Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Allinson was convicted of federal programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(2), and conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. 371, in connection with a pay-to-play scheme involving Pawlowski, the former Mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania.The Third Circuit affirmed. Sufficient evidence showed the parties’ plan to steer a Parking Authority contract to Allinson’s law firm in exchange for campaign contributions to support Allinson’s bribery conviction; it is an “official act” for a public official to use his power to influence the awarding of government contracts, even if the official lacks final decision-making power. The court rejected Allinson’s argument that the indictment, which alleged a single conspiracy among Allinson and others, impermissibly varied from the evidence at trial that, he claimed, proved only multiple, unrelated conspiracies. The charged conspiracy included over 10 alleged co-conspirators and seven distinct sub-schemes, only one of which involved Allinson but the government’s efforts at trial were reasonably calculated to prevent guilt transference. No constructive amendment of the indictment occurred. The prosecution’s statement in closing arguments that “Bribery happens with a wink and a nod and sometimes a few words, an understanding between two people,” was not improper. Allinson failed to show “clear and substantial prejudice” resulting from the joint trial. View "United States v. Allinson" on Justia Law

Pawlowski, the former mayor of Allentown, Pennsylvania, was convicted of federal programs bribery, 18 U.S.C. 666; Travel Act bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952; attempted Hobbs Act extortion, 18 U.S.C. 1001; wire and mail fraud, honest services fraud, making false statements to the FBI, and conspiracy. The charges stemmed from a scheme in which Pawlowski steered city contracts and provided other favors in exchange for campaign contributions. The district court imposed a 180-month sentence.The Third Circuit affirmed. There was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find “quid pro quo” to support the bribery convictions. Any error caused by Pawlowski's inability to recross-examine a government witness was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Pawlowski’s sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The case against Pawlowski was strong. The evidence showed a man eager to influence and be influenced if it would help him fund his political campaigns. View "United States v. Pawlowski" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting a motion to dismiss filed by Appellees - Arkansas Parole Board, John Felts, and Andy Shock - in Appellant's action filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Ark. Code Ann. 25-15-201 through 25-15-220, holding that Appellant failed to state a sufficient basis for judicial review under the APA.Appellant pleaded guilty to the sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old and was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Years later, the parole board denied Appellant parole for a two-year period of time. Appellant filed a petition for judicial review from the denial of his parole under the APA, alleging that Appellees failed to adhere to parole statutes and the APA, in violation of his due process rights. The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Appellant's complaint for failing to state a claim for relief pursuant to the APA. View "Wood v. Arkansas Parole Board" on Justia Law

Petitioner Joseph Bruyette appealed an April 2021 Department of Corrections ("DOC") declaratory ruling, made after his case staffing in June 2019, in which the DOC stated that it would “continue to rely on evaluations and reports that refer to [an] expunged offense when assessing [an] individual’s risk to make programming, classification and release decisions.” The DOC further stated in its declaratory ruling that it would also “maintain a record of such evaluations and reports to support its decisions . . . until [the individual in question] ha[s] reached their maximum release date whether or not the offense has been expunged.” Petitioner had several felony convictions expunged prior to reclassifications in June and August 2021, and alleged that the declaratory ruling violated Vermont’s expungement statute, 13 V.S.A. 7606. The State argued petitioner lacked standing to bring this case because it did not rely on petitioner's expunged convictions during his final reclassification in August 2021. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that because the disputed facts were vital for consideration of petitioner’s standing, it remanded the case for further development of the record. View "In re Joseph Bruyette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding two officials with the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (hereinafter, MDPHHS) in indirect contempt of referenced orders in the underlying matter and imposing a sanction pending subsequent compliance with the subject orders, holding that the district court erred.The referenced orders at issue directed the Montana State Hospital to accept custody and care of the underlying criminal defendant for fitness rehabilitation pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-14-221(2)-(3) and thus imposing a $500 per-day coercive civil sanction pending future compliance with the orders. The district court adjudicated MDPHHS in indirect contempt for failing to transport the defendant as required and imposed a $500 per-day coercive civil sanction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court's threshold contempt finding and resulting imposition of a coercive civil sanction were both erroneously based on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact; and (2) the court's imposition of a continuing or cascading per-day fine was further erroneous in excess of the limiting language of Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-501(3). View "Fouts v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation acted within the authority provided by Cal. Const. art. I, 32(b) when it adopted regulations prohibiting early parole consideration under the scheme set forth in Proposition 57, The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016, for inmates "currently serving a term of incarceration for a 'violent felony.'"After Petitioner was convicted of nine violent felony counts and six nonviolent felony counts voters approved Proposition 57. The Department subsequently adopted regulations implementing early parole considerations, including the regulations at issue here. Consistent with these regulations, the Department determined that Petitioner was ineligible for nonviolent offender early parole consideration because he was serving a term of incarceration for a violent felony. The court of appeal granted relief, concluding that the language of article I, section 32(a) requires early parole consideration for any inmate convicted of a nonviolent felony even when that inmate was also convicted of a violent felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department acted within its authority provided by article I, section 32(b) when it adopted the regulation at issue. View "In re Mohammad" on Justia Law

Michael Knoke appealed an order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by ordering Knoke’s commitment without determining it he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The Court therefore reversed the commitment order. View "Matter of Knoke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's motion for an award of statutory damages under the Ohio Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Appellant was entitled to statutory damages.Appellant, an inmate, sent a request to the Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory (CPFL) for three categories of public records. When CPFL did not respond to his request, Appellant filed a mandamus action and sought statutory damages under section 149.43(C)(2). The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus compelling the production of some of the requested records and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages. The Supreme Court reversed and granted Appellant's application for an award of statutory damages, holding that, given the length of time during which the CPFL failed to respond, Appellant was entitled to the maximum amount permitted under the statute. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rendered judgment dismissing Petitioner's claims regarding his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), holding that all of Petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law.Following a trial, a jury found that Petitioner was an SVP and issued a civil commitment order placing Petitioner in outpatient treatment and setting forth certain conditions. Petitioner later brought this lawsuit against the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) and the director of the office (collectively, the State), alleging that the TCCO's cost-recovery rules were invalid. The State filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit. The district court dismissed all claims against the State except Petitioner's due process and takings claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that all of Petitioner's claims against the State failed as a matter of law and that the State's plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted in full. View "Matzen v. McLane" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law