Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Theopalis Gregory, a former City of Wilmington Council President and Delaware lawyer, was convicted by jury for official misconduct. The charges stemmed from a $40,000 discretionary grant Gregory earmarked for his non-profit organization before leaving office. He personally received at least $15,000 of the grant after he left office. On appeal, Gregory argued the jury instructions were flawed because the trial judge did not define for the jury “official functions,” a necessary element of an official-misconduct conviction. He also argued that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction because he was not performing official functions when he earmarked funds for his nonprofit. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Gregory’s conviction: Gregory did not object to the jury instructions, and the trial judge did not plainly err when he instructed the jury using the words of the statute. Further, the Court was satisfied that the jury had more than sufficient evidence to find that Gregory was performing official functions when he earmarked the $40,000. View "Gregory v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirming the order of the circuit court granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Hawai'i Criminal Justice Data Center (HCJDC) and dismissing Phillip Barker's action seeking to require the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record, holding that the ICA gravely erred.Barker, who was convicted of disorderly conduct as a violation, applied for expungement of his arrest, asserting that because Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) provides that a violation does not constitute a crime, he was entitled to expungement pursuant to Haw. Rev. Stat. 831-3.2. The HCJDC denied the application, concluding that Barker had been convicted of a "crime" within the meaning of section 831-3.2(a). The circuit court denied Barker's request for an order requiring the HCJDC to expunge his arrest record. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the judgments below, holding that under the plain language of Haw. Rev. Stat. 701-107(7) and §§ 831-3.2(a), a person arrested for or charged with a crime, including a petty misdemeanor, but convicted of a violation is eligible for expungement because a “violation” is not a “crime.” View "Barker v. Young" on Justia Law

Brian Sternberg appealed a district court order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. In 1992, Sternberg was convicted of corruption of a minor. He was incarcerated in late 1993 and remained on probation until January 1994. In 2000, the State charged Sternberg with committing three or more sexual acts with a child who was then his stepdaughter and under the age of fifteen. Sternberg was charged with one class A felony and five class C felonies. He also has convictions involving deceitful behavior, including financial fraud and bad checks. The court sentenced him to incarceration from October 2000 to February 2021. Peter Byrne, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who conducted Sternberg’s evaluation, testified that there was no record of Sternberg’s having undergone treatment to deal with his “sexual interest or arousal to children” and reported that at the end of treatment it was recommended Sternberg continue sexual offender specific treatment. Sternberg has both pedophilic and antisocial personality disorders, which predisposed him to intense sexual fantasies and urges and to disregard “the rights and wishes of others.” The district court held a commitment hearing and granted the State’s petition for civil commitment. The court reported that its biggest concern with releasing Sternberg is that he has been living in a supervised environment while incarcerated and “[i]mmediate release into the community without support or supervision would ‘very likely result in a serious difficulty controlling his behaviors.’” On appeal, Sternberg argues the district court erred in finding the State had met its burden in proving that he is likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and that he has serious difficulty in controlling behavior. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the trial court record did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that Sternberg presently had a serious difficulty controlling behavior. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Interest of Sternberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. Section 552, seeking documents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) related to himself, speculating that they might include exculpatory information that the government had not disclosed in his recent criminal trial. The government produced sets of responsive documents and an index detailing FOIA exemptions under which it withheld other responsive documents, and the district court granted summary judgment for the government. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling granting summary judgment to the United States Department of Justice.   On appeal, Plaintiff argued (1) that summary judgment was improperly granted because his FOIA action is an effort to vindicate his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and (2) that, in the alternative, the district court erred in not conducting an in-camera inspection of withheld documents. The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in Brown v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 658 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 1981), FOIA and the criminal discovery process provide distinct tracks for seeking disclosure from the government. That a FOIA action might lead to the discovery of documents useful to a particular criminal defendant changes neither the government’s statutorily defined obligations under FOIA nor the government’s burden at summary judgment. View "Jabar v. U.S. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed a judgment of the district court committing him to the custody of the Attorney General for medical care and treatment under 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. The court found that Defendant presently suffered from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release from custody posed a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the findings underlying the commitment were not clearly erroneous. The court explained that the district court’s finding that Defendant posed a substantial risk to persons or property was adequately supported in the record. The court relied on the unanimous recommendation of the experts. The experts observed that the most reliable predictor of future violence is past violence, and they detailed Defendant’s history of random and unpredictable violent actions. The court further found that the parties have not made a sufficient showing to justify sealing the briefs in this appeal. View "United States v. Dewayne Gray" on Justia Law

Suspecting that Troconis-Escovar was involved in the illegal drug business, the DEA searched his vehicle. Agents found $146,000 in cash, which they believed represented drug proceeds. DEA notified Troconis-Escovar that it intended to effect an administrative forfeiture of the funds (to declare them to be government property). Illegal drug proceeds are eligible for civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(6), subject to the procedural safeguards of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 983. Troconis-Escovar’s attorney tried to contest the forfeiture, but filed the wrong form—a “petition for remission” rather than a “claim.” Only a claim may be used to challenge a proposed forfeiture. After the mistake was discovered, DEA gave Troconis-Escovar an extra 30 days to supplement his petition for remission. Troconis-Escovar did not do so and lost the money. He filed a Motion for the Return of Property under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g).The district court dismissed his lawsuit, finding that it lacked jurisdiction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The dismissal was correct, but not because jurisdiction was lacking. Troconis-Escovar does not explain why he should be able to obtain relief outside section 983 when Congress expressly conditioned relief from civil forfeiture on circumstances that do not apply to him. He did not explain his argument about the untimeliness or sufficiency of the DEA’s notice. View "Troconis-Escovar v. United States" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the circuit court denying Appellants' petitions for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry, holding that the circuit court did not err.Appellants Brock Smith and Gary Ford separately appealed two circuit court judgments denying their separately-filed petitions for removal from the Missouri sex offender registry. Smith argued that because he was a tier I sex offender, Mo. Rev. Stat. 589.400.1(7) did not mandate that he remain on the registry for his lifetime. Ford argued that the lower court misstated and misapplied the law in denying his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed in both cases, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Appellants were not entitled to removal from the Missouri sex offender registry. View "Smith v. St. Louis County Police" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this complaint brought by Plaintiff, an inmate in the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services system, against the Department and several of its officials (collectively, DCS) under 42 U.S. 1983 and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) regarding Plaintiff's tentative release date, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff sued DCS under section 1983 and the APA, alleging that DCS violated both his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have his "sentence determined consistent with the statutes and case law of Nebraska." DCS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the entire was barred by claim preclusion. The district court agreed with DCS and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's action with prejudice; and (2) did not err in not granting Plaintiff leave to amend. View "Schaeffer v. Frakes" on Justia Law

In September 2013, defendant Deje Coviello was found unconscious in the driver’s seat of a parked car with the engine running and with several open containers of alcoholic beverages on the passenger seat. She was arrested and pled guilty to disorderly conduct and driving while intoxicated (DWI). On the disorderly conduct count, a Criminal Part judge sentenced defendant to one year of probation, a suspended eight-day jail term, and a monetary penalty. For the DWI conviction, her second, defendant she was sentenced to a two-year period of driver’s license forfeiture and, among other things, a two-year period of breath alcohol IID installation to commence after completion of the license forfeiture. Defendant never installed an IID. Defendant maintained she did not do so because she could not afford to buy or lease a car and had no access to drive another person’s vehicle. Defendant sought credit on her sentence: she fulfilled her entire sentence except for the IID requirement. The Criminal Part judge denied her motion, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear defendant’s application for relief from the IID requirement and that the MVC was the appropriate forum in which to seek that sentencing relief. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that defendant’s requested modification of the IID requirement was not “a sentencing issue,” but rather an “administrative” matter for the MVC. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed: the sentencing court, and not the MVC, had the appropriate jurisdiction over defendant’s motion for sentencing credit concerning the IID requirement. View "New Jersey v. Coviello" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are U.S. service members wounded in terrorist attacks in Iraq and the families and estates of service members killed in such attacks. They appealed from the dismissal of their claims under the Antiterrorism Act (the “ATA”) as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (the “JASTA”), against various financial institutions in the United States and abroad (the “Banks”). As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs alleged that the Banks conspired with and aided and abetted Iranian entities to circumvent sanctions imposed by the United States and channel funds to terrorist groups that killed or injured U.S. service members. The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims primarily because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead a direct connection between the Banks and the terrorist groups. The district court also declined to consider Plaintiffs’ JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims because they were raised for the first time in Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.   The Second Circuit explained that while it disagreed with the district court’s primary reason for dismissing Plaintiffs’ JASTA conspiracy claims, it affirmed the district court’s judgment because Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege that the Banks conspired – either directly or indirectly – with the terrorist groups, or that the terrorist attacks that killed or injured the service members were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to circumvent U.S. sanctions. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs forfeited their JASTA aiding-and-abetting claims by raising them for the first time in a motion for reconsideration. View "Freeman v. HSBC Holdings PLC" on Justia Law