Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves Amaka Oji and Oji Fit World, LLC (OFW), who were approved as Medicaid providers by the D.C. Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF) in 2011. Between 2012 and 2015, they submitted over 24,000 claims for reimbursement for wellness services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. Investigations by DHCF, the Office of the Inspector General for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the FBI revealed that Oji and OFW regularly overbilled Medicaid, often charging for a full hour of service regardless of the actual time spent or whether the service was provided at all.The District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in April 2021 under the D.C. False Claims Act and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding that Oji and OFW had submitted false claims and falsified records. The court awarded the District $1,001,362.50 in treble damages and $497,000 in civil penalties. Oji and OFW's various procedural defenses, including claims of laches and statute of limitations, were deemed waived due to their failure to raise them in a timely manner.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment order. However, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the damages and penalties. The appellate court found that the Superior Court had not provided sufficient explanation or analysis for the awarded amounts, making it difficult to review the decision. The appellate court emphasized the need for the trial court to explain its reasoning in detail to permit adequate appellate review. View "Oji Fit World, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law

The case involves Lucas Sirois and Alisa Sirois, who were indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). They sought to enjoin the Department of Justice (DOJ) from prosecuting them, arguing that their conduct was in substantial compliance with the Maine Medical Use of Cannabis Act, which allows for the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical marijuana under state law. The defendants claimed that the DOJ's prosecution violated the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment, which prohibits the DOJ from using funds to prevent states from implementing their medical marijuana laws.The United States District Court for the District of Maine denied the defendants' request for injunctive relief. The court held a hearing where the government presented evidence that the defendants' operations, particularly a grow operation known as the "Shoe Shop," violated Maine's medical marijuana laws by operating as a collective and engaging in black-market sales. The court found that the government had met its burden of production, showing a substantial evidentiary basis for the prosecution. However, the defendants failed to meet their burden of persuasion to demonstrate that the prosecution lacked a substantial evidentiary basis or was arbitrary or irrational.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were in substantial compliance with Maine's medical marijuana laws. The court noted significant evidence that the Shoe Shop operated as a collective and that Lucas Sirois engaged in black-market sales. The court concluded that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the DOJ's prosecution would prevent Maine from giving practical effect to its medical marijuana laws, as required under the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment. Therefore, the denial of the motion to enjoin the prosecution was affirmed. View "United States v. Sirois" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charles Anthony Giovinco pleaded guilty to enticement of a minor and possession of child pornography. He received concurrent sentences of 235 months for enticement and 120 months for possession. The First Step Act of 2018 (FSA) allows eligible prisoners to earn time credits for participating in certain programs, but excludes those serving sentences for specific offenses, including possession of child pornography.Giovinco argued that he should be eligible for FSA time credits after completing the sentence for the ineligible offense. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denied his request, stating that his entire term of imprisonment must be considered as a single, aggregated sentence, making him ineligible for FSA time credits. Giovinco filed a habeas petition, which the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut denied, deferring to the BOP's interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c), multiple terms of imprisonment must be treated as a single, aggregate term for administrative purposes, including the administration of FSA time credits. Therefore, a prisoner serving any part of an aggregated sentence for an ineligible offense is not eligible to earn FSA time credits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that the BOP correctly aggregated Giovinco's sentences and determined his ineligibility for FSA time credits. View "Giovinco v. Pullen" on Justia Law

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law

Kenneth Bryan Ritchey, the defendant, operated Gulf Coast Pharmaceuticals Plus, LLC, a wholesale distributor of pharmaceutical products. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ritchey directed his employees to acquire large quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE) and resell them at inflated prices to various healthcare providers, including the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The VA was charged significantly higher prices than the market value, resulting in Ritchey and his company receiving over $2 million, including more than $270,000 from the VA.Ritchey was charged with six counts, including conspiracy to defraud the United States. He pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 371, and the remaining counts were dismissed. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi calculated Ritchey’s offense level based on the estimated pecuniary loss caused by his actions, which included a significant enhancement for the amount of loss. The court determined the fair market value (FMV) of the PPE based on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, leading to a higher offense level and a 60-month prison sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court erred in calculating the FMV by relying on pre-pandemic prices and 3M’s pricing, which did not reflect the actual market conditions during the pandemic. The appellate court held that the district court’s method of determining the FMV was not based on a realistic economic approach. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated Ritchey’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, emphasizing the need for a more accurate calculation of the FMV that reflects the market conditions at the time of the transactions. View "United States v. Ritchey" on Justia Law

A senior trooper with the Louisiana State Police (LSP), August McKay, committed suicide at his home after learning he was being reassigned and that a search warrant was to be executed on his residence. His widow, Brandy McKay, sued several LSP officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state law, alleging their actions contributed to his death. The district court denied qualified immunity to two officers, Sergeant Rohn Bordelon and Trooper David LaCroix, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana initially dismissed Brandy’s Eighth Amendment claim but allowed her to amend her complaint. She then limited her claims to the Fourteenth Amendment and state laws. The district court found that Brandy had sufficiently stated § 1983 claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix, concluding they had subjective knowledge of August’s suicide risk and responded with deliberate indifference. The court dismissed the claims against other defendants and allowed the state law claims against Sgt. Bordelon and Trooper LaCroix to proceed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no constitutional duty to protect August from self-harm, as he was not in state custody or otherwise restrained. The court emphasized that the officers did not attempt to arrest or confine August, and Brandy’s complaint focused on their failure to restrain him. Without a constitutional duty, there could be no violation, and thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court’s decision regarding qualified immunity and dismissed the appeal concerning the state law claims without prejudice, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "McKay v. LaCroix" on Justia Law

Kavonte Amarion Vaughn sought a writ of mandate to vacate an order denying his request for mental health diversion under California Penal Code sections 1001.35 and 1001.36. Vaughn was charged with two counts of second-degree robbery and one count of second-degree attempted robbery. The trial court found that Vaughn met the eligibility and suitability requirements for mental health diversion, including that he would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety. However, the court denied the diversion, citing Vaughn's failure to make a "serious enough effort" to be deemed suitable for mental health diversion.The Los Angeles County Superior Court initially reviewed the case. Vaughn posted bail and underwent a psychological evaluation, which confirmed his mental health issues, including schizoaffective disorder and PTSD. Despite the trial court's acknowledgment of Vaughn's eligibility, it denied the motion for diversion, focusing on Vaughn's perceived lack of seriousness about his mental health treatment, particularly his failure to bring his medication bottles to the evaluation.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering the legislative goals of the mental health diversion law. The appellate court noted that Vaughn had made a prima facie showing of eligibility and suitability for diversion and that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized that the trial court's discretion must align with the legislative intent to broadly apply mental health diversion to reduce recidivism and support public safety.The appellate court granted Vaughn's petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order denying mental health diversion and to grant the motion, barring any evidence of changed circumstances affecting Vaughn's suitability. The trial court must ensure that the recommended mental health treatment program meets Vaughn's specialized needs. View "Vaughn v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2018, Robbie Gail Charette, a Republican candidate for Judge of the County Court-at-Law in Washington County, Texas, was indicted on four misdemeanor charges related to campaign law violations. These charges included misrepresenting the source of a campaign communication, falsely claiming to hold a public office, failing to file a personal financial statement on time, and not maintaining proper records of political expenditures. A special prosecutor pursued these charges without a prior referral from the Texas Ethics Commission (TEC).The trial court denied Charette's pretrial habeas application, which argued that the prosecution was unauthorized without prior TEC proceedings. The court found no legislative language granting the TEC exclusive authority to enforce the violations and ruled that district attorneys could independently investigate and prosecute election-related crimes. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld this decision, stating that the district court had jurisdiction over the misdemeanors and that any alleged deprivation of civil due process rights by the TEC did not affect this jurisdiction.The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the TEC has exclusive jurisdiction over the offenses listed in Chapter 571 of the Texas Government Code. The court held that the TEC must make an initial determination on alleged violations before any criminal charges can be brought. Since no TEC proceedings occurred in Charette's case, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. Consequently, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and ordered the dismissal of the indictments against Charette. View "EX PARTE CHARETTE" on Justia Law

Christopher Dallas Nelson pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography. The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) revealed that Nelson possessed 3,699 images, including 196 images of his seven-year-old daughter and 25 images of his five-year-old daughter. Nelson admitted to downloading child pornography and taking images of his older daughter but denied producing images of his younger daughter. He also attempted to obstruct justice by hiding a laptop and cellphone containing evidence. Nelson's total offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was 43, and he filed objections to the PSR.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas sentenced Nelson to 240 months in prison, a $250,000 fine, additional restitution and special assessments totaling $10,100, and supervised release for life. The court imposed mandatory and standard conditions of supervised release and added discretionary special conditions barring Nelson’s access to the Internet. Nelson objected to these special conditions, and the court’s written judgment contained less severe versions of the Internet-related conditions. Nelson timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's denial of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility, finding no abuse of discretion. The court also found that the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement regarding Internet restrictions, holding that the oral pronouncement controls. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a lifetime Internet ban without exceptions, as it was not narrowly tailored. The court affirmed Nelson’s sentence except for the special conditions of supervised release, vacated the Internet-related conditions, and remanded for further proceedings. View "U.S. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Three retired New Hampshire State Police troopers challenged their inclusion on the Exculpatory Evidence Schedule (EES), claiming their placement was based on outdated and misinterpreted conduct. Approximately twenty years ago, the troopers inflated traffic stop records in their activity logs to meet mandated quotas. An internal investigation led to their discipline but not termination. Initially placed on the "Laurie List," their names were later removed, only to be reinstated on the EES over a decade later.The Superior Court dismissed the troopers' complaint, finding their conduct potentially exculpatory and their placement on the EES appropriate. The court also ruled that the troopers had received adequate due process. The troopers appealed, arguing that their conduct was not fraudulent and that the age of the conduct diminished its relevance.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case, focusing on whether the troopers' conduct was "potentially exculpatory" under RSA 105:13-d. The court noted that "potentially exculpatory evidence" includes evidence that could be material to guilt or punishment, including impeachment evidence. The court emphasized that factors such as the age and nature of the conduct should be considered in determining its relevance.The court concluded that the limited record did not establish whether the troopers' conduct was potentially exculpatory, as it could have been a result of a mistaken interpretation of reporting requirements rather than dishonesty. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the potential exculpatory nature of the conduct, considering its admissibility and relevance in future criminal cases. View "Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen." on Justia Law