Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant, Lawrence Clark was issued a citation for displaying his art for sale on neutral ground at Decatur Street and Esplanade Avenue in New Orleans, in violation of New Orleans Municipal Code. Clark moved to quash the charging affidavit, asserting the ordinance was unconstitutional. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to consider whether New Orleans Municipal Code section 110-11, which regulated the outdoor retail sale of art, was indeed unconstitutional as a violation of Clark’s First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court concurred with Clark that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Therefore, it reversed the lower courts’ rulings and granted the motion to quash the charging affidavit against Clark. View "City of New Orleans v. Clark" on Justia Law

In 2002, officers seized $100,120 in U.S. currency from an Amtrak train passenger. The federal government initiated a civil forfeiture proceeding against the currency. The passenger and the owner of the funds, neither of whom were charged with committing any crime related to the funds, joined the suit as claimants. After 14 years and two appeals, a jury found the currency was substantially connected to a drug transaction and entered a verdict for the government. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the claimants’ motion to have dog-sniff evidence excluded on spoliation grounds based on claimants' argument that the government intentionally converted the currency to a cashier’s check, depriving them of the opportunity to perform chemical tests to determine the presence or absence of drugs. The judge accepted the government’s contention that the officers deposited the currency in conformity with a Justice Department policy not to hold large amounts of cash and found no bad faith. The jury instructions were not confusing; they told the jury to determine whether the money was substantially connected to some unlawful drug transaction and fit within certain statutory categories, regardless of the claimants’ personal participation in any such drug transaction. The verdict was supported by evidence concerning the drug-courier profile, the drug dog’s alert, and the claimants' implausible explanations for being on the train and having the cash. View "Marrocco v. Funds in the Amount of One Hundred Thousand and One Hundred Twenty Dollars" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Bacon appeals the district court’s denial of his post-conviction motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for the return of seized property that allegedly went missing from the physical custody of state officials while federal charges were pending. State officials seized property in Appellant’s possession at the time of his arrest, including a fake mustache; a black wig; numerous items of clothing; a bank robbery demand note; multiple wallets, knives, lighters, bags, and keys; the title to a vehicle; and a small container with a crystalline substance within it that tested positive for meth. While Appellant’s state charges were still pending, he was indicted by a federal grand jury on five counts of bank robbery. Federal officials asked the state officials to hold Appellant’s seized property for use as evidence in the federal case. Thereafter, Appellant entered a guilty plea in the state prosecution that resolved all of the state charges against him. State officials allegedly released some of the property seized from Appellant, specifically, a wallet and the keys and title to a van, to his ex-wife. Following the expiration of Appellant’s time for appeal, defense counsel went to the Salt Lake City Police Department to retrieve Appellant’s property for him. Several items were returned to him. However, Appellant alleged there was a major discrepancy between what had been seized and what was turned over to counsel by state officials. Following a hearing, the court denied the Rule 41(g) motion for two reasons: (1) Appellant had other adequate remedies at law, including state causes of action and a pending federal section 1983 civil action Appellant had already filed regarding the disposition of his seized property; and (2) the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant monetary relief for any missing property. Finding no reversible error in the district court decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Bacon" on Justia Law

In January 2014, a General Order was issued under the authority of the Chief of the Barnegat Township Police Department that applied only to that department. The Order instructed officers to record by MVR several categories of incidents. It was undisputed that the MVR recordings at the center of this appeal were made in compliance with the Order. The MVR recordings at issue documented an incident in which police officers pursued and arrested a driver who had allegedly eluded an officer attempting a traffic stop. One officer’s decision to deploy a police dog during the arrest led to internal investigations and criminal charges against the officer. Approximately four months after the driver’s arrest, plaintiff John Paff sought access to the MVR recordings under OPRA and the common law. The Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office (OCPO) opposed disclosure. Plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show cause, seeking access to the MVR recordings on the basis of OPRA and the common-law right of access. The trial court ordered disclosure of the MVR recordings. A divided Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s determination. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division panel, concurring with the panel’s dissenting judge that the MVR recordings were not “required by law” within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1, that they constituted criminal investigatory records under that provision, and that they were therefore not subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of plaintiff’s claim of a common-law right of access to the MVR recordings. View "Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutors Office" on Justia Law

John Doe I and John Doe II were two separate individuals required by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) to register as sex offenders in Alaska based on their out-of-state convictions. DPS argued Doe I’s Washington convictions and Doe II’s California conviction were “similar” to the Alaska offense of attempted sexual abuse of a minor under AS 11.31.100 and AS 11.41.436(a)(2), making both Doe I and Doe II subject to Alaska’s sex offender registration requirement. One superior court judge determined that Doe I was not required to register; another superior court judge determined that Doe II was required to register. The cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that neither the Washington nor the California laws under which Doe I and Doe II were convicted were similar to the relevant Alaska law and therefore held that neither Doe I nor Doe II was required to register under Alaska law. View "Alaska, Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Parole Board to hold a parole hearing at which Appellant’s parole request would be given “meaningful consideration,” holding that Appellant did not demonstrate that the parole board failed to give his parole request meaningful consideration.On appeal, Appellant argued that the parole board did not give his parole request meaningful consideration as a result of materially false or misleading information in his parole record. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his parole record contained false or misleading information that might have adversely affected the board’s consideration of his parole request. View "State ex rel. Keith v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

At issue was the degree to which Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-470 constrains the discretion of the habeas court as to when it may act on the Commissioner of Correction’s motion for an order to show good cause why a habeas petition should be permitted to proceed when a petitioner has delayed filing the petition.In this case, the Commissioner filed a motion requesting the habeas court to order Petitioner to show cause why his untimely filed petition should be permitted to proceed. The court interpreted section 52-470 to deprive it of discretion to act on the motion prior to the close of all proceedings and thus took no action on the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 52-470(e) applied in this case and did not limit the discretion of the habeas court as to when it may act on a motion for an order to show cause why an untimely petition should be permitted to proceed; and (2) therefore, the habeas court erred in determining that it lacked discretion to act on the Commissioner’s order to show cause because the pleadings were not yet closed. View "Kelsey v. Commissioner of Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board’s use of the Static-99R recidivism risk assessment comports with Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.1214’s assessment requirements, that changes to parole procedures do not constitute an ex post facto violation, and that the use of the Static-99R assessment does not violate an inmate’s due process rights.As part of Appellant’s parole review, his recidivism risk was assessed with the Static-99R risk assessment. The assessment classified Appellant as a high risk to recidivate, and the Parole Board denied parole. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the Static-99R assessment. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the Static-99R assessment was not formally adopted as or determined to be a “currently accepted standard of assessment” for use in Appellant’s parole hearing; (2) because Appellant failed to show that changes to the parole statute enacted after his conviction created a risk of prolonged imprisonment, they did not constitute impermissible ex post facto punishment; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the use of the Static-99R violated his due process rights. View "Coles v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the burden and quantum of proof in cases in which sex offenders seek termination of their duty to register under the State’s sex offender registry law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178C-178Q.In this companion case to Noe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, 480 Mass. __ (2018), the Supreme Judicial Court held (1) due process requires that the appropriate quantum of proof in termination proceedings is clear and convincing evidence, and the burden is imposed on the Sex Offender Registry Board, not the sex offender; (2) an offender seeking termination has a burden of production to show a change in circumstances indicating that he or she no longer poses a risk to reoffend or a danger to the public; and (3) hearings on reclassifications and terminations must take place within a reasonable period of time after the issuance of the rescript in the instant case. View "Doe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 76819 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court held that reclassification hearings of convicted sex offenders under the sex offender registry law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178C-178Q, require the Sex Offender Registry Board (Board) to meet the same standard and burden of proof as initial classification hearings.Plaintiff was classified as a level three sex offender in 2007. In 2013, Plaintiff filed a request for downward reclassification. After a hearing, the Board denied Plaintiff’s request for reclassification, concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff remained a high risk of reoffense and of dangerousness. A superior court judge vacated the Board’s reclassification, concluding (1) the Board’s regulations placing the burden of proof on the offender seeking reclassification violate the offender’s right to due process, and (2) the Board’s failure to provide counsel for indigent offenders seeking reclassification violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 6, 178L(3). The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) due process requires that the Board be required to prove the appropriateness of the offender’s current classification by clear and convincing evidence; (2) offenders do have a burden of production to show a change in circumstances indicating a decreased risk of reoffense or degree of dangerousness; and (3) indigent sex offenders have a right to counsel in such reclassification hearings. View "Noe, Sex Offender Registry Board No. 5340 v. Sex Offender Registry Board" on Justia Law