Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Aquil Johnson claimed he was entitled to a refund of monies deducted from his inmate account pursuant to Act 84 because no procedural safeguards were in place when the deductions began. Recent decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, certain safeguards had to be applied before the first Act 84 deduction was made in connection with a given criminal sentence. The issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in this case was whether relief was available where the first deduction was made before those decisions were announced. The Supreme Court found that due process mandated the Department of Corrections afford post-deprivation process analogous to the pre-deprivation procedures required by Bundy v. Wetzel, 184 A.3d 551 (2018). Further development was required to determine whether the Department already supplied Appellant with adequate post-deprivation process. The Court found Appellant failed to set forth a valid basis to implicate an administrative ability-to-pay hearing. The Commonwealth Court was affirmed insofar as it dismissed Appellant’s claims relating to negligence and the administrative ability-to-pay hearing; it was vacated to the extent it dismissed Appellant’s claim relating to due process. The matter is remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the master commissioner and granted Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the amount of his pretrial bond, holding that the master commissioner properly stated the facts and applied the law.Petitioner was in jail awaiting trial on multiple charges when he filed his habeas petition. The Supreme Court referred the matter to a master commissioner to conduct a hearing to determine whether Petitioner was being held unlawfully due to an excessive bond. The master commissioner concluded that the $1,000,000 bond on which Petitioner was being held was excessive and recommended modifying the bail to $200,000. The Supreme Court adopted the recommendation and granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus but with certain additional nonfinancial conditions. View "Mohamed v. Eckelberry" on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing a hearing officer’s decision suspending Brandon Jorgenson’s driving privileges for 180 days. The Department argued the court erred in determining that, regardless of whether Jorgenson raised a proper objection at the administrative hearing regarding the omission of the phrase “directed by the law enforcement officer” from the implied consent advisory, the court could reverse the hearing officer’s decision if its findings of fact were not supported by the preponderance of evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court found it was undisputed in this case that the deputy omitted the phrase “directed by the law enforcement officer” from the implied consent advisory. Section 39-20-01(3)(b), N.D.C.C., stated, “A test administered under this section is not admissible in any criminal or administrative proceeding to determine a violation of section 39-08-01 or this chapter if the law enforcement officer fails to inform the individual charged as required under [N.D.C.C. § 39-20-01(3)(a)].” In Vagts, 932 N.W.2d 523 (2019), the Supreme Court concluded that “the officer’s omission of the phrase ‘directed by the law enforcement officer’ was a substantive omission and did not comply with the statutory requirements for the implied consent advisory.” Therefore, the Court concluded the district court properly reversed the hearing officer's decision. View "Jorgenson v. NDDOT" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and its director (collectively, DRC) to revise their calculation of Charles Fraley's prison sentence, holding that Fraley was entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling DRC to correct its records.In this case, the sentencing court imposed an aggregate sentence of ten years. However, DRC computed Fraley's sentence to be an aggregate term of thirteen years. In his petition for a writ of mandamus Fraley argued that DRC was under a clear legal duty to follow the sentencing judge's entries. The Supreme Court agreed, holding (1) Fraley did not have an alternative remedy that would preclude the possibility of a writ of mandamus; and (2) DRC had a clear legal duty to carry out the sentence that the trial court imposed. View "State ex rel. Fraley v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended Bradley Sanders' driver's license pursuant to South Carolina's implied consent statute after he refused to take a blood-alcohol test following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The suspension was upheld by the Office of Motor Vehicles and Hearings (OMVH), the Administrative Law Court (ALC), and the court of appeals. Sanders argued on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court that the decision of the court of appeals should have been reversed due to a lack of substantial evidence in the record to support the suspension. Specifically, Sanders argued the court of appeals erred in: (1) determining there was substantial evidence that a nurse, who was working in the emergency room at the time Sanders was admitted, qualified as licensed medical personnel; and (2) holding the statements used to establish his alleged inability to submit to a breath test were not hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the suspension. View "Sanders v. So. Carolina Dept. Motor Veh." on Justia Law

In 1998-2010, Dimora served as one of three Cuyahoga County Commissioners. An FBI investigation revealed that Dimora had received over $250,000 in gifts from individuals with business before the County, including home renovations, trips to Las Vegas, and encounters with prostitutes. Dimora had used his position to help with the awarding of County contracts, hiring, the results of at least one County election, and civil litigation outcomes. Dimora’s “influence” ranged from casting formal votes as Commissioner to pressuring other officials.Dimora was charged with Hobbs Act offenses, bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, making false statements on tax returns, conspiracy to commit mail fraud and honest services mail fraud, conspiracy to commit bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds, conspiracy to commit wire fraud and honest services wire fraud, RICO conspiracy, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice and obstructing a federal investigation. A jury convicted Dimora on 33 counts. The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions defining “official acts” as having “fairly trace[d] the line between permissible gifts and impermissible bribes.” A ruling that state ethics reports were inadmissible hearsay was harmless in light of “overwhelming evidence.”In its 2016 “McDonnell” decision, the Supreme Court gave a narrow construction to a key element included within several of Dimora’s offenses. The term “official acts” does not include “setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event.” Official acts are limited to “formal exercise[s] of governmental power.” Dimora petitioned to vacate his convictions under 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit vacated a denial of relief. The court declined to decide whether the instructional error was harmless with respect to most of the counts or whether the “cumulative effect” of instructional and evidentiary errors entitles Dimora to relief. View "Dimora v. United States" on Justia Law

Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to making false statements to FBI agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. In May 2020, before sentencing, the government moved to dismiss all charges with prejudice. Flynn consented to that motion and moved to withdraw his pending motions, including a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court appointed an amicus curiae to present arguments in opposition to the government’s motion and to address whether the court should issue an Order to Show Cause why Flynn should not be held in criminal contempt for perjury.Flynn filed an emergency mandamus petition. A panel of the D.C. Circuit issued the writ to compel the district court to immediately grant the government’s motion. On rehearing, en banc, the D.C. Circuit denied Flynn’s requests to compel the immediate grant of the government’s motion and to vacate the district court’s appointment of amicus. Flynn has not established that he has “no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.” The court also declined to mandate that the case be reassigned to a different district judge; Flynn has not established a clear and indisputable right to reassignment. The court noted the interest in allowing the district court to decide a pending motion in the first instance; that Flynn is not in custody; and that “it is simply not the case that the Executive will be irreparably harmed by the procedures." View "In re: Flynn" on Justia Law

Ruben Lona admitted he had been a member of a criminal street gang, but claimed he left the gang in 2016. In 2018, invoking the procedure in Penal Code section 186.34, Lona asked the City of Fullerton Police Department (the Department) to remove his name from a shared gang database that listed him as a suspected gang member or associate. The Department denied his request; Lona then filed a petition for removal pursuant to section 186.35. The trial court denied his petition, based in large part on Lona’s sworn statements that he left the gang only three years earlier, still possessed attire that violated the gang injunction applicable to his former gang, and still bore gang tattoos. Lona appealed, asserting the trial court erred by admitting the Department’s 2018 denial letter and by denying him an opportunity to respond to the letter’s contents. He further contended the Department did not prove his “active gang membership” by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Lona v. City of Fullerton Police Dept." on Justia Law

After the Department discharged plaintiff based on her failure to report another deputy's use of force against an inmate and her failure to seek medical assistance for the inmate, the Commission affirmed the discharge. However, the trial court granted plaintiff's petition for writ of mandate and directed the Commission to set aside plaintiff's discharge, award her back pay, and reconsider a lesser penalty.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in upholding plaintiff's discharge. In this case, plaintiff committed a more egregious violation of Department policy that went beyond a failure to report the use of force or to seek medical attention by perpetuating a code of silence among deputies in the jail, which encouraged other deputies to ignore their responsibilities and brought embarrassment to the Department. Therefore, plaintiff's conduct also violated the general behavior policy, which requires a deputy "not act or behave privately or officially in such a manner as to bring discredit upon himself or the Department." Given the Department's reasoned explanation that discharge was necessary in light of plaintiff's furtherance of the code of silence and the resulting embarrassment and loss of trust in the Department, the court held that this is not the exceptional case where reasonable minds cannot differ on the appropriate penalty. View "Pasos v. Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission" on Justia Law

Petitioner Everett Johnson, a citizen of the Bahamas, became a United States permanent resident in 1977. But in 2016, he pleaded guilty to possessing a schedule II controlled substance in violation of Colorado law. Soon after, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Johnson as removable from the United States based on the state drug conviction. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) then ordered Johnson’s removal from the United States back to the Bahamas. He appealed, challenging that the state drug conviction subjected him to deportation from the United States. The Tenth Circuit determined Colorado Revised Statute section 18-18-403.5(1), (2)(a) was overbroad and indivisible as to the identity of a particular controlled substance. Therefore, Johnson’s conviction could not subject him to removal from the United States. The Court therefore granted Johnson’s petition for review, vacated the BIA’s order, and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Barr" on Justia Law