Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and ordered to pay restitution. The district court granted the Government’s application for writs of garnishment seeking access to Defendant’s 401(k) retirement accounts. Defendant appealed. 
 The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes garnishment of Defendant’s 401(k) retirement funds. The court remanded to the district court, however, to determine whether the ten-percent early withdrawal tax will be imposed upon garnishment, limiting the Government’s access to Defendant’s retirement funds. The court also held that the Consumer Credit Protection Act’s 25-percent cap on garnishments does not apply to limit the Government’s garnishment. View "United States v. Greebel" on Justia Law

Nine Illinois energy consumers sued their electricity provider, ComEd, and its parent, Exelon, on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated for damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging injury from increased electricity rates. These rates increased, they allege, because ComEd bribed former Illinois Speaker of the House Michael Madigan to shepherd three bills through the state’s legislature: the Energy Infrastructure and Modernization Act of 2011 (EIMA); 2013 amendments to that legislation; and the Future Energy Jobs Act of 2016. Although Illinois law still required public utilities to file rates with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC), EIMA implemented statutorily prescribed, performance-based rate increases that limited ICC discretion in reviewing rates and authorized at least $2.6 billion in ComEd spending on smart meters and smart grid infrastructure, costs that were required to be passed on to customers. In 2016, FEJA provided $2.35 billion in funding for nuclear power plants operated, paid for through a new fee for utility customers, and allowed ComEd to charge ratepayers for all energy efficiency programs and for some expenses relating to employee incentive compensation, pensions, and other post-employment benefits.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Paying a state’s required filed utility rate is not a cognizable injury for a RICO damages claim. View "Brooks v. Commonwealth Edison Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this immigration case to the Boards of Immigration Appeals (BIA) after it affirmed an immigration judge's (IJ) decision to deny Petitioner's applications for relief from removal based on two marijuana offenses found by the IJ and the BIA to be "particularly serious" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), holding that remand was required.The IJ found Petitioner removable based on two Massachusetts state court convictions involving marijuana. The BIA upheld the IJ's determination that Petitioner was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal for having been convicted of a particularly serious crime. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for review, holding that there was not a sufficient rational explanation to explain the BIA's conclusion that Petitioner's minor marijuana offenses were particularly serious crimes and that remand was required. View "Dor v. Garland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of mandamus against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Annette Chambers-Smith, the Ohio Adult Parole Authority, and the Ohio Bureau of Sentencing Computation (collectively, DRC), holding that there was no error.Appellant, an inmate, filed an original action in the court of appeal seeking a writ of mandamus to compel DRC to correct what he alleged were inaccurate records pertaining to him and alleging that he had a right to be released from custody under Ohio Rev. Code 2967.15(B). The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to show error, let alone plain error, in the judgment of the court of appeals. View "State ex rel. Anderson v. Chambers-Smith" on Justia Law

A DEA task force investigated Jacobs, a Kentucky drug dealer. Jacobs sold drugs to a couple who allegedly were “good friends” with the local Commonwealth Attorney (CA). After Jacobs' arrest on state drug-trafficking charges, the couple had extensive conversations with the CA. After one conversation, an assistant state prosecutor requested Jacobs’s cell phone records from the task force, alerting the DEA to the CA’s relationship with Jacobs’s customers. The CA became involved in the case in other ways, impeding Jacobs’ use as a cooperating witness in other federal investigations by opposing a bond reduction and refusing to seek a state search warrant for an unrelated case if the DEA agent from the Jacobs investigation was involved. The DEA began investigating the CA’s conduct, “Operation Speakeasy.” Evidence was presented to the U.S. Attorney, who refused to bring obstruction charges against the CA.A Cincinnati Enquirer reporter filed a Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 request with the DEA, seeking any document related to the Jacobs investigation or Operation Speakeasy. The DEA denied that request, citing an exception for “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes,” disclosure of which “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Enquirer’s suit. The documents “only minimally advance[d] a public interest in shedding light on the decision” to not prosecute the CA and “significant privacy interests outweigh[ed] the proffered public interest.” View "Cincinnati Enquirer v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

The State petitioned to commit Nicholas Needham California under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA). Preparing for trial on the petition, the district attorney retained a psychological expert to evaluate Needham and testify at trial that he qualified as an SVP. Needham moved to exclude the expert’s testimony at trial, but the trial court denied his motion. Needham appealed, seeking a declaration that the SVPA did not permit the State to call a privately retained expert to testify at trial. The Court of Appeal granted relief: “[G]iven the obvious dangers to essential liberty interests inherent in the SVPA, it must be carefully implemented and applied only where there is a high degree of certainty that it is warranted.” The Court found the statutory scheme deliberately limited when an SVP petition could be filed and brought to trial, as well as the evidence available to the prosecution. In light of this system, the Court concluded the expert-witness provisions of the Civil Discovery Act did not apply and that the State had no right to retain an expert witness to testify at trial. View "Needham v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner F.E.D., seventy-three years old, was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and would not be eligible for parole until 2040. In February 2021, the Managing Physician of the New Jersey Department of Corrections submitted to the Commissioner of Corrections a Request for Compassionate Release on behalf of F.E.D. Based on the diagnoses provided by the attesting physicians, the Managing Physician found that F.E.D. “meets the medical conditions established” by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(1), the Commissioner issued a Certificate of Eligibility for Compassionate Release. A trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion. With regard to whether F.E.D. suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(1), the trial court relied on the list of “activities of daily living” enumerated in the administration of New Jersey’s Medicaid program, which the court identified to be bathing, dressing, toileting, locomotion, transfers, eating and bed mobility. Applying that standard to the medical diagnoses presented in F.E.D.’s petition for compassionate release, the trial court observed that the attesting physicians had found a diminished ability in instrumental activities of daily living but not an inability to perform activities of basic daily living. The court accordingly found that F.E.D. had not presented clear and convincing evidence that he suffered from a “permanent physical incapacity” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(1). The Appellate Division found that the Certificate of Eligibility for compassionate release that the Department issued to F.E.D. was invalid based on its view that the Compassionate Release Statute applied only to inmates whose medical conditions rendered them unable to perform any of the activities of basic daily living, and to be inapplicable to any inmate who could conduct one or more of those activities. The New Jersey Supreme Court found that the Compassionate Release Statute did not require that an inmate prove that he is unable to perform any activity of basic daily living in order to establish a “permanent physical incapacity” under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(l). Rather, the statute required clear and convincing evidence that the inmate’s condition rendered him permanently unable to perform two or more activities of basic daily living, necessitating twenty-four-hour care. Assessing F.E.D.’s proofs in accordance with the statutory standard, the Supreme Court found he did not present clear and convincing evidence that his medical condition gave rise to a permanent physical incapacity under N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(1). View "New Jersey v. F.E.D." on Justia Law

Soon after the Mississippi Supreme Court appointed counsel to represent death-row inmate Alberto Garcia in post-conviction proceedings before it challenging his death sentence, the Attorney General preemptively filed in the trial court a “Motion for Notice of and an Opportunity to Be Heard on Requests for Litigation Expenses.” Relying on Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(c)(3), the Attorney General asserted her office was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on Garcia’s requests for litigation expenses. Even though Garcia’s counsel had made no such request, the trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court vacated this ruling: "Under Rule 22(c)(3), the Attorney General is not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard on a request for litigation expenses that was never made—and will never be made—because Garcia’s appointed attorneys are not compensated and reimbursed through court-approved expenses but rather through their state employer. ... So the Attorney General’s request was not only premature; it was inapplicable. Thus, the trial court lacked authority to grant the Attorney General’s motion." View "Garcia v. Mississippi" on Justia Law

After a man was found incompetent to stand trial, and his civil commitment proceeding was dismissed, he stayed in jail for six more years. Plaintiff, the man’s guardian, filed suit against the District Attorney, Sheriffs, and Clay County under Section 1983, challenging the man’s years-long detention.   The district court first dismissed the District Attorney from the case. However, the court determined that the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity on the detention claim because their constitutional violations were obvious. It denied summary judgment to Clay County too, finding that there was strong evidence that the Sheriffs were final policymakers for the county.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Clay County’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the Sheriffs.  The court first held that it lacked jurisdiction over the ruling keeping Clay County in the case. The Court explained that, unlike the Sheriffs, municipalities do not enjoy immunity. Further, the court wrote it did not have pendent party jurisdiction over Clay County. Defendants assume that if Clay County’s liability is “inextricably intertwined” with that of the individual officers, that provides “support [for] pendent appellate jurisdiction.” But the court has never permitted pendent party (as opposed to pendent claim) interlocutory jurisdiction.   Further, taking the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the Sheriffs violated the man’s due process right by detaining him for six years in violation of the commit-or-release rule and the circuit court’s order enforcing that rule. The court explained that it was clearly established that the Sheriffs could be liable for a violation of the man’s clearly established due process right. View "Harris v. Clay County, MS" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing a Department hearing officer’s decision to suspend McKayla Hanson’s driving privileges. Hanson was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Deputy Kyle Haman administered a chemical breath test using the Intoxilyzer 8000. The hearing officer found that Deputy Haman was the field inspector who installed the Intoxilyzer 8000 used in this matter and that he fairly administered the test in accordance with the approved method. The district court reversed the decision, concluding that the evidence did not show “when and if the Intoxilyzer was properly installed” and that the hearing officer abused her discretion in admitting the chemical breath test results. The Department argued on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court that documentation established the Intoxilyzer 8000 was installed by a field inspector before its use, and the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion in admitting the chemical breath test results. To this the Supreme Court concurred, reversed the district court judgment and reinstated the hearing officer’s decision. View "Hanson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law