Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles affirming the South Dakota Department of Correction's (Department) calculations of Appellant's parole eligibility for his two sentences under the parole grid in S.D. Codified Laws 24-15A-32, holding that the Department correctly calculated Appellant's parole eligibility.Appellant was sentenced to penitentiary terms for aggravated assault against a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon. Before the Supreme Court, Appellant argued that the Department misapplied the parole grid by using one or more of his prior non-violent felony convictions to increase his time until parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Department properly applied the parole grid. View "Reck v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles" on Justia Law

In late 2016, then-Pennsylvania Attorney General Bruce Beemer petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, pursuant to the Investigating Grand Jury Act, for an order to convene a multicounty investigating grand jury having statewide jurisdiction to investigate organized crime or public corruption or both. This appeal concerned a motion for return of property filed by several Lackawanna County governmental entities (“County”) relative to materials seized by the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”). The OAG seized the County’s property pursuant to search warrants issued by the Supervising Judge of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. After the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury was empaneled and an investigation was ongoing, an OAG Special Agent and a Pennsylvania State Trooper applied to Judge Sarcione for four warrants to search and seize certain property belonging to the County. Approximately a year later, the County moved for return of property. Notably, the County filed its motion in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, which comprised the 45th Judicial District. In its motion, the County advanced a threefold argument to support its claim of entitlement to lawful possession of the seized materials: (1) the underlying search warrants were unconstitutionally general and overbroad; (2) the seizing of judicial and other governmental officials’ property infringed upon various privacy interests and legal privileges; and (3) the search warrants were invalid under Pa.R.Crim.P. 200. Without confirming or denying the existence of a grand jury investigation due to secrecy concerns, the OAG nevertheless challenged the lower court’s jurisdiction to hear the motion for return. The Supreme Court determined that the judge overseeing the Grand Jury, was empowered to issue search warrants in any judicial district, provided that the warrants related to an investigation of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury. Because there was no dispute the search and seizure warrants for the County’s property related to such an investigation, the supervising judge was authorized to issue them. Further, because the County’s motion for return of property challenged the validity of those search warrants, it related to the work of the 41st Statewide Investigating Grand Jury and had to be presented to the Supervising Judge, who had to adjudicate the motion or conclude it did not raise grand jury secrecy concerns. As the lower court reached the opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated its order and remanded for further proceedings. View "In Re: Return of Seized Property of Lackawanna Cty" on Justia Law

Former federal prisoner, plaintiff-appellant Billy May, filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), claiming he was denied his due process rights as a prisoner when he was quarantined without a hearing during a scabies infestation at the prison. The magistrate judge granted camp administrator Juan Segovia summary judgment on two issues: (1) the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applied to May; and (2) there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the availability of administrative remedies. May appealed to contest both conclusions. Segovia opposed May’s appeal, raising two alternative grounds for affirmance that Segovia raised before the magistrate judge, but the judge did not reach. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge’s conclusions that the PLRA exhaustion requirement applied to May and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether administrative remedies were available to him. Because the Court affirmed the judgment below, it did not reach Segovia’s alternative arguments. View "May v. Segovia" on Justia Law

After Sandy City, Utah’s city council adopted an ordinance making it illegal for any person “to sit or stand, in or on any unpaved median, or any median of less than 36 inches for any period of time,” appellant Steve Ray Evans received four citations for violating the Ordinance when he stood on narrow or unpaved medians. Evans filed suit against the City and many of its officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the Ordinance was facially invalid because it violated the First Amendment right to free speech. Evans also asked the district court to grant his request for a preliminary injunction. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, and after a hearing, the district court denied Evans’ preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment in favor of the City because the Ordinance was a valid time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Evans appealed, arguing the district court incorrectly applied the time, place, or manner standard and wrongly granted summary judgment because the City did not satisfy its evidentiary burden. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment. View "Evans v. Sandy City" on Justia Law

In 2005, near the end of a five-year sentence for conviction of corruption or solicitation of a minor, the State successfully petitioned to commit T.A.G. as a sexually dangerous individual. He appealed, arguing the findings were insufficient to demonstrate he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed denial of T.A.G.'s petition for discharge because it concurred the findings were insufficient to conclude process requirement had been met under Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002). View "Interest of T.A.G." on Justia Law

The North Dakota Department of Transportation appealed a district court judgment reversing an administrative hearing officer’s decision to suspend Andrew Bridgeford’s driving privileges for 91 days. The Department maintained the district court erred in finding a law enforcement officer was not within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment when the officer entered Bridgeford’s vehicle after he failed to respond to the officer’s actions outside the vehicle. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding the community caretaker exception applied and allowed the warrantless entry into Bridgeford’s vehicle. The suspension was reinstated. View "Bridgeford v. Sorel" on Justia Law

The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement audited the Indian Lake Police Department and found what it believed to be deficiencies in firearms-proficiency records for several volunteer reserve officers. To cure the deficiencies, Appellant John Chambers, then-Police Chief John Chambers, directed a subordinate to falsify the records. The jury found Appellant guilty of 14 courts of tampering with a governmental record with the intent to defraud or harm. On discretionary review, Appellant challenged the denial of a requested jury instruction on whether the records were required to be kept and the sufficiency of the evidence to show his intent to defraud or harm the government. He also claimed the court of appeals did not address his argument about the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome a statutory defense that applied when the falsification of the record has no effect on the governmental purpose for the record. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held: (1) Appellant was not harmed by the denial of the requested jury instruction; (2) the evidence was insufficient to show intent to defraud or harm; and (3) the court of appeals should be given the opportunity to address his argument about the sufficiency of the evidence to overcome his statutory defense. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to evaluate Appellant’s statutory defense. View "Chambers v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury found Kenneth Campbell met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP) under South Carolina's SVP Act, S.C. Code Ann. sections 44-48-10 to -170 (2018). Campbell appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. On petition of certiorari, Campbell contended the court of appeals erred in affirming his civil commitment because the State inappropriately impeached the credibility of Campbell's expert witness by introducing evidence of a recent arrest warrant for an unrelated sex offender whom the expert had opined was unlikely to reoffend. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the admission of testimony about a mere arrest warrant of an unrelated individual in a collateral matter unduly prejudiced Campbell and, therefore, reversed and remanded for a new commitment proceeding. View "In the Matter of the Care & Treatment of Campbell" on Justia Law

The State of Delaware appealed a superior court order that affirmed a determination by the Industrial Accident Board (the Board) that Nicholas Gates was working within the course and scope of his employment when he was injured in a motor vehicle collision. At the time of the collision, Gates was employed by the State as a road-maintenance equipment operator for the Department of Transportation (DelDOT). The collision occurred while he was responding to a “call-back” after his normal work hours. He was called back to attend to a roadside accident. Gates sought workers’ compensation benefits from the State for his injury. At the hearing before the Board, the State argued that State of Delaware Merit Rule 4.16 1 and a document titled “Call-Back Pay Guidelines and Recommended Procedure” (the Call-Back Pay Guidelines) were part of Gates’s employment contract. According to these provisions, Gates was not to be paid for a call-back until he arrived at the DelDOT yard. Because Gates’s collision occurred before he arrived at the yard, the State argued, his injury occurred outside the course and scope of his employment and was, therefore, not compensable under Delaware’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act).3 The Board looked to the parties’ prior course of conduct to determine the terms of the employment contract and found that Gates’s injury was compensable under the Act because, based on the parties’ prior course of conduct, he “was working within the course and scope of his employment contract when the motor vehicle accident occurred.” The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court, and therefore the Board. Specifically, the Court determined the Board applied the correct legal standard and acted within its discretion in finding, based on Gates’s unrebutted testimony as to the parties’ course of conduct prior to the collision, that the terms of Gates’s employment contract established he was to be paid for a callback from the time he received the call and that, at the time of the collision, he was working within the course and scope of this contract. These factual findings were supported by substantial evidence; the Board did not err in determining that Gates’s injury was compensable under the Act. View "Delaware v. Gates" on Justia Law

Drew Sutton appealed a district court judgment affirming the Department of Transportation hearing officer’s decision revoking Sutton’s driver’s license for 180 days. Sutton argued the Report and Notice did not include a statement of reasonable grounds for why the police officer believed Sutton was driving under the influence of alcohol or why he believed Sutton’s body contained alcohol. Sutton argued both alleged failures fall below the statutory requirements. He also argued there was no evidence that he affirmatively refused the onsite screening test. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment affirming the hearing officer’s decision. View "Sutton v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law