Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant Anthony Brunetta appealed the civil suspension of his driver’s license for driving under the influence (DUI), arguing that the criminal division erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence he alleged was obtained based on an illegal stop of his vehicle. Specifically, defendant claimed the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion of wrongdoing to stop his car as required by the federal and state constitutions. At trial, the State played a dashboard video recording of the stop at issue, and the trooper who stopped defendant testified that he did not observe defendant use a turn signal at the intersection. On cross-examination, the trooper reiterated that defendant did not use his turn signal at the intersection, and that he would have seen the signal if defendant had used it. Defendant did not challenge the criminal division’s finding that he did not use his vehicle’s turn signal before changing direction at the intersection in question. He argued to the Vermont Supreme Court only that the state trooper had no reasonable basis to stop him without first confirming that he did not use a hand signal instead of the vehicle’s turn signal. The Supreme Court found Defendant correctly observed that 23 V.S.A. 1064(a) unambiguously allowed a driver to discharge the responsibility to signal a turn by using a hand signal rather than a mechanical or lighting signal. "But this does not mean that a law enforcement officer who is unable to see a hand signal even if one is given—whether due to darkness, weather conditions, or vantage point relative to the vehicle in question—may never form a reasonable suspicion that section 1064(a) has been violated. ... It follows that, where an officer suspects that a driver failed to signal a turn, but is unable to confirm or rule out the use of a hand signal, the officer may nonetheless have reasonable suspicion of a failure to signal sufficient to stop the car to further investigate the suspected traffic violation." View "Vermont v. Brunetta" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Allen appealed his conviction for depredation of government property. arguing his conviction violated both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and separation of powers principles. Allen also appealed the district court’s restitution order of $20,300, claiming the order included restitution for uncharged conduct, and that the district court erred in applying the procedural framework of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA) by placing the burden on him to disprove the amount of loss contained in the presentence report and by ordering a restitution amount unsupported by evidence. After the parties completed briefing on this case, the government filed a notice of concession, acknowledging that the restitution order was erroneous and suggesting remand for resentencing on restitution. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, vacated the district court’s restitution order, and remanded the case to the district court to recalculate restitution. View "United States v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a mandamus action in the district court, seeking an order to compel USCIS officials to travel to federal prison in order to administer the oath of citizenship to him. Plaintiff alleged that USCIS unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed the administration of his oath under section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim for relief and denial of his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Contrary to defendant's contention, the district court did consider defendant's APA claim before dismissing it. The district court dismissed after determining that his section 706(1) claim could not proceed. The court explained that when plaintiff appears before USCIS officials, they must administer the oath to him. But the manner in which USCIS administers the oath, including where within the United States that administration occurs, is left to the agency's discretion. In this case, plaintiff cannot show a clear right to relief and thus he is not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. View "Mendoza-Tarango v. Flores" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence.Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. View "Rogers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Kyle Christianson appealed a district court’s judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on his conviction in Canada for a driving under the influence offense. Christianson argued the Department lacked jurisdiction because the Canadian statute did not define an equivalent offense, and that the hearing officer failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s suspension and disqualification of Christianson’s noncommercial and commercial driving privileges. View "Christianson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Corey Jundt appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative hearing officer’s decision to suspend Jundt’s driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence. Jundt argued the hearing officer erred in suspending his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to read him the implied consent advisory. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the implied consent requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-01 did not apply when an individual consented to a chemical test. View "Jundt v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Benjamin Suelzle appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking his driving privileges for two years. Suelzle argued the hearing officer erred: (1) by finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01; (2) by admitting a supplemental report and notice form; and (3) by failing to exclude evidence of his test refusal because he was not given a valid implied consent advisory. Specifically, he contended he could not be lawfully arrested under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 because the alleged actual physical control occurred on the grassy yard of his private residence, which was an improved private residential lot and not a place to which the public has access. The hearing officer rejected Suelzle’s argument that his vehicle was located on private property to which the officer could have no reasonable grounds to believe the public would have a right of access for vehicular use. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review of the Department hearing and district court record that although there was evidence in the record that Suelzle drove under the influence on areas where the public had a right of access before parking on his lawn, he was not charged with driving under the influence. He was charged only with actual physical control of his pickup where it was ultimately parked on his residential grass lawn. The hearing officer’s finding was based on a misapplication of law, and it was not supported by evidence in the record sufficient to show the location of the actual physical control offense was within the scope of N.D.C.C. 39-08-01. The district court's judgment affirming the hearing officer's revocation of Suelzle's driving privileges was reversed. View "Suelzle v. NDDOT" on Justia Law