Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's petition for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) miscalculated his parole eligibility, holding that the circuit court failed to address Appellant's primary claim that the ADC erred in applying a 2007 amended version of Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-120(e) requiring defendants sentenced to a firearm enhancement to serve seventy percent of the enhanced sentence.Defendant was sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment for aggravated robbery and an additional fifteen years' imprisonment for use of a firearm in the robbery pursuant to section 16-90-120. In dismissing Appellant's mandamus petition, the circuit court agreed with the State's argument that Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-911(a)(1)(c) authorized the ADC to require Appellant to serve seventy percent of his aggregate sentence of forty-five years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that remand was required for the circuit court to address whether the seventy-percent requirement was applicable to the fifteen-year sentence enhancement and to address the language found in the amendment to section 16-90-120. View "Rogers v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the condition restricting entry upon school grounds on certain offenders is mandatory only for parolees who have been designated a level three sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) and are serving a sentence for an offense enumerated in N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).Although Petitioner's conviction did not qualify as an enumerated offense under the statute, the Board of Parole determined that, because of his level three sex offender designation, Petitioner was nevertheless subject to the mandatory condition restricting entry upon school grounds. The Appellate Division granted Petitioner's petition for habeas corpus to the extent of annulling that part of the Board's determination that found Petitioner subject to the mandatory school grounds restriction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding than an offender must be serving a sentence for an enumerated offense and be a level three sex offender in order for the mandatory condition to apply. View "People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, in these two criminal cases, there was no constitutional violation in the practice of temporarily confining level three sex offenders in correctional facilities, after the time they would otherwise be released to parole or postrelease supervision (PRS), while they remain on a waiting list for accommodation at a shelter compliant with N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14).New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified. At issue was whether the Federal Constitution allows DOCCS to place a SARA-restricted sex offender in an RTF or other correctional facility while awaiting SARA-compliant housing. The Court of Appeals held that the practice is constitutional. View "People ex rel. Johnson v. Superintendent, Adirondack Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that New York statutes allow the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) to place a Sexual Assault Reform Act (SARA)-restricted sex offender temporarily in a residential treatment facility (RTF) until SARA-compliant housing is identified.Under N.Y. Penal Law 70.45(3), the board of parole may impose as a condition of postrelease supervision (PRS) that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from an underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of an residential treatment facility (RTF). N.Y. Correct. Law 73(10) authorizes the DOCCS to use any RTF as a residence for persons who are on community supervision, which includes those on PRS. The Court of Appeals held that Correction Law 73(10) authorizes DOCCS to provide temporary housing in an RTF to sex offenders subject to the mandatory condition set forth in the SARA, N.Y. Exec. Law 259-c(14), after the six-month period specified in Penal Law 70.45(3) has expired but before the offender on PRS has located compliant housing. View "People ex rel. McCurdy v. Warden, Westchester County Correctional Facility" on Justia Law

Kyle Christianson appealed a district court’s judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on his conviction in Canada for a driving under the influence offense. Christianson argued the Department lacked jurisdiction because the Canadian statute did not define an equivalent offense, and that the hearing officer failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s suspension and disqualification of Christianson’s noncommercial and commercial driving privileges. View "Christianson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Corey Jundt appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative hearing officer’s decision to suspend Jundt’s driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence. Jundt argued the hearing officer erred in suspending his driving privileges because the arresting officer failed to read him the implied consent advisory. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the implied consent requirements of N.D.C.C. 39-20-01 did not apply when an individual consented to a chemical test. View "Jundt v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Benjamin Suelzle appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking his driving privileges for two years. Suelzle argued the hearing officer erred: (1) by finding the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01; (2) by admitting a supplemental report and notice form; and (3) by failing to exclude evidence of his test refusal because he was not given a valid implied consent advisory. Specifically, he contended he could not be lawfully arrested under N.D.C.C. 39-08-01 because the alleged actual physical control occurred on the grassy yard of his private residence, which was an improved private residential lot and not a place to which the public has access. The hearing officer rejected Suelzle’s argument that his vehicle was located on private property to which the officer could have no reasonable grounds to believe the public would have a right of access for vehicular use. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review of the Department hearing and district court record that although there was evidence in the record that Suelzle drove under the influence on areas where the public had a right of access before parking on his lawn, he was not charged with driving under the influence. He was charged only with actual physical control of his pickup where it was ultimately parked on his residential grass lawn. The hearing officer’s finding was based on a misapplication of law, and it was not supported by evidence in the record sufficient to show the location of the actual physical control offense was within the scope of N.D.C.C. 39-08-01. The district court's judgment affirming the hearing officer's revocation of Suelzle's driving privileges was reversed. View "Suelzle v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

Appellant Derrick Lingnaw, a registered sex offender, sought declaratory relief from the district court asking whether he could legally reside on his property. The district court found Lingnaw’s residence was within five hundred feet of property on which a school was located, as that term was used in Idaho Code section 18-8329(1)(d). The court thus denied Lingnaw’s request to enjoin the Custer County Sheriff, Stuart Lumpkin, from interfering with Lingnaw’s ability to reside on his property. The court also denied Sheriff Lumpkin’s request for attorney fees and costs. On appeal, the parties mainly disputed the district court’s finding that Lingnaw’s residence was within five hundred feet of a school. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling that Lingnaw's property was within five hundred feet of property on which a school was located. Lingnaw raised a question of fact as to whether the building, ruled as a "school," was simply a gymnasium and building leased by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”); Lingnaw argued the plain meaning of “school” required some form of traditional educational instruction. The trial court found “that the gymnasium, as contemplated by the statute, is a school building utilized by the school for school functions on a regular basis . . . for sporting events and other school activities. And children are coming and going from that building on a regular basis.” Because it was “clear from the evidence” that Lingnaw’s property fell “well within” five hundred feet or the buildings’ property line, the district court found that Lingnaw lived within five hundred feet of a school. To this, the Supreme Court concurred. The district court's judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Lingnaw v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

Murphy Burnett was arrested and detained for several years. The State eventually moved to nolle prosequi its criminal case against Burnett, and he was released from detention. Burnett filed suit against several governmental entities based on torts connected to his arrest, prosecution, and detention. All the entities moved to dismiss based on a failure to file proper notices of claims and based on the statutes of limitation. The trial court granted these motions. Because proper notices of claims were not sent, because most of the claims were barred by one-year statutes of limitation, and because Burnett did not specifically raise the remaining claims on appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Burnett v. Hinds County, Mississippi" on Justia Law

In August 2017, the State filed a petition to civilly commit P.D., relying on P.D.’s conviction for an offense that qualified as a “sexually violent offense” as defined in N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.26, and other offenses. The State submitted two clinical certificates from psychiatrists who opined that P.D. suffered from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that made him “likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility for control, care and treatment.” The trial court entered an order temporarily civilly committing P.D. to the Special Treatment Unit. P.D. waived his right under the SVPA to a court hearing within twenty days of the court’s temporary commitment order. P.D. thereafter filed a motion to compel discovery, which the trial court denied. The court found no support for P.D.’s contention that a person facing an SVPA commitment hearing could seek discovery under the general civil discovery rule, Rule 4:10-1, or other rules governing civil cases. The Appellate Division denied P.D.’s motion for leave to appeal the trial court’s decision. Finding no reversible error in the trial or appellate court orders, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of P.D." on Justia Law