Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Michael Knoke appealed an order civilly committing him as a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred by ordering Knoke’s commitment without determining it he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The Court therefore reversed the commitment order. View "Matter of Knoke" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's motion for an award of statutory damages under the Ohio Public Records Act, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43, holding that Appellant was entitled to statutory damages.Appellant, an inmate, sent a request to the Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory (CPFL) for three categories of public records. When CPFL did not respond to his request, Appellant filed a mandamus action and sought statutory damages under section 149.43(C)(2). The court of appeals granted a writ of mandamus compelling the production of some of the requested records and denied Appellant's request for statutory damages. The Supreme Court reversed and granted Appellant's application for an award of statutory damages, holding that, given the length of time during which the CPFL failed to respond, Appellant was entitled to the maximum amount permitted under the statute. View "State ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rendered judgment dismissing Petitioner's claims regarding his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator (SVP), holding that all of Petitioner's claims failed as a matter of law.Following a trial, a jury found that Petitioner was an SVP and issued a civil commitment order placing Petitioner in outpatient treatment and setting forth certain conditions. Petitioner later brought this lawsuit against the Texas Civil Commitment Office (TCCO) and the director of the office (collectively, the State), alleging that the TCCO's cost-recovery rules were invalid. The State filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting immunity from suit. The district court dismissed all claims against the State except Petitioner's due process and takings claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that all of Petitioner's claims against the State failed as a matter of law and that the State's plea to the jurisdiction should have been granted in full. View "Matzen v. McLane" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upholding the decision of the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) suspending Defendant's driver's license and operating privileges pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(e), holding that the OAH reasonably concluded as it did.Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol. Because a breathalyzer test indicated that Defendant had a blood alcohol concentration greater than .08% the WYDOT suspended Defendant's driver's license. The OAH upheld the suspension. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the OAH's finding that law enforcement did not interfere with Defendant's right to obtain an independent chemical test under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 31-6-102(a)(ii)(C) and 31-6-105(d). View "Flauding v. State ex rel. Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint seeking an injunction halting their execution and a declaration that the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's (DRC) written execution protocol was invalid, holding that there was no error.Plaintiffs were two condemned inmates who challenged the DRC's written execution protocol setting forth the specific process by which DRC personnel are to carry out death sentences by lethal injection. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued (1) DRC may adopt the execution protocol only by following the procedures for promulgating it as an administrative rule, in accordance with Ohio Rev. Code 111.15(B); and (2) until these procedures were followed, the protocol was invalid and could not be used to carry out death sentences. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the execution protocol was neither a rule having a general and uniform application nor an internal management rule; and (2) therefore, the protocol was not subject to the rule-making requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 111.15. View "O'Neal v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zachary Rose challenged the decision of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) to terminate him from treatment programming without a hearing. He argued his program termination constituted punishment under 28 V.S.A. 851, and therefore required a hearing and due process under section 852. The superior court granted summary judgment to DOC, concluding that the termination was not punishment and that plaintiff’s claim was not reviewable under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 75. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that DOC’s decision was reviewable, but on this record, neither party was entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and remanded. View "Rose v. Touchette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioner's petition for declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that the circuit court improperly dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice.In his petition, Petitioner sought a declaration that his federal supplemental security income was exempt under federal law from paying the required monthly intervention fees to the Missouri Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole, as a condition of his supervised probation. The circuit court dismissed the petition with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner's request for declaratory relief was not ripe for adjudication; but (2) because Petitioner may be able to state a claim ripe for adjudication in the future, the circuit court improperly dismissed the claim with prejudice. View "Graves v. Missouri Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dawson, the City Manager of Del Rey Oaks, purchased the Portola lot, “the last vacant lot” in the City. It had a water meter but no water credits and could not be built upon without water credits. The prior owner had never been able to obtain water rights or water credits. The City lacked any water credits and had no surplus water. In 2015, the City leased the Rosita property, part of Work Memorial Park, to Mori for a garden center. Dawson contracted on behalf of the City for a new well on the Rosita property and arranged for the water credit from the Rosita property to be transferred to Dawson’s Portola lot. Dawson never reported his ownership of the Portola lot on his Form 700 disclosure.Dawson was convicted of a felony count of violating Government Code section 10901 (conflict of interest as to a contract entered into in his official capacity) and a misdemeanor count of violating section 91000 (failing to report an interest in real property under the Political Reform Act). The court granted him probation. The court of appeal affirmed. The prosecution was not required to prove the inapplicability of an exception to section 1090 “for remote or minimal interests” because it was an affirmative defense; Dawson bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. View "People v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that the medical parole scheme set forth in the Medical Parole Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 127, 119A, authorizing the Commissioner of Correction to grant medical parole to terminally ill or permanently incapacitated prisoners, while delegating to the parole board oversight of a medical parolee's compliance with the conditions of parole imposed, does not offend due process.Plaintiff, an inmate, filed a petition for medical parole after being diagnosed with terminal cancer. Plaintiff was subsequently released on medical parole but later arrested for violating the terms of his release. Plaintiff's parole was later revoked, and the Commissioner denied Plaintiff's second petition for medical parole. Plaintiff then sought release from custody, and a single justice denied the request. The Supreme Judicial Court answered reported questions regarding the Medical Parole Act by holding that the statutory and regulatory scheme concerning the revocation of medical parole does not violate a parolee's right to due process. View "Emma v. Massachusetts Parole Board" on Justia Law