Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Darrie Rushin was indicted on multiple charges, including first-degree burglary and first-degree sodomy. He pled guilty to amended charges and was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by a five-year period of postincarceration supervision. After completing his initial sentence, Rushin was released but later reincarcerated for violating the terms of his supervision.Rushin requested the Department of Corrections (DOC) to review his sentence calculation, arguing he was wrongfully denied sentence credits that would reduce his reincarceration period. The DOC denied his request, and his subsequent administrative appeal was also denied. Rushin then filed a motion in his underlying criminal case seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The trial court dismissed his claim on separation-of-powers grounds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the trial court improperly dismissed the petition but affirmed on other grounds, holding Rushin was not entitled to relief as a matter of law.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that inmates reincarcerated for violating postincarceration supervision terms are entitled to earn statutory sentence credits under KRS 197.045 during their reincarceration. The court reasoned that the initial term of imprisonment and the subsequent period of postincarceration supervision are parts of a single sentence. The court emphasized that statutory sentence credits apply to all inmates unless explicitly excluded by statute. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "RUSHIN V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY" on Justia Law

In 2016, John O. Kalu, an inmate at FCI Allenwood, alleged that he was sexually assaulted on three separate occasions by Lieutenant K. Middernatch. Kalu reported the first two incidents to Warden Spaulding, who responded that he would investigate but took no further action. Following his report, Kalu was placed in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and later returned to the general population, where he was assaulted a third time. Kalu also claimed that he was subjected to inhumane conditions of confinement, including being forced to sleep on a cold metal bunk in freezing temperatures without adequate clothing.Kalu filed a pro se complaint in the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Warden Spaulding and Lt. Middernatch, seeking damages under Bivens for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed Kalu’s claims against Warden Spaulding for lack of personal involvement but allowed the sexual assault claim against Lt. Middernatch to proceed. Kalu later amended his complaint, but the District Court ultimately dismissed all claims, determining that they presented new Bivens contexts and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens remedies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The court held that Kalu’s Eighth Amendment sexual assault and conditions-of-confinement claims presented new Bivens contexts. It found that special factors, including the availability of alternative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons’ Administrative Remedy Program, Congress’s omission of a standalone damages remedy in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and separation of powers principles, counseled against extending Bivens liability. The court also agreed that Kalu’s complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim against Warden Spaulding for deliberate indifference or failure to protect. View "Kalu v. Spaulding" on Justia Law

In 1999, Mark McCloy was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) for tampering with a potential witness in an EEOC proceeding. In 2021, he applied to purchase a handgun in Maryland, stating he had no disqualifying convictions. The Maryland State Police (MSP) disapproved his application, determining his federal conviction was equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime under CR § 9-305.McCloy appealed the MSP's decision to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) was not equivalent to CR § 9-305 but sua sponte determined it was comparable to CR § 9-306, affirming the MSP's disapproval. McCloy sought judicial review in the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s County, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision but on the grounds that CR § 9-305 was the appropriate equivalent Maryland crime.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that the relevant Maryland law for determining equivalency is the law in effect at the time of the application, not the conviction. The court used a two-step approach to determine equivalency, comparing the elements of the statutes and considering whether a reasonable mind could conclude the statutes prohibit similar conduct.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court’s decision. It held that the relevant Maryland law for determining whether an out-of-State crime is disqualifying is the law in effect when the application is submitted. The court adopted a modified categorical approach, comparing the elements of the out-of-State crime with the Maryland crime. If the elements are broader, the MSP must have conclusive evidence of the acts forming the basis of the conviction to determine if those acts would support a conviction under a disqualifying Maryland crime. The court concluded that McCloy’s federal conviction was not equivalent to a disqualifying Maryland crime and remanded the case with instructions to reverse the MSP’s disapproval of McCloy’s firearm application. View "In the Matter of McCloy" on Justia Law

In January 2019, Ashley Franklin, an inmate at the Franklin County Regional Jail, was transported to a hospital by Jail Sergeant Brandon Price due to illness. During the transport, Price sexually assaulted Franklin. Franklin filed a lawsuit against Price, Franklin County, and two other Jail employees, asserting constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claims. She alleged that Price and his superior, Captain Wes Culbertson, were deliberately indifferent to her safety and that Franklin County had inadequate policies and training to prevent such assaults.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky granted Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on her Eighth Amendment claim against Price but denied her other claims. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants, finding no evidence that Culbertson or Franklin County were deliberately indifferent or that the County’s policies were inadequate. The court also found that the County’s previous incidents of misconduct did not establish a pattern of unconstitutional behavior. Franklin’s negligence claims against Culbertson and Jailer Rick Rogers were dismissed, with the court ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Kentucky law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Franklin County was not liable under § 1983 because Franklin failed to show a direct causal link between the County’s policies and her assault. The court also found that Culbertson and Rogers were entitled to qualified immunity, as their actions were discretionary and performed in good faith. Franklin’s claims of gross negligence were deemed forfeited due to lack of development in her arguments. The court concluded that Franklin had not established that the County’s policies or training were constitutionally inadequate or that there was a pattern of similar constitutional violations. View "Franklin v. Franklin County" on Justia Law

Robert William Doelz was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless search, and the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial. Subsequently, Doelz sought compensation for his wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004, which requires proving actual innocence among other criteria.The Shawnee District Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, interpreting K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) to require a claimant to prove that their innocence resulted in the reversal of their conviction, dismissal of charges, or a not guilty verdict upon retrial. The court found that Doelz's conviction was reversed due to a Fourth Amendment violation, not because he did not commit the crime. Since there was no evidence explaining why the charges were dismissed, a material fact remained unresolved. At a bench trial, Doelz testified to his innocence, but the court granted the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Doelz failed to prove the charges were dismissed due to his innocence.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to prove actual innocence and that this innocence led to the reversal, dismissal, or acquittal. The court found that the legislative intent behind the statute was to compensate only those who are factually innocent. Since Doelz did not provide evidence that the charges were dismissed because of his innocence, he did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation. View "In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of Doelz" on Justia Law

Amy Romero was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) after being found stuck in a snowbank. Officer George Phillips of the Rawlins Police Department noticed the vehicle and, upon investigation, detected a strong odor of alcohol from Ms. Romero. During the interaction, Ms. Romero admitted to driving the vehicle and exhibited signs of intoxication. Officer Phillips placed her in the back of his patrol car to deescalate a potentially violent situation with her husband, Joseph Romero, who was also present and behaving aggressively.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license, concluding that Officer Phillips had reasonable suspicion to detain her for a DWUI investigation. The OAH found that the officer’s actions, including placing Ms. Romero in the patrol car and transporting her to a dry environment for field sobriety tests, were justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the strong odor of alcohol, her admission of driving, and the need to manage her husband’s aggressive behavior.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the OAH’s decision. The Court held that Officer Phillips’ detention of Ms. Romero in the back of the patrol car did not constitute an unlawful arrest but was a reasonable investigative detention supported by substantial evidence. The Court found that the officer’s actions were necessary to ensure safety and were within the scope of a lawful investigative detention. The Court concluded that the OAH’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the detention was in accordance with constitutional protections. The decision to uphold the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license was affirmed. View "Romero v. State of Wyoming Ex Rel., Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Jose Oliveras, serving a life sentence without parole, was found with over 600 pornographic images on a tablet provided by the prison. The images were stored on a removable SIM card. Oliveras pled guilty to an administrative violation for possession of contraband and received counseling without reprimand. However, at a subsequent classification review, his computer clearance was rescinded, citing regulations that prohibit inmates with a history of computer fraud or abuse from accessing computers.Oliveras filed a grievance with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), arguing that his violation did not constitute "computer fraud or abuse" as defined by Penal Code section 502. The CDCR denied his grievance and appeal. Oliveras then petitioned the Del Norte County Superior Court, which denied his petition, stating that the hearing officer's decision was supported by "some evidence."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Oliveras's conduct did not meet the criteria for "computer fraud or abuse" under Penal Code section 502. The court noted that Oliveras had permission to access the tablet and there was no evidence he used computer services without permission or for fraudulent purposes. The court concluded that the CDCR's interpretation of Oliveras's conduct as "computer fraud or abuse" was incorrect.The Court of Appeal ordered the CDCR to vacate any reference to a section 502 violation from Oliveras's record and reversed the October 2022 revocation of his computer clearance. The court directed the CDCR to remove any reference to this revocation from Oliveras's file. View "In re Oliveras" on Justia Law

Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged with taking bribes from a contractor, Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari. Macrina made several decisions that favored Jafari’s company in the bidding process for a city contract. After the contract was awarded, Macrina received $10,000 in cash, a diamond ring, and other perks from Jafari. She also went to work for Jafari’s company shortly after leaving her city position. Macrina later contacted the FBI to report possible corruption, but during interviews, she admitted to receiving gifts from Jafari, which she later retracted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia admitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and federal agents, as well as the City of Atlanta’s Code of Ethics, over Macrina’s objections. The court also declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a bribe. The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and she was sentenced to 54 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversation and the Code of Ethics, as both were relevant to proving Macrina’s corrupt intent. The court also found that the district court’s refusal to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, as the instruction misstated the law by failing to acknowledge that a payment received after an official act can still be considered a bribe if there was an agreement to accept the payment before the act was completed. View "USA v. Macrina" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hunt arrived at the Lee County Courthouse to testify in a criminal case. Directed outside due to courtroom scheduling, Hunt re-entered and sat on a staircase. Officer Dale Acosta confronted Hunt, leading to a heated exchange. Despite Hunt's explanation of his courthouse business, Acosta arrested him for obstruction, claiming Hunt disrupted the county tax office.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed most of Hunt's claims but allowed his Fourth Amendment claim against Acosta, a failure to train or supervise claim against Mayor Jimmy Williams and Chief of Police Martin Wilson, and a Monell claim against the City of Marianna. The court denied qualified and quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta and qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson. Acosta, Williams, and Wilson appealed the denial of immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta's initial stop of Hunt, as Acosta acted under a judge's directive. However, the court affirmed the denial of quasi-judicial and qualified immunity for Acosta's arrest of Hunt, finding no probable cause for obstruction. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson, ruling that Hunt failed to show a pattern of unconstitutional acts by Acosta that would have put them on notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Hunt v. Acosta" on Justia Law

Marc D. Curtis, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Complex, requested records from the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk, Earle B. Turner, related to his criminal case. Curtis sought documents including arrest warrants, DNA search warrants, and cellphone search warrants. The clerk provided some documents but withheld others, citing that Curtis, as an inmate, could not access certain records without a judge's approval per R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Curtis filed a mandamus complaint to compel the clerk to produce the remaining records or confirm their nonexistence.The Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Curtis's writ of mandamus. The court relied on an affidavit from Ronald Tabor, the clerk’s assistant director, who stated that the clerk did not possess the requested records. The court found this affidavit sufficient to establish that the records were not in the clerk’s possession and noted that respondents are not required to create or provide access to nonexistent records.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's judgment. The court held that Curtis failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the clerk possessed the requested records. The court also denied Curtis's motion to take judicial notice of new documents and granted the clerk's motion to strike certain personal information from the record. The court concluded that the clerk had adequately demonstrated that the requested records were not in his possession, and Curtis did not rebut this evidence. View "State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner" on Justia Law