Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the decision of the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) suspending Defendant's driver's license and operating privileges pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(e), holding that the OAH reasonably concluded as it did.Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Because a breathalyzer test indicated that Defendant had a blood alcohol concentration greater than .08% the WYDOT suspended Defendant's driver's license. The OAH upheld the suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the OAH's finding that law enforcement did not interfere with Defendant's right to obtain an independent chemical test under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(a)(ii)(C) and 31-6-105(d). View "Flauding v. State ex rel. Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking an injunction halting their execution and a declaration that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's (DRC) written execution protocol was invalid, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs were two condemned inmates who challenged the DRC's written execution protocol setting forth the specific process by which DRC personnel are to carry out death sentences by lethal injection. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued (1) DRC may adopt the execution protocol only by following the procedures for promulgating it as an administrative rule, in accordance with Ohio Rev. Code 111.15(B); and (2) until these procedures were followed, the protocol was invalid and could not be used to carry out death sentences. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the execution protocol was neither a rule having a general and uniform application nor an internal management rule; and (2) therefore, the protocol was not subject to the rule-making requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 111.15. View "O'Neal v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zachary Rose challenged the decision of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) to terminate him from treatment programming without a hearing. He argued his program termination constituted punishment under 28 V.S.A. 851, and therefore required a hearing and due process under section 852. The superior court granted summary judgment to DOC, concluding that the termination was not punishment and that plaintiff’s claim was not reviewable under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that DOC’s decision was reviewable, but on this record, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Rose v. Touchette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that the circuit court improperly dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice.In his petition, Petitioner sought a declaration that his federal supplemental security income was exempt under federal law from paying the required monthly intervention fees to the Missouri Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole, as a condition of his supervised probation. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner's request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication; but (2) because Petitioner may be able to state a claim ripe for adjudication in the future, the circuit court improperly dismissed the claim with prejudice. View "Graves v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dawson, the City Manager of Del Rey Oaks, purchased the Portola lot, “the last vacant lot” in the City. It had a water meter but no water credits and could not be built upon without water credits. The prior owner had never been able to obtain water rights or water credits. The City lacked any water credits and had no surplus water. In 2015, the City leased the Rosita property, part of Work Memorial Park, to Mori for a garden center. Dawson contracted on behalf of the City for a new well on the Rosita property and arranged for the water credit from the Rosita property to be transferred to Dawson’s Portola lot. Dawson never reported his ownership of the Portola lot on his Form 700 disclosure.Dawson was convicted of a felony count of violating Government Code section 10901 (conflict of interest as to a contract entered into in his official capacity) and a misdemeanor count of violating section 91000 (failing to report an interest in real property under the Political Reform Act). The court granted him probation. The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove the inapplicability of an exception to section 1090 “for remote or minimal interests” because it was an affirmative defense; Dawson bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the medical parole scheme set forth in the Medical Parole Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A, authorizing the Commissioner of Correction to grant medical parole to terminally ill or permanently incapacitated prisoners, while delegating to the parole board oversight of a medical parolee's compliance with the conditions of parole imposed, does not offend due process.Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a petition for medical parole after being diagnosed with terminal cancer. Plaintiff was subsequently released on medical parole but later arrested for violating the terms of his release. Plaintiff's parole was later revoked, and the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's second petition for medical parole. Plaintiff then sought release from custody, and a single justice denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court answered reported questions regarding the Medical Parole Act by holding that the statutory and regulatory scheme concerning the revocation of medical parole does not violate a parolee's right to due process. View "Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Public Safety to disqualify Appellant's commercial driver's license (CDL) for one year after he pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) and received a suspended imposition of sentence, holding that the Department properly disqualified Appellant's CDL.On appeal, Appellant argued that the Department violated the doctrine of separation of powers under the state constitution by unconstitutionally infringing upon the judiciary's sentencing authority and that the Department no longer had the statutory authority to disqualify Appellant's CDL once his case was dismissed and discharged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to show that South Dakota's CDL disqualification statutes violate the separation of powers doctrine in article II of the state constitution; and (2) the Department properly considered Appellant's 2016 DUI conviction for the purpose of CDL disqualification under S.D. Codified Laws 32-12A-32. View "Jans v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Commissioner of Correction's exercise of the "commissioner's certification" provision in Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 18(a) to retain K.J. at Bridgewater State Hospital violated article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.K.J., an adult man who faced criminal charges in the district court and the superior court, was committed involuntarily to Bridgewater. The commitment was subsequently extended. This appeal concerned the medical director of Bridgewater's most recent petition to have K.J. again recommitted for one year under section 18(a). The judge found that K.J. did not require strict custody and therefore, as required by section 18(a), issued an order committing K.J. to a lower security Department of Mental Health (DMH) facility. Despite that order, the Commissioner exercised the "commissioner's certification" provision in section 18(a) to retain K.J. at Bridgewater. The Supreme Judicial Court ordered that K.J. be transferred to a DMH facility, holding (1) the commissioner's certification provision of section 18(a) violates article 30; and (2) the remainder of section 18(a) is capable of separation. View "K.J. v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital" on Justia Law

Percoco, a longtime friend and top aide to former Governor Andrew Cuomo, accepted payment in exchange for promising to use his position to perform official actions. For one scheme, Percoco promised to further the interests of an energy company, CPV; for another, Percoco agreed with Aiello to advance the interests of Aiello’s real estate development company. Aiello was convicted of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349. Percoco was convicted of both conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud and solicitation of bribes or gratuities, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). The court had instructed the jury that the quid-pro-quo element of the offenses would be satisfied if Percoco wrongfully “obtained . . . property . . . in exchange [for] official acts as the opportunities arose.”The Second Circuit affirmed. Although the as-opportunities-arise instruction fell short of a recently clarified standard, which requires that the honest-services fraud involve a commitment to take official action on a particular matter or question, that error was harmless. A person who is not technically employed by the government may nevertheless owe a fiduciary duty to the public if he dominates and controls governmental business, and is actually relied on by people in the government because of some special relationship. View "United States v. Percoco" on Justia Law

In 2012, then-Governor Cuomo launched the "Buffalo Billion” initiative to develop the greater Buffalo area through the investment of $1 billion in taxpayer funds. A big-rigging scheme ensued with respect to state-funded projects. Four defendants were convicted of various counts of conspiracy to engage in wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1349, wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and making false statements to federal officers, 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2).The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the charged wire fraud conspiracies, the instructions to the jury regarding the right-to-control theory of wire fraud and the good faith defense, the preclusion of evidence regarding the success of the projects awarded to defendants through the rigged bidding system and the admission of evidence from competitors regarding the range of fees typically charged by other companies in the market, and the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss Gerardi's false statement charge for alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Evidence of actual economic harm is not necessary for conviction in "right-to-control" cases, which require "a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of information that could impact on economic decisions, deprived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information." View "United States v. Percoco et al." on Justia Law