Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Commitment Appeal Panel (CAP) granting Appellant's petition for provisional discharge, holding that the record evidence reasonably supported the CAP's decision that the Commissioner for the Department of Human Services failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the provisional discharge was not appropriate for Appellant under Minn. Stat. 253D.30.Appellant was adjudicated delinquent of multiple sexual offenses against minors and was later convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against a minor. Appellant was indeterminately committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) as a sexually dangerous person and was later transferred to MSOP's Community Preparation Services. Appellant later petitioned for a provisional discharge. The Special Review Board (SRB) recommended that Appellant's request for a provisional discharge be granted and the CAP granted the petition. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the record as a whole reasonably supported the CAP's findings and that the CAP did not clearly err by granting Appellant's petition for provisional discharge. View "In re Civil Commitment of Kenney" on Justia Law

Texas state prisoner Haverkamp, a biological male at birth who identifies as a transgender woman, sued, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause by denying Haverkamp medically necessary sex-reassignment surgery and by failing to provide certain female commissary items and a long-hair pass. Texas’s Correctional Managed Healthcare Committee has a policy concerning the treatment of gender disorders. Based on the state’s advisory, the district court ordered service of Haverkamp’s operative complaint on Dr. Murray, whom the state identified as the proper defendant if Haverkamp were seeking sex-reassignment surgery, and the nine Committee members who had not yet been named as parties. The district court subsequently denied motions to dismiss, concluding that the state was not entitled to sovereign immunity.The Fifth Circuit vacated. Haverkamp’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity because the Committee members are not proper defendants under Ex Parte Young; Haverkamp fails to allege they have the requisite connection to enforcing the policies Haverkamp challenges. In light of the state’s representations to the district court that these defendants are the proper state officials to sue, the court did not dismiss them from the case. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

A member of the Metlakatla Indian Community was convicted of several commercial fishing violations in State waters and fined $20,000. He appealed his conviction and sentence to the court of appeals, which asked the Alaska Supreme Court to take jurisdiction of the appeal because of the importance of the primary issue involved: whether the defendant’s aboriginal and treaty-based fishing rights exempted him from State commercial fishing regulations. The defendant also challenged several evidentiary rulings and the fairness of his sentence. Because the Supreme Court held the State had authority to regulate fishing in State waters in the interests of conservation regardless of the defendant’s claimed fishing rights, and because the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its procedural rulings, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The Court also affirmed the sentence as not clearly mistaken, except for one detail on which the parties agreed: the district court was mistaken to include a probationary term in the sentence. The case was remanded for modification of the judgments to correct that mistake. View "Scudero Jr. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Pioch and co-defendants were convicted based on their scheme to defraud the multimillion-dollar estate of an elderly widower. Pioch was sentenced to 111 months’ imprisonment with a special assessment of $3,700 and restitution of $2,037,783.30. Pioch shares joint-and-several liability with her co-defendants for $1,990,342.76 of the restitution to McLaughlin (victim’s son), under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. 3664(i)). Pioch personally owes the remaining $47,440.54 to the IRS, so she is liable for a total of $2,041,483.30 for the assessment and restitution. The government sought garnishment and, invoking the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 28 U.S.C. 3011(a)), requested a 10% surcharge, $204,148.33.The district court granted the garnishment and surcharge requests. The Sixth Circuit remanded, rejecting Pioch's argument that the surcharge should be calculated based on the “debt” that the government “actually recover[s] through enforcement of a collection remedy” (10% of the $367,681.48 subject to garnishment) and not the total debt resulting from her crimes (10% of the $2,041,483.30 judgment). When the government initiates an FDCPA action to recover debt owed to the United States, the government is entitled to recover a 10% surcharge on the entire outstanding debt; the debt must be paid off before the United States may collect the surcharge, which is added to, not subtracted from, the judgment. View "United States v. Pioch" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court order and a judgment reversing a Department hearing officer’s decision to suspend Yonis Hussiene’s driving privileges for a period of 180 days. Hussiene was stopped by a state trooper for running a red light. Dash camera footage from the trooper's patrol vehicle did not show the traffic light for Hussiene. Rather, it showed only the traffic light across the intersection from the trooper. The footage showd the left turn signal lights for the traffic immediately next to the trooper turning green just as Hussiene left the intersection. After Hussiene was pulled over, the trooper detected an odor of alcohol, and Hussiene acknowledged drinking that night. The trooper administered field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test, and then he arrested Hussiene for driving under the influence. After finding there were sufficient grounds to stop the vehicle and Hussiene refused the chemical breath test, a hearing officer revoked Hussiene’s license for 180 days. Hussiene appealed the hearing officer’s decision to district court, and the court reversed the hearing officer’s decision, concluding, “[T]hat a reasoning mind could not have reasonably determined that Hussiene ran a red light.” The court held, “Hoffner failed to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Hussiene had violated or was about to violate the law.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the district court erred when it determined there was no reasonable and articulable suspicion for the traffic stop. The trooper had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Hussiene for failing to stop at a red light, and the weight of the evidence showed Hussiene refused the chemical breath test. The Court therefore reversed the order and the judgment of the district court and reinstated the hearing officer’s decision. View "Hussiene v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition to proceed in forma pauperis with respect to a petition for writ of certiorari, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner, proceeding pro se, submitted a complaint to the Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission concerning the circuit judge who presided at his criminal trial. Petitioner then tendered a petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record and to review the Commission's disposition of the complaint with the petition to proceed in forma pauperis seeking file the petition for writ of certiorari without remitting the required filing fee. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that where no fundamental right was involved, the filing fees did not violate due process. View "Burnside v. Arkansas Judicial Discipline & Disability Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment of the superior court affirming the decision of the Sex Offender Registry Board denying Doe's motion to vacate her final classification as a level three sex offender, holding that Doe's premature classification violated due process.In 2012, years before her potential release date from prison, Doe was classified as a level three sex offender. She did not challenge the classification at the time. In 2019, Doe moved to vacate the final classification on the grounds that it was premature. The Board denied the motion. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the classification violated due process because it served little to no purpose, posed an unnecessary risk of harm and error and was not justified by the Board's limited interest in finality or administrative efficiency. View "Doe v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

Corley was convicted of three counts of sex trafficking of a minor. Corley subsequently sent Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests concerning his own case. The Department of Justice withheld 323 pages of responsive records, including “the names, descriptions and other personally identifiable information” of Corley’s victims, invoking FOIA Exemption 3, which authorizes withholding of certain materials “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3). The “statute” relied upon was the Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights Act, which restricts disclosure of “information concerning a child [victim or witness],” 18 U.S.C. 3509(d)(1)(A)(i).The D.C. Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the government. The Child Victims’ Act qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute and covers the records Corley seeks. The Act provides that “all employees of the Government” involved in a particular case “shall keep all documents that disclose the name or any other information concerning a child in a secure place” and disclose such documents “only to persons who, by reason of their participation in the proceeding, have reason to know such information.” Corley sought the documents not as a criminal defendant but rather as a member of the public. The protections apply even though the victims are no longer minors. View "Corley v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, All of Us or None–Riverside Chapter (All of Us or None), Jane Roe, and Phyllis McNeal, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside (Riverside Superior Court), and its Executive Officer and Clerk, W. Samuel Hamrick, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly maintained the Riverside Superior Court’s records in criminal cases in various ways. Plaintiffs alleged that these practices invaded their right to privacy as embodied in the California Constitution (fifth cause of action). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and writ of mandate (seventh cause of action) to remedy these violations. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s demurrer and summary judgment rulings. The Court of Appeal agreed with Plaintiffs the trial court erred in its ruling on the first, third, and fifth causes of action; as a result, the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ remedial causes of action for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and injunctive relief (seventh cause of action) were also reversed. The matter was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "All of Us or None etc. v. Hamrick" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of a single justice of the court denying Petitioner's petition filed pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211, 3, holding that the single justice did not err or abuse his discretion in denying relief.Petitioner, an inmate, filed a complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in connection with two Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) standard operating procedures (SOPs) implemented earlier that year. Petitioner also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent DOC from enforcing the SOPs during the pendency of this case. The superior court judge denied Petitioner's injunction request as moot and ordered that judgment enter declaring that implementation of the first SOP violates 103 Code Mass. Regs. 481. Petitioner then filed this petition seeking review of the superior court's judgment and orders. The single justice denied the petition. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner failed to show that review of the trial court decision could not adequately be obtained on appeal or by other available means. View "Wright v. Department of Correction" on Justia Law