Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.Appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In 2010, Appellant submitted a request to the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory regarding DNA testing. The circuit court ordered the crime lab to release the information. When the file arrived at the prison, it was confiscated by prison officials based on their determination that it contained contraband. In 2019, Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for conversion seeking to compel Appellees to release his crime lab file and monetary damages for conversion. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice and issued a strike. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly dismissed Appellant's petition for writ of mandamus and complaint for conversion on the ground that Appellant had already obtained the crime lab file and that Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Davis v. Kelley" on Justia Law

In 2017, a grand jury indicted Ryan Duke for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the October 2005 death of Tara Grinstead. For approximately 17 months, Duke was represented by a public defender from the Tifton Judicial Circuit’s Public Defender’s Office. Then, in August 2018, Duke’s public defender withdrew from representation and John Merchant and Ashleigh Merchant filed an entry of appearance, indicating that they were representing Duke pro bono. The Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining whether Duke had neither a statutory right under the Indigent Defense Act of 2003, nor a constitutional right to state-funded experts and investigators needed to prepare a defense, notwithstanding private counsel as his representation. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court found the IDA allowed an indigent defendant to obtain such ancillary defense services through a contract between pro bono counsel and either the Georgia Public Defender Council (“GPDC”) or the appropriate circuit public defender. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court reversing the judgment of the Department of Public Safety ordering Appellee's commercial driving privileges to be disqualified for one year, holding that commercial driver's license (CDL) disqualification under S.D. Codified Laws 32-12A-36(4) applies when a vehicle is used as a means to possess a felony quantity of marijuana.The Department disqualified Appellee's commercial driving privileges for one year pursuant to 32-12A-36(4) because he had been convicted of a felony committed in a vehicle by a CDL holder. The circuit court reversed Appellee's CDL disqualification, holding that the statute requires that a vehicle was an "instrumentality" of the felony. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the Department's decision, holding (1) possession of a felony quantity of marijuana in a vehicle is "using a...vehicle in the commission of any felony" under section 13-21A-36(4); (2) the circuit court erred by holding that section 13-21A-36(4) was unconstitutionally vague; and (3) there was sufficient evidence to support the Department's disqualification of Appellee's CDL privileges. View "Ibrahim v. Department Of Public Safety" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the court of appeals denying the State's petition for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of an order of the circuit court granting Defendant's discovery request, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting the request.In 2016, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Defendant was a sexually violent person. The circuit court found probable cause to believe that Defendant was a sexually violent person and bound him over for trial. Thereafter, Defendant moved the circuit court to order the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) to disclose its database so he could have an expert analyze the Wisconsin-specific base rate. Defendant asserted that the DOC's Wisconsin-specific data provided a more relevant basis upon which to calculate his risk of engaging in future acts of sexual violence and that the database was discoverable. The circuit court ordered the DOC to transmit the full, unredacted database to Defendant. The court of appeals denied the State's petition for leave to appeal the non-final order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court permissibly ordered the disclosure of the DOC database. View "State v. Jendusa" on Justia Law

Ethiopian native, petitioner Thewodros Wolie Birhanu petitioned the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of a final order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA dismissed Birhanu’s appeal of the Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) decision finding him removable. The BIA and the IJ found: (1) Birhanu was removable as an alien convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude (“CIMTs”) not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct; (2) he was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal because his convictions qualified as particularly serious crimes; and (3) he was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Tenth Circuit dismissed Birhanu's claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as unexhausted, and denied the balance of his petition for review on the merits. View "Birhanu v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Senate Bill No. 1421 amended Penal Code section 832.7 to allow disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) of records relating to officer-involved shootings, serious use of force and sustained findings of sexual assault or serious dishonesty. VCDSA filed suit against defendants to enjoin section 832.7’s application to records involving peace officer conduct and incidents occurring before January 1, 2019, the statute's effective date. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction.In the meantime, the First District issued Walnut Creek Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Walnut Creek (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 940, which rejected the assertion "that applying the 2019 amendments to compel disclosure of records created prior to 2019 constitutes an improper retroactive application of the new law." In the absence of a reason to depart from Walnut Creek, and for reasons stated in Becerra v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 897, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and dissolved the permanent injunction. The court agreed with Walnut Creek that section 832.7 does not attach new legal consequences to or increase a peace officer's liability for conduct that occurred before the statute's effective date. The court explained that because the statute merely broadens the public's right to access records regarding that conduct, it applies retroactively. View "Ventura County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n. v. County of Ventura" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Panaggio appealed a New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board (Board) determination that respondent, CNA Insurance Company (the insurer), could not be ordered to reimburse him for his purchase of medical marijuana because such reimbursement would have constituted aiding and abetting his commission of a federal crime under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). When Panaggio appealed the insurer’s denial to the New Hampshire Department of Labor, a hearing officer agreed with the insurer. Panaggio appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the Board, which unanimously found that his use of medical marijuana was reasonable and medically necessary. Nonetheless, the Board upheld the insurer’s refusal to reimburse Panaggio, concluding that “the carrier is not able to provide medical marijuana because such reimbursement is not legal under state or federal law.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court surmised the issue on appeal raised a question of federal preemption, "which is essentially a matter of statutory interpretation and construction." Although it was an issue of first impression for the New Hampshire Court, other courts considered whether the CSA preempted a state order requiring reimbursement of an employee’s purchase of medical marijuana. Panaggio reasoned that “[b]ecause New Hampshire law unambiguously requires the insurer to pay for the claimant’s medically related treatment,” an insurer that reimburses a claimant for the purchase of medical marijuana acts without the volition required by the federal aiding and abetting statute. The insurer asserted Panaggio’s argument leads to an absurd result, observing that “[c]onflict preemption applies because state law requires what federal law forbids.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court ultimately concluded the CSA did not make it illegal for an insurer to reimburse an employee for his or her purchase of medical marijuana. "[A] Board order to reimburse Panaggio does not interfere with the federal government’s ability to enforce the CSA. Regardless of whether the insurer is ordered to reimburse Panaggio for his medical marijuana purchase, the federal government is free to prosecute him for simple possession of marijuana under the CSA." Under these circumstances, the Court concluded the “high threshold” for preemption “is not met here.” The Board's decision was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Andrew Panaggio" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented was one of first impression for the Court of Appeal: whether a licensee can rebut an Evidence Code presumption that chemical blood tests were properly conducted, and the results are thus reliable. Plaintiff William Lee Gerwig crashed into the back of another vehicle at an intersection. He was thrown from his motorcycle and landed on the asphalt. California Highway Patrol Officer Jacob Rebelo responded to the scene and spoke with Gerwig while he was receiving medical attention. Based on his lethargic responses, the smell of alcohol, and his inability to recall the collision details, Rebelo suspected Gerwig was intoxicated. Rebelo arrested Gerwig for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and watched while state-certified phlebotomist Francisco Moreno collected two vials of blood using a nonalcoholic swab to clean the site. Rebelo took the vials himself and entered them into evidence. Test results from Gerwig’s blood draw showed a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of .25 percent. At the Department of Motor Vehicle hearing, Gerwig’s counsel called an employee of Specimen Specialists of America, Inc. (SSI), the company that dispatched phlebotomist Moreno to draw Gerwig’s blood. Through the employee’s testimony, counsel demonstrated that certain SSI procedures were out of compliance with state regulations that govern blood test procedures. In particular, Moreno was functionally unsupervised and the manual that SSI provided for phlebotomists had not been approved by a physician and surgeon. After eliciting testimony to demonstrate these procedural failings, counsel argued that the test results could not be relied on due to SSI’s regulatory violations. The Court of Appeal concluded that licensees rebut the Evidence Code presumption only when they cast doubt on the integrity of the test. "It is not enough to show a violation of governing regulations that has only a tenuous connection to the accuracy of the results. Here, because plaintiff proved a regulatory violation with only an indirect and speculative relationship to the manner in which the blood test was conducted, and thus the reliability of the test results," the Court affirmed the order denying mandamus relief. View "Gerwig v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Darl Hehn appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge from civil commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. The North Dakota Supreme Court the case to the district court for further findings and retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3). Upon return, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in holding the State proved Hehn remained a sexually dangerous individual. The Court affirmed the trial court’s order as supplemented by its order entered on remand. View "Matter of Hehn" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing a Department hearing officer’s decision suspending James McClintock’s driving privileges for a period of 91 days. The Department argued the court erred in reversing because the greater weight of the evidence showed the Intoxilyzer 8000 was installed by a field inspector before its use. To this the North Dakota Supreme Court concurred, reversed the judgment and reinstated the hearing officer’s decision. View "McClintock v. NDDOT" on Justia Law