Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that an investigating officer had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the police department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the release of the dishonesty records but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The trial court's protective order restricted the defense from sharing the records outside the defense team. The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate this protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The Court of Appeal initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the records of the officer's sustained finding of dishonesty were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for these records, as they were not confidential. Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer's dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Thomas Swinford was shot and killed by Athens-Clarke County police officers after he refused to drop a gun and instead raised and pointed it at the officers. His widow, Jayne Swinford, filed a lawsuit in Georgia state court alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia’s wrongful death statute against seven officers, the police chief, and the county government. The case was removed to federal court.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on qualified and official immunity grounds, relying on body camera footage showing the events leading up to the shooting. The district court considered the footage and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the officers acted reasonably and did not violate Thomas’s constitutional rights. The court also denied Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that the district court properly considered the body camera footage under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The footage showed that the officers had probable cause to believe Thomas posed a serious threat when he raised his gun at them, justifying their use of deadly force. The court found that the officers did not use excessive force and were entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the supervisory liability claim against the police chief and the Monell claim against the county also failed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders, including the denial of Mrs. Swinford’s motion to amend her complaint and her motion for reconsideration. View "Swinford v. Santos" on Justia Law

Adrian Renee Soliz was found unconscious behind the wheel of his vehicle, which was impeding traffic. Concerned, a passerby called 9-1-1, and emergency responders arrived at the scene. They discovered drug paraphernalia on Soliz's lap while providing medical assistance for what was later confirmed to be a drug overdose. Soliz was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and other related offenses.Soliz filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that under Idaho’s overdose immunity statute (Idaho Code section 37-2739C(2)), he should be immune from prosecution because the evidence was obtained as a result of his medical emergency. The State opposed the motion, contending that the evidence was discovered during a traffic investigation, not solely due to the medical emergency. The district court denied Soliz’s motion, concluding that the evidence was not obtained solely as a result of the medical emergency.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Court held that the phrase “as a result of” in the overdose immunity statute means that the drug-related medical emergency must be the sole cause of the discovery of evidence. Since the evidence was discovered during both a traffic investigation and a medical emergency response, the statute did not apply. Therefore, Soliz was not entitled to immunity, and the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss was upheld. View "State v. Soliz" on Justia Law

The case involves Amaka Oji and Oji Fit World, LLC (OFW), who were approved as Medicaid providers by the D.C. Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF) in 2011. Between 2012 and 2015, they submitted over 24,000 claims for reimbursement for wellness services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. Investigations by DHCF, the Office of the Inspector General for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the FBI revealed that Oji and OFW regularly overbilled Medicaid, often charging for a full hour of service regardless of the actual time spent or whether the service was provided at all.The District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in April 2021 under the D.C. False Claims Act and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding that Oji and OFW had submitted false claims and falsified records. The court awarded the District $1,001,362.50 in treble damages and $497,000 in civil penalties. Oji and OFW's various procedural defenses, including claims of laches and statute of limitations, were deemed waived due to their failure to raise them in a timely manner.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment order. However, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the damages and penalties. The appellate court found that the Superior Court had not provided sufficient explanation or analysis for the awarded amounts, making it difficult to review the decision. The appellate court emphasized the need for the trial court to explain its reasoning in detail to permit adequate appellate review. View "Oji Fit World, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucas Sirois and Alisa Sirois, who were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting them, arguing that their conduct was in substantial compliance with the Maine Medical Use of Cannabis Act, which allows for the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana under state law. The defendants claimed that the DOJ's prosecution violated the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prohibits the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied the defendants' request for injunctive relief. The court held a hearing where the government presented evidence that the defendants' operations, particularly a grow operation known as the "Shoe Shop," violated Maine's medical marijuana laws by operating as a collective and engaging in black-market sales. The court found that the government had met its burden of production, showing a substantial evidentiary basis for the prosecution. However, the defendants failed to meet their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the prosecution lacked a substantial evidentiary basis or was arbitrary or irrational.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in substantial compliance with Maine's medical marijuana laws. The court noted significant evidence that the Shoe Shop operated as a collective and that Lucas Sirois engaged in black-market sales. The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the DOJ's prosecution would prevent Maine from giving practical effect to its medical marijuana laws, as required under the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. Therefore, the denial of the motion to enjoin the prosecution was affirmed. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

Kenneth Bryan Ritchey, the defendant, operated Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, LLC, a wholesale distributor of pharmaceutical products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ritchey directed his employees to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE) and resell them at inflated prices to various healthcare providers, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA was charged significantly higher prices than the market value, resulting in Ritchey and his company receiving over $2 million, including more than $270,000 from the VA.Ritchey was charged with six counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi calculated Ritchey’s offense level based on the estimated pecuniary loss caused by his actions, which included a significant enhancement for the amount of loss. The court determined the fair market value (FMV) of the PPE based on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, leading to a higher offense level and a 60-month prison sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in calculating the FMV by relying on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, which did not reflect the actual market conditions during the pandemic. The appellate court held that the district court’s method of determining the FMV was not based on a realistic economic approach. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Ritchey’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need for a more accurate calculation of the FMV that reflects the market conditions at the time of the transactions. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

A senior trooper with the Louisiana State Police (LSP), August McKay, committed suicide at his home after learning he was being reassigned and that a search warrant was to be executed on his residence. His widow, Brandy McKay, sued several LSP officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law, alleging their actions contributed to his death. The district court denied qualified immunity to two officers, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially dismissed Brandy’s Eighth Amendment claim but allowed her to amend her complaint. She then limited her claims to the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws. The district court found that Brandy had sufficiently stated § 1983 claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix, concluding they had subjective knowledge of August’s suicide risk and responded with deliberate indifference. The court dismissed the claims against other defendants and allowed the state law claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional duty to protect August from self-harm, as he was not in state custody or otherwise restrained. The court emphasized that the officers did not attempt to arrest or confine August, and Brandy’s complaint focused on their failure to restrain him. Without a constitutional duty, there could be no violation, and thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal concerning the state law claims without prejudice, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "McKay v. LaCroix" on Justia Law

Kavonte Amarion Vaughn sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his request for mental health diversion under California Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Vaughn was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree attempted robbery. The trial court found that Vaughn met the eligibility and suitability requirements for mental health diversion, including that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. However, the court denied the diversion, citing Vaughn's failure to make a "serious enough effort" to be deemed suitable for mental health diversion.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case. Vaughn posted bail and underwent a psychological evaluation, which confirmed his mental health issues, including schizoaffective disorder and PTSD. Despite the trial court's acknowledgment of Vaughn's eligibility, it denied the motion for diversion, focusing on Vaughn's perceived lack of seriousness about his mental health treatment, particularly his failure to bring his medication bottles to the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the legislative goals of the mental health diversion law. The appellate court noted that Vaughn had made a prima facie showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion and that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court's discretion must align with the legislative intent to broadly apply mental health diversion to reduce recidivism and support public safety.The appellate court granted Vaughn's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and to grant the motion, barring any evidence of changed circumstances affecting Vaughn's suitability. The trial court must ensure that the recommended mental health treatment program meets Vaughn's specialized needs. View "Vaughn v. Superior Court" on Justia Law