Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

J.M. appealed a district court order denying his petition for discharge and continuing his commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. J.M. was civilly committed as a sexually dangerous individual in October 2005 at the end of his incarceration for a 2001 conviction for gross sexual imposition involving a nine-year-old victim. J.M. unsuccessfully petitioned for discharge several times and has appealed his commitment on four prior occasions. He argued this time the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence his antisocial personality disorder and sexual disorder were likely to result in a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Based on this record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the State did not establish clear and convincing evidence of a nexus between J.M.’s disorder and his sexual dangerousness to others, and reversed. View "Matter of J.M." on Justia Law

T.A.G. appeals from an order denying discharge from commitment as a sexually dangerous individual. T.A.G. argues the district court did not make sufficient findings or meet its burden of clear and convincing evidence on the elements of “likely to reoffend” and “serious difficulty controlling behavior.” The North Dakota Supreme Court determined the findings of fact were not sufficient to permit appellate review. The Court retained jurisdiction under N.D.R.App.P. 35(a)(3) and remanded the case with instructions that, within thirty days from the filing of this opinion, the district court make specific findings of fact on whether T.A.G. was “likely to reoffend” and whether T.A.G. has “serious difficulty controlling behavior” beyond that of a dangerous but ordinary criminal recidivist. View "Interest of T.A.G." on Justia Law

Morgan Lies appealed a district court judgment affirming a Department of Transportation decision suspending his driving privileges for ninety-one days. Lies argued the hearing officer’s decision violated his constitutional rights because neither the arresting officer nor the officer who received the tip had a reasonable and articulable suspicion Lies was violating the law prior to being stopped. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the record did not support the administrative officer’s conclusion that the vehicle was properly identified prior to being stopped, and reversed. View "Lies v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

Shaun Ebach appealed a district court judgment affirming an administrative hearing officer’s decision to suspend Ebach’s driving privileges for 180 days for driving under the influence of alcohol. On appeal, Ebach argued the administrative hearing officer erred by admitting invalid chemical breath test records and by making result-oriented findings of fact, and that he was entitled to attorney fees and costs. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the test record was properly admitted, and a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the administrative hearing officer’s finding that the officer who administered the Intoxilyzer test ascertained a 20-minute waiting period prior to administering the test was supported by the weight of the evidence on the entire record. View "Ebach v. N.D. Dept. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), intended to combat sex crimes and crimes against children, requires a broad range of sex offenders to register and imposes criminal penalties; 34 U.S.C. 20913 describes the “[i]nitial registration” requirements. Under subsection (b)'s general rule an offender must register “before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement.” Subsection (d) provides that the Attorney General “shall have the authority” to “specify the applicability” of SORNA’s registration requirements to pre-Act offenders and “to prescribe rules for [their] registration.” The Attorney General issued a rule that SORNA’s registration requirements apply in full to pre-SORNA offenders. The district court and the Second Circuit rejected a claim by a pre-SORNA offender that subsection (d) unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. The Supreme Court affirmed. Four justices concluded that section 20913(d) does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Congress may confer substantial discretion on executive agencies to implement and enforce the laws as long as Congress “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise that authority] is directed to conform.” The Supreme Court has already interpreted 20913(d) to require the Attorney General to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. To “specify the applicability” does not mean “specify whether to apply SORNA” to pre-Act offenders but means “specify how to apply SORNA” to pre-Act offenders; no Attorney General has used section20913(d) in any more expansive way. Section 20913(d)’s delegation falls within constitutional bounds. View "Gundy v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a petition for habeas relief and partial grant of summary judgment for the Government regarding petitioner's claim that USCIS should have exercised jurisdiction over his application for asylum. The court held that the improper inclusion of irrelevant documents in the administrative record and its subsequent supplementation with relevant documents did not prejudice petitioner and any errors on the part of the Government in this respect were harmless; USCIS's decision not to exercise jurisdiction over petitioner's asylum claim was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law; and petitioner's habeas petition was moot because he did not otherwise argue that any meaningful relief could be granted to him via a habeas petition. View "Salmeron-Salmeron v. Spivey" on Justia Law

The State of Alabama petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a mandamus relief. The State sought the vacation of a circuit court order holding certain statutes and acts of Alabama unconstitutional, and to require the Mobile circuit clerk to withhold 10% of the funds collected as court costs and fees from litigants in Mobile County until such time the State adequately funds the clerk’s office. This matter arose out of a criminal proceeding in which a grand jury indicted Mandy Brady for trafficking methamphetamine. Brady posted bond on that charge and was released; however, she was subsequently arrested on a new charge, and the State moved to revoke her bond. The circuit court granted the State's motion and revoked Brady's bond. Despite the fact that Brady was in State custody when the circuit court revoked the bond, Brady did not appear at her scheduled trial on the trafficking charge. When Brady failed to appear, the circuit court issued a show-cause order to the circuit clerk, the Mobile County sheriff, "and/or" the warden of the Mobile County jail seeking an explanation as to why Brady was released from jail despite the fact that the circuit court had revoked her bond. The warden testified that he never received notice from the circuit clerk's office that Brady's bond had been revoked; the circuit clerk testified that an employee in her office had properly entered the circuit court's order revoking Brady's bond before Brady was released from the county jail but that employee apparently failed to send notice of the order to the county jail. The circuit clerk explained that this mistake occurred because she did not have the ability to fully train her employees before giving them the responsibility of managing a circuit judge's docket; ultimately the problem, according to the circuit clerk, was that she did not have adequate funding to retain well trained personnel. The Supreme Court determined the circuit court exceeded its authority in the Brady matter, “purporting to award declaratory and injunctive relief no party had requested.” The State’s petition for mandamus relief was granted. View "Ex parte State of Alabama." on Justia Law

An en banc panel of the Superior Court ruled that Appellant Molly Hlubin’s stop and arrest at a sobriety checkpoint in Robinson Township, Pennsylvania, conducted by a task force that included police officers from a number of other municipalities operating outside of their primary jurisdictions, was lawful. According to the Superior Court, formation of the task force did not require compliance with the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act (“ICA”), as the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (“MJPA”) contained exceptions to the general limitation on police activities outside of an officer’s primary jurisdiction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed: the checkpoint at issue here equired compliance with the ICA, as none of the exceptions in the MPJA authorized the extraterritorial police activities performed here. View "Pennsylvania v. Hlubin" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, in the alternative, failure to state a claim. Although plaintiffs challenged the inclusion of marijuana on Schedule I of the federal Controlled Substances Act, they did not first pursue reclassification through the administrative process defined in the Act.The Second Circuit held that plaintiffs' action was premature, because plaintiffs should attempt to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking relief from this court. However, the court noted that it was troubled by the DEA's history of dilatory proceedings and thus, rather than dismiss the case, the court held it in abeyance and retained jurisdiction in this panel to take whatever action might become appropriate if the DEA does not act with adequate dispatch. View "Washington v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellant's pro se complaint filed under the Declaratory Judgment Act alleging that the Wyoming Department of Corrections (WDOC) violated certain policies and procedures during disciplinary proceedings brought against him, holding that Appellant was not entitled to relief.Specifically, the Court held (1) Appellant did not have standing to seek a general declaration that the WDOC must abide by its own rules and regulations, and the district court properly considered standing in dismissing Appellant's complaint even though the WDOC did not raise the standing issue in its motion to dismiss; and (2) collateral estoppel and res judicata barred Appellant's claims that procedural violations occurred during his disciplinary proceedings. View "Bird v. Lampert" on Justia Law