Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether the suspension of petitioner’s driver’s license for refusing a breath test was valid when, in addition to providing petitioner with the statutorily required information regarding rights and consequences, the arresting officer also told petitioner that she would seek a search warrant for a blood draw if petitioner refused the test. The Department of Transportation, Driver and Motor Vehicle Services Division (DMV) suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, but, after petitioner sought judicial review from the circuit court, the circuit court set aside that suspension, a decision that the Court of Appeals later affirmed. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that DMV properly suspended petitioner’s driving privileges, therefore reversing the Court of Appeals’ and the circuit court’s judgments. View "Murdoch v. DMV" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Appellant's petition was moot.Appellant pleaded no contest to several drug-related offenses and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that sentencing errors entitled him to immediate release. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a valid claim in relief. After he appealed, Appellant was released from prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' dismissal of the action, holding that Appellant's release from incarceration meant that his habeas claim was moot. View "State ex rel. Johnson v. Foley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed as moot Appellant's appeal from a judgment of the county court denying, without a hearing, Appellant's petition for extraordinary relief, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion by denying relief.In his petition, Appellant sought relief in the nature of mandamus compelling the Department of Correction to prepare a medical parole plan in connection with his application for medical parole. After Appellant submitted his petition his request for medical parole was denied. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Appellant's appeal from the judgment of the county court denying the petition, holding that the litigation was considered moot. View "Troila v. Department of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court dismissing Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the superior court dismissing Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Practice Book section 23-29 requires the habeas court to provide prior notice of the court’s intention to dismiss, on its own motion, a petition that it deems legally deficient and an opportunity to be heard on the papers by filing a written response.Acting on its own motion and without prior notice, the habeas court dismissed Petitioner's habeas petition as repetitious under section 23-29(3). The appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a dismissal under section 23-29, which occurs after the writ has issued and the action has commenced, requires some procedural safeguards, including prior notice and an opportunity to submit a written response, but not a full hearing; and (2) on remand, if the writ is issued, and the habeas court again dismisses Petitioner's habeas petition on its own motion pursuant to section 23-29, it must provider Petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to submit a brief or written response to the proposed basis for dismissal. View "Brown v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, __ A.3d __ (2022), which the Court also decided today, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the habeas court dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Practice Book 23-29 sua sponte and without prior notice, holding that remand was required.Petitioner filed a third petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting four claims. The habeas court, sua sponte and without prior notice, dismissed the petition pursuant to Practice Book 23-29. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the habeas court did not have the benefit of the Court's decision in Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction, 223 A.3d 368 (Conn. 2020), remand was required for the habeas court to first determine whether any grounds exist for it to decline to issue the writ pursuant to Practice Book 23-24. View "Boria v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

Respondents are a group of college students, all of which face criminal charges for marching though San Luis Obispo in the wake of the murder of George Floyd. Respondents sought recusal of the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office on the basis that the District Attorney had a well-publicized association with critics of the Black Lives Matter movement. The trial court granted respondents' motion, appointing the Attorney General to the case, and the District Attorney and Attorney General appealed.On appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. Based on social media posts, public statements and targeted fundraising appeal to undermine the Black Lives Matter movement, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s determination that the San Luis Obisbo District Attorney's Office was not likely to treat respondents fairly. View "P. v. Lastra" on Justia Law

In 1993, Kastman was charged with misdemeanor offenses based on acts of public indecency involving children and disorderly conduct. The state’s attorney initiated a civil commitment proceeding against Kastman under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (725 ILCS 205/0.01). Evidence indicated that Kastman suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, exhibitionism, and alcohol dependency. Kastman was found to be a sexually dangerous person, and the circuit court granted the petition. In 2016, Kastman was granted conditional release from institutional care.In 2020, he sought financial assistance. Kastman asserted that he was unemployed, disabled, and could not afford his $300 monthly treatment costs and the $1800 monthly rent for housing that complied with the Sex Offender Registration Act. The circuit court of Lake County ordered the Department of Corrections to pay a portion of Kastman’s monthly expenses. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The statutes indicate that a sex offender’s ability to pay is a relevant consideration in deciding who should bear the expense of treatment costs; without a clear statutory directive, the legislature is not presumed to have intended that only financially stable individuals are eligible for conditional release. Financial instability and the need for supervision to protect the public are not the same things. View "People v. Kastman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus ordering the Mahoning County Board of Elections to place Eric Ungaro's name on the November 2022 general election ballot as an independent candidate for the office of state representative, holding that Ungaro successfully established that he was entitled to the writ.Ungaro filed a statement of candidacy and nominating petition to run as an independent candidate for the office of state representative of the 59th Ohio House District in the November 2022 general election. The Board rejected the petition by a vote of three to one. Ungaro then filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering the Board to place his name on the ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board abused its discretion by invalidating Ungaro's petition in an arbitrary fashion. View "State ex rel. Ungaro v. Mahoning County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the parole board as to Plaintiff's appeal from the board's fourth denial of his request for parole, holding that the superior court correctly affirmed the board's decision to deny Plaintiff release on parole.After a retrial, Plaintiff was convicted of rape and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon for crimes he committed when he was sixteen years old. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. In denying Plaintiff's fourth request for parole, the board concluded that he was not yet rehabilitated and that his release was not compatible with the welfare of society. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief as to any of his arguments on appeal. View "Rodriguez v. Mass. Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) allows some inmates to serve a portion of their prison sentence outside a correctional facility while wearing electronic monitoring equipment. This case presented a jurisdictional question for the Alaska Supreme Court's review: did the superior court have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of DOC’s decision to remove an inmate from electronic monitoring and return the inmate to prison? Within that jurisdictional question iwass a more fundamental question: was DOC’s decision subject to the constitutional guarantee that “[n]o person shall be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law?” The Supreme Court held that due process applied. Although the Court rejected the argument that removal from electronic monitoring and remand to prison implicated the constitutional right to rehabilitation, the Court concluded that serving a sentence on electronic monitoring afforded a limited but constitutionally protected degree of liberty, akin to parole. Nevertheless, the Court held that the superior court did not have appellate jurisdiction to review DOC’s decision in this case. "Appellate review of an agency’s decision is possible only when the decision is the product of an adjudicative process in which evidence is produced, law is applied, and an adequate record is made. DOC’s decisional process in this case was not an adjudicative process and did not create a record that permits appellate review." The case was remanded to the superior court to convert this case from an appeal to a civil action so that the parties could create the record necessary for judicial review of DOC's decision. View "Alaska Department of Corrections v. Stefano" on Justia Law