case sufficient to justify the Board's determination that he posed a level II, moderate risk to reoffend. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the judgment below, holding that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the Board's moderate risk classification. View "State v. Decredico" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments of probation entered in separate superior court cases stemming from the same adjudication, holding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.After a hearing, the hearing justice found that Defendant had violated the terms of his probation in two cases and removed three and a half years suspension on each sentence in those cases. On appeal, Defendant argued that the State did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms and conditions of his probation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation. View "Carver v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court remanded this matter to the Commissioner of Correction in this appeal from the denial of medical parole, holding that the Commissioner's decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was made without the benefit of a standardized risk assessment required by Title 501 Code Mass. Regs. 17.02.Appellant, a sixty-six-year-old man serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole in connection with his first-degree murder conviction, petitioned for medical parole under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A arguing that he was permanently incapacitated and unlikely to return to violating the law if released. The Commissioner denied the request, determining that there was not a "significant and material" change in Plaintiff's circumstances. Plaintiff then commenced this action pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 249, 4. A superior court denied the motion, finding that the Commissioner's decision was reasonable. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding that the Commissioner's decision to deny Plaintiff medical parole was erroneous because a risk assessment was not conducted on him. View "McCauley v. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Norfolk" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's complaint for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Pickaway Correctional Institution (PCI), where Appellant was an inmate, and denied Appellant's motion to supplement his merit brief with additional documents, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.According to Appellant, he was indicted in Franklin County for a crime that was committed in Fairfield County. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that Franklin County lacked venue or subject-matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's petition failed to state a claim that is cognizable in habeas corpus. View "State ex rel. Norman v. Collins" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Pavan Parikh to provide copies of three oaths of office and various court records from a 2001 case and awards of statutory damages and costs, holding that Relator was entitled to mandamus in part.Relator, an inmate, sent a public records request requesting three judges' oaths of office and documents from a case filed in 2001. When the clerk of courts did not respond to the public-records request Relator filed this action. The Supreme Court granted relief in part, holding (1) Relator used the incorrect vehicle for requesting copies of the oaths of office; and (2) the clerk did not meet his burden to show that Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(B)(8) foreclosed Relator's right to receive the second portion of his records request. View "State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh" on Justia Law

Appellant California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) appealed from a judgment granting Plaintiff’s petition for writ of mandate (judgment). DMV contends the issues presented on appeal are whether the trial court erred in overturning the suspension of Plaintiff’s driver’s license (1) “by applying [former] Government Code section 11440.30.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the “Judgment Granting Petition For Writ Of Mandate And Awarding Costs And Attorney Fees To Petitioner” and remanded the cause to the court below, with directions to modify the judgment to provide that the matter shall thereafter be remanded to the DMV for further proceedings. The court concluded that former Government Code section 11440.30 was applicable to Plaintiff’s DMV driver’s license suspension hearing. Said former statute is fully consistent with other relevant statutes, including, without limitation, Vehicle Code sections 14100 through 14112 and Government Code section 11501. Further, the court concluded that both CCR section 115.07 and former Government Code section 11440.30 were mandatory and not merely directory. Moreover, substantial evidence supports an implied finding that Plaintiff was prejudiced by DMV’s failure to adhere to former government code section 11440.30. View "Ramirez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law