Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Kelley Maves was convicted of two sexual assaults in Colorado. He moved to Alaska in 2015, where the Department of Public Safety required him to register for life as a sex offender under the Alaska Sex Offenders Registration Act (ASORA). Maves appealed the Department’s decision to the superior court, arguing that one of the two convictions could not be used as the basis for a lifetime registration requirement because it had been set aside; with one conviction he would be required to register for only 15 years. His argument on appeal included a challenge to a 1995 departmental regulation that defined “conviction” as including those that had been set aside. The superior court affirmed the Department’s decision requiring the Maves to register for life. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the 1994 version of ASORA was not plainly intended to apply to offenders whose convictions have been set aside, and that the 1995 regulation extending the Act’s reach to those convictions was not necessary to carry out the Act’s purposes. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision upholding the requirement that Maves register under ASORA for life. View "Maves v. Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's pro se complaint filed under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act alleging that the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) inmate classification policies are invalid rules, holding that the WDOC's inmate classification policy is not a rule required to be filed with the Wyoming Secretary of State.Plaintiff pled guilty to kidnapping and first-degree sexual assault and was sentenced to two concurrent life sentences. In his complaint for declaratory judgment Plaintiff alleged that the failure to file WDOC policies and procedures with the Secretary of State rendered them, and any actions taken pursuant to them, void. Therefore, Plaintiff claimed that his recent inmate classification was void. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WDOC was not required to file the inmate classification policy at issue with the Secretary of State's office, and therefore, Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. View "Bird v. Lampert" on Justia Law

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to determine whether the Department of Transportation (PennDOT) was precluded from suspending an individual’s driving privileges based on a DUI conviction, where there was a lengthy delay between the conviction and the time the driver was notified of the suspension. Under the facts of this case, the Court concluded the trial court’s finding – that Appellee would suffer prejudice if the suspension were to be imposed at this juncture – was supported by competent evidence of record, and moreover, it demonstrated that prejudice would follow from the fact of the delay itself. Additionally, there was no dispute that Appellee did not accrue any additional Vehicle Code violations after his predicate DUI conviction. The Court therefore agreed with the Commonwealth Court majority that a suspension at this late date will have lost much of its effectiveness with regard to its underlying legislative purposes, result in prejudice which can be attributed to the delay, and ultimately deny fundamental fairness. View "PennDOT Bureau of Driver Lic. v. Middaugh" on Justia Law

Wilmington Trust financed construction projects. Extensions were commonplace. Wilmington’s loan documents reserved its right to “renew or extend (repeatedly and for any length of time) this loan . . . without the consent of or notice to anyone.” Wilmington’s internal policy did not classify all mature loans with unpaid principals as past due if the loans were in the process of renewal and interest payments were current, Following the 2008 "Great Recession," Wilmington excluded some of the loans from those it reported as “past due” to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Reserve. Wilmington’s executives maintained that, under a reasonable interpretation of the reporting requirements, the exclusion of the loans from the “past due” classification was proper. The district court denied their requests to introduce evidence concerning or instruct the jury about that alternative interpretation. The jury found the reporting constituted “false statements” under 18 U.S.C. 1001 and 15 U.S.C. 78m, and convicted the executives.The Third Circuit reversed in part. To prove falsity beyond a reasonable doubt in this situation, the government must prove either that its interpretation of the reporting requirement is the only objectively reasonable interpretation or that the defendant’s statement was also false under the alternative, objectively reasonable interpretation. The court vacated and remanded the conspiracy and securities fraud convictions, which were charged in the alternative on an independent theory of liability, View "United States v. Harra" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision reversing Defendant-doctor's convictions on the ground that the trial court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress incriminating answers he gave during a medical board investigation, holding that the State may use incriminating answers given by a doctor during a medical board investigation in a subsequent criminal prosecution of the doctor.Defendant was convicted of three third-degree misdemeanor counts of sexual imposition. The court of appeals reversed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress statements he had made to the medical board investigator as having been illegally compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a medical license is a property right, the threatened loss of which is a form of coercion that can compromise the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; (2) for coercion to be sufficient to warrant the suppression of statements made during a medical board investigative interview, the person making the statements must subjectively believe that asserting the privilege against self-incrimination could cause the loss of the person's medical license, and that belief must be objectively reasonable; and (3) Defendant's belief that he could lose his medical license if he refused to truthfully answer questions posed by the medical-board investigator was not objectively reasonable. View "State v. Gideon" on Justia Law

A felony complaint alleged that on seven different dates in 2014, Martinez committed a felony under Insurance Code section 1814 by entering into an agreement and having an understanding with a person incarcerated in jail, to inform and notify Martinez, a bail licensee, of the fact of an arrest in violation of California Code of Regulations, title 10, section 2076. Martinez was associated with Luna Bail Bonds.The court of appeal reversed her subsequent conviction, finding the regulation facially invalid. Section 2076 prohibits bail licensees from entering, indirectly or directly, any arrangement or understanding with specified types of people— including a “person incarcerated in a jail”—“or with any other persons” to inform or notify any bail licensee, directly or indirectly, of information pertaining to (1) an existing criminal complaint, (2) a prior, impending, or contemplated arrest, or (3) the persons involved therein, which impliedly includes arrestees and named criminals. The section is not unconstitutionally vague but is a content-based regulation, which unduly suppresses protected speech and fails to survive even intermediate judicial scrutiny. While section 2076 might indirectly deter unlawful solicitation of arrestees, an indirect effect is not enough to survive intermediate scrutiny. View "People v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Defendant Anthony Brunetta appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the criminal division erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence he alleged was obtained based on an illegal stop of his vehicle. Specifically, defendant claimed the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing to stop his car as required by the federal and state constitutions. At trial, the State played a dashboard video recording of the stop at issue, and the trooper who stopped defendant testified that he did not observe defendant use a turn signal at the intersection. On cross-examination, the trooper reiterated that defendant did not use his turn signal at the intersection, and that he would have seen the signal if defendant had used it. Defendant did not challenge the criminal division’s finding that he did not use his vehicle’s turn signal before changing direction at the intersection in question. He argued to the Vermont Supreme Court only that the state trooper had no reasonable basis to stop him without first confirming that he did not use a hand signal instead of the vehicle’s turn signal. The Supreme Court found Defendant correctly observed that 23 V.S.A. 1064(a) unambiguously allowed a driver to discharge the responsibility to signal a turn by using a hand signal rather than a mechanical or lighting signal. "But this does not mean that a law enforcement officer who is unable to see a hand signal even if one is given—whether due to darkness, weather conditions, or vantage point relative to the vehicle in question—may never form a reasonable suspicion that section 1064(a) has been violated. ... It follows that, where an officer suspects that a driver failed to signal a turn, but is unable to confirm or rule out the use of a hand signal, the officer may nonetheless have reasonable suspicion of a failure to signal sufficient to stop the car to further investigate the suspected traffic violation." View "Vermont v. Brunetta" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Allen appealed his conviction for depredation of government property. arguing his conviction violated both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and separation of powers principles. Allen also appealed the district court’s restitution order of $20,300, claiming the order included restitution for uncharged conduct, and that the district court erred in applying the procedural framework of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) by placing the burden on him to disprove the amount of loss contained in the presentence report and by ordering a restitution amount unsupported by evidence. After the parties completed briefing on this case, the government filed a notice of concession, acknowledging that the restitution order was erroneous and suggesting remand for resentencing on restitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court to recalculate restitution. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking an order to compel USCIS officials to travel to federal prison in order to administer the oath of citizenship to him. Plaintiff alleged that USCIS unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the administration of his oath under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief and denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Contrary to defendant's contention, the district court did consider defendant's APA claim before dismissing it. The district court dismissed after determining that his section 706(1) claim could not proceed. The court explained that when plaintiff appears before USCIS officials, they must administer the oath to him. But the manner in which USCIS administers the oath, including where within the United States that administration occurs, is left to the agency's discretion. In this case, plaintiff cannot show a clear right to relief and thus he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence.Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. View "Rogers v. Kelley" on Justia Law