Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In separate criminal cases, a trial court found 37 defendants incompetent to stand trial (IST) and ordered the State Department of State Hospitals (Department) to admit them within 60 days of the receipt of an informational packet. The Department failed to timely admit 31 of the 37 defendants. These defendants separately sought sanctions against the Department pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5, claiming violation of the court’s order. The trial court found the Department in violation of the order, and imposed monetary sanctions. The Department appealed, contending the trial court was not authorized to impose sanctions against it under section 177.5. Additionally, it claimed good cause or substantial justification for violating the order even assuming the court could impose sanctions under section 177.5. After review, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Department’s arguments and affirmed. View "California v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs were indigent defendants represented in criminal actions by attorneys provided through Idaho’s public defense system. They alleged that numerous inadequacies in Idaho’s public defense system, as administered by the State and the Idaho Public Defense Commission (“PDC” or together “Respondents”), violated the rights of the named plaintiffs, as well as those of similarly situated criminal defendants across Idaho, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In 2019, the district court denied cross motions for summary judgment, citing a lack of precedent as to the controlling legal standard to be applied, and requested this appeal. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the district court’s request for permissive appeal to determine the standard of review. The central issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on how to properly evaluate the deficiencies in Idaho’s public defense systems alleged by Appellants. In sum, Appellants insisted that a broader view was sufficient, while Respondents demanded the district court examine this issue closely. The Supreme Court held that both views were necessary: "a close up view, which allows for greater specificity, must be applied to the individual claims of at least one of the named plaintiffs whose allegations formed the basis of standing; however, a more distant view, which allows for greater overall perspective, is permissible for the examination of the systemic constitutional shortcomings alleged by Appellants." View "Tucker v. Idaho" on Justia Law

Defendant Daniel Clapp plead no contest to concealing the true extent of his physical activities and abilities from his employer, the Department of the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and the State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF). Consistent with a resolution negotiated by the parties, the trial court granted defendant three years’ probation, and as a condition of probation, ordered him to pay restitution. Following a hearing, defendant was ordered to pay $30,095.68 to SCIF for temporary disability benefits and $81,768.01 to CHP for benefits wrongfully obtained. He was also ordered to pay $1,350 and $70,159 to SCIF and CHP respectively for investigative costs. Defendant appealed the restitution award as to investigation costs contending that, as public investigative agencies, neither SCIF nor CHP was entitled to reimbursement for the costs of investigating his claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that as direct victims of defendant’s fraud, both CHP and SCIF were indeed entitled to restitution for investigative costs incurred in an effort to justify discontinuance of payments and recoup money defendant fraudulently obtained. View "California v. Clapp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the conclusion of the court of appeals that this appeal was moot but affirmed the court's decision dismissing the appeal, holding that Appellant, a Level III predatory offender serving the conditional release term of his sentence, was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.Before the time that Appellant filed this habeas petition, his conditional release had been revoked on five separate occasions. An order was later entered preventing the Department from using Appellant's inability to maintain an agent-approved placement due to his epilepsy as a basis for future revocations of his conditional release. In his habeas corpus petition, Appellant argued that his epilepsy was the sole reason for the revocation of his conditional release and continued incarceration. During the appeal from the denial of relief the Department released Appellant from prison. The court of appeals determined that Appellant's release from prison rendered his appeal moot. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the mootness exception applied in this case; and (2) The Department did not violate Appellant's substantive due process rights or the rule of law set forth in State ex rel. Marlowe v. Fabian, 755 N.W.2d 792 (Minn. App. 2008). View "State, ex rel. Young v. Schnell" on Justia Law

Dakota Bee appealed a criminal judgment entered on a conditional plea of guilty, reserving the right to appeal a district court order denying her motion to suppress evidence. Burleigh County Social Services (BCSS) contacted the Bismarck Police Department requesting assistance in removing a child from Bee’s care. Officers accompanied BCSS social workers to Bee’s residence and informed her that they were there to remove her child. Bee refused, backing up into the home, picking up the child, and then running towards the rear of the home. Officers pursued Bee through the home and out the back door. Fleeing out the back, Bee fell while holding the child, and officers separated her from the child. After Bee had been detained outside the residence, a social worker entered the residence to obtain personal belongings for the child, and an officer followed. Once the officer was inside, the social worker pointed out a glass smoking pipe. Bee was subsequently charged with Child Neglect; Possession of Methamphetamine; Possession of Drug Paraphernalia; and Refusal to Halt. The district court found that the officers entered “the residence with BCSS to retrieve personal belongings for the child” after Bee had been detained and the child was in BCSS’s custody. The court further found that the officers observed the glass smoking device on a shelf in plain view. The court concluded the officers’ actions did not violate Bee’s Fourth Amendment rights. On appeal, Bee argued the court erred in concluding that her Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the officers entered her home. The North Dakota Supreme Court found that during the first entry to the residence, the officers observed nothing that Bee sought to suppress. The second entry of the residence was justified only by a need to collect clothing and other personal items needed by the child. Because the search was concededly warrantless and no exception applies, the Court concluded Bee was entitled to claim the protection of the exclusionary rule. The district court erred by denying Bee’s motion to suppress the results of the warrantless search. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to allow Bee to withdraw her guilty plea. View "North Dakota v. Bee" on Justia Law

Joshua Breeze appeals a district court judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on a conviction for driving under the influence. On appeal, Breeze argued that Waltz, a UND police officer, was outside of his jurisdiction when he stopped Breeze, and therefore had no authority for the stop or the subsequent chemical test. The Department argued that Waltz was in “hot pursuit” and therefore had authority for the stop. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined Waltz did not have authority to arrest Breeze: "a reasoning mind could not have reasonably concluded the preponderance of the evidence supports that Waltz was in 'hot pursuit,' as defined by section 15-10-17(2)(d), N.D.C.C., when he continued beyond his jurisdictional boundary to arrest Breeze." The Department's order suspending Breeze's driving privileges, and the district court's judgment affirming the Department's order were reversed. View "Breeze v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2010, Appellant submitted a request to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory regarding DNA testing. The circuit court ordered the crime lab to release the information. When the file arrived at the prison, it was confiscated by prison officials based on their determination that it contained contraband. In 2019, Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for conversion seeking to compel Appellees to release his crime lab file and monetary damages for conversion. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice and issued a strike. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for conversion on the ground that Appellant had already obtained the crime lab file and that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Davis v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2017, a grand jury indicted Ryan Duke for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the October 2005 death of Tara Grinstead. For approximately 17 months, Duke was represented by a public defender from the Tifton Judicial Circuit’s Public Defender’s Office. Then, in August 2018, Duke’s public defender withdrew from representation and John Merchant and Ashleigh Merchant filed an entry of appearance, indicating that they were representing Duke pro bono. The Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining whether Duke had neither a statutory right under the Indigent Defense Act of 2003, nor a constitutional right to state-funded experts and investigators needed to prepare a defense, notwithstanding private counsel as his representation. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court found the IDA allowed an indigent defendant to obtain such ancillary defense services through a contract between pro bono counsel and either the Georgia Public Defender Council (“GPDC”) or the appropriate circuit public defender. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the Department of Public Safety ordering Appellee's commercial driving privileges to be disqualified for one year, holding that commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification under S.D. Codified Laws 32-12A-36(4) applies when a vehicle is used as a means to possess a felony quantity of marijuana.The Department disqualified Appellee's commercial driving privileges for one year pursuant to 32-12A-36(4) because he had been convicted of a felony committed in a vehicle by a CDL holder. The circuit court reversed Appellee's CDL disqualification, holding that the statute requires that a vehicle was an "instrumentality" of the felony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Department's decision, holding (1) possession of a felony quantity of marijuana in a vehicle is "using a...vehicle in the commission of any felony" under section 13-21A-36(4); (2) the circuit court erred by holding that section 13-21A-36(4) was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the Department's disqualification of Appellee's CDL privileges. View "Ibrahim v. Department Of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying the State's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of an order of the circuit court granting Defendant's discovery request, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the request.In 2016, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Defendant was a sexually violent person. The circuit court found probable cause to believe that Defendant was a sexually violent person and bound him over for trial. Thereafter, Defendant moved the circuit court to order the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) to disclose its database so he could have an expert analyze the Wisconsin-specific base rate. Defendant asserted that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provided a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of engaging in future acts of sexual violence and that the database was discoverable. The circuit court ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to Defendant. The court of appeals denied the State's petition for leave to appeal the non-final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC database. View "State v. Jendusa" on Justia Law