Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Huazhi Han, who was convicted on charges of money laundering and related offenses. Han used his electronic goods business to launder drug proceeds for Mexican drug traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Chicago Police Department (CPD) began investigating a money laundering organization in Chicago, in which Han played a key role. Han received cash proceeds from a drug trafficker, Rafiq Roman, on multiple occasions. After Roman's arrest, he cooperated with the authorities, leading to Han's arrest. The officers found a loaded firearm, approximately $200,000 in cash, and lookalike currency in Han's car. They also searched Han's home, where they found nearly $1.3 million in cash, a money counter, rubber bands, and firearms.Han was indicted on four charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Before trial, Han moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the officers searched his home without a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion, finding that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Han was convicted on all counts.On appeal, Han argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, admitting threat evidence, and denying his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search of their home, the threat evidence was admissible as it was directly related to Han's crimes, and the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not result in an unfair trial. View "United States v. Huazhi Han" on Justia Law

A state agency (the Agency) is under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) for alleged criminal wrongdoing by senior Agency personnel. The DOJ requested the district court to determine that certain Agency communications were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. The district court agreed, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency did not challenge the district court’s ruling as to the first three categories, but disputed the fourth category, which pertained to any actions or communications contemplated or undertaken by the Agency to interfere in or obstruct the current Federal investigation.The district court had previously granted the DOJ's application, ruling that the Agency could not invoke the attorney-client privilege to avoid producing evidence and witness testimony regarding four general categories of information. The Agency sought to modify or rescind this order, but the district court only partially granted the Agency's motion. In April 2024, DOJ served grand jury subpoenas on two senior Agency employees. The Agency moved to quash the subpoenas, but the district court denied the motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the Agency's petition for a writ of mandamus, which sought to override the district court's order allowing grand jury testimony to proceed. The court found that the Agency failed to show a clear and indisputable right to relief. The court also denied the Agency's emergency motion to stay grand jury proceedings. The court clarified that government attorneys may assert the attorney-client privilege as to state agency communications that were conducted in confidence and for the purpose of providing legal advice. However, the court also noted that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege may apply, and left this determination to the discretion of the district court. View "In re Sealed Petitioner" on Justia Law

Ronald Tilley, the appellant, was convicted for robbing a credit union in Bangor, Maine, in 2019. His pre-sentence investigation report (PSI Report) revealed two prior convictions involving potential sexual misconduct, leading to a suggestion for special conditions of supervised release requiring Tilley to participate in sex-offender treatment. The first conviction in 2005 involved an incident where Tilley's then-wife accused him of choking and sexually assaulting her. The second conviction in 2008 was for violating a protective order and involved sexually explicit text messages allegedly exchanged between Tilley and his underage niece. Tilley objected to the sex-offender treatment conditions, leading to a compromise requiring him to undergo a Sexual Offense Assessment and Treatment Evaluation (SOATE).The SOATE, conducted by a licensed clinical social worker, placed Tilley in the "well below average risk" category for sexual recidivism due to the time elapsed since his last sexual misconduct. However, the assessment recommended caution due to a deceptive response in a sexual history polygraph. The SOATE also diagnosed Tilley with antisocial personality disorder and opioid use disorder, and recommended that he have no unsupervised contact with minors and participate in weekly group therapy for sexually problematic behavior.Based on the SOATE report, the government petitioned to add several special conditions to Tilley's supervised release terms, including participation in sex-offender treatment and restrictions on associating with minors. Tilley objected to these conditions, arguing that they were not supported by his previous convictions and that the relevance of these convictions was significantly mitigated by the time elapsed without any sexual misconduct incidents.The United States District Court for the District of Maine granted the government's petition, finding that the proposed modifications promoted the goals of supervised release. The court also found the conditions restricting Tilley's association with minors to be proportionate and reasonably related to the goals of supervised release and his history and characteristics.Tilley appealed, arguing that the district court relied on "clearly erroneous facts" in imposing the modified conditions. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case for abuse of discretion and found no clear error. The court upheld the district court's decision, concluding that the modified conditions were reasonable and supported by the record. View "US v. Tilley" on Justia Law

Between 2012 and 2015, Anthony D’Ambrosio and Armando Delgado were involved in a sex trafficking ring that operated across several states. They were responsible for transporting victims, collecting money, providing security, and supplying drugs to the victims. In 2015, a federal grand jury indicted them, and in 2017, a jury convicted them of several crimes, including sex trafficking of children and transportation of an individual to engage in prostitution. As part of their sentences, the District Court required them to comply with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) as a condition of their supervised release.Delgado objected to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing, arguing that his offenses did not require SORNA registration. The District Court acknowledged that it was unclear whether the SORNA requirement applied to Delgado’s offenses and delegated the determination to the Probation office. Delgado appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, stating that the District Court did not impose any SORNA requirement. However, following his direct appeal, Probation required Delgado to register under SORNA. Delgado challenged this condition, but the District Court denied his motion, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his legal challenge.D’Ambrosio, on the other hand, did not object to the SORNA registration requirement at his sentencing. The District Court required D’Ambrosio to comply with SORNA as a condition of his supervised release. D’Ambrosio first challenged the SORNA requirement in a motion to modify, which the District Court also denied on the grounds of lacking jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's decisions. The Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in delegating its responsibility to determine the applicability of SORNA to the Probation office and in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendants' motions to modify the conditions of their supervised release. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. D’Ambrosio" on Justia Law

The case involves James Snyder, the former mayor of Portage, Indiana, who was convicted of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(B). In 2013, while Snyder was mayor, Portage awarded two contracts to a local truck company, Great Lakes Peterbilt, and purchased five trash trucks from the company for about $1.1 million. In 2014, Peterbilt paid Snyder $13,000. The FBI and federal prosecutors suspected that the payment was a gratuity for the City’s trash truck contracts, but Snyder claimed that the payment was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt. A federal jury convicted Snyder, and the District Court sentenced him to 1 year and 9 months in prison. On appeal, Snyder argued that §666 criminalizes only bribes, not gratuities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Snyder’s conviction.The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision. The Court held that 18 U.S.C. §666 proscribes bribes to state and local officials but does not make it a crime for those officials to accept gratuities for their past acts. The Court reasoned that the statutory text, history, structure, punishments, federalism principles, and fair notice considerations all support the conclusion that §666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute. The Court concluded that a state or local official does not violate §666 if the official has taken the official act before any reward is agreed to, much less given. Although a gratuity offered and accepted after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate §666. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Snyder v. United States" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Joseph Brian McElroy, who was charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs with intent to distribute, a felony. The charge stemmed from a traffic stop initiated by Trooper Adams for speeding. During the stop, Trooper Adams noticed the smell of marijuana from the vehicle and observed signs of "hard travel." After verifying the driver's information and concluding that the driver was not under the influence, Trooper Adams questioned the occupants about the smell of marijuana. When they denied consent to search the vehicle, Trooper Adams deployed a canine for a sniff test, which led to the discovery of drugs and other items. McElroy filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop was unlawfully extended without sufficient particularized suspicion.The District Court denied McElroy's motion to suppress the evidence. The court found that Trooper Adams had sufficient particularized suspicion to conduct the canine sniff based on the smell of marijuana, signs of hard travel, the occupants' nervousness, and their somewhat differing backstories. McElroy then entered a plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision. The court found that Trooper Adams did not have sufficient particularized suspicion to expand the traffic stop into a drug possession investigation. The court held that factors such as signs of hard travel, traveling from a known drug center in a third-party vehicle, and nervous demeanor, even when considered together, do not constitute particularized suspicion. The court also noted that the smell of marijuana itself does not constitute particularized suspicion sufficient to conclude there could be drugs in the vehicle. Therefore, the court concluded that Trooper Adams's further questioning about the marijuana smell and subsequent use of the canine sniff were unlawful. The court reversed the District Court's order denying McElroy's motion to suppress evidence and the resulting judgment of conviction and sentence. View "State v. McElroy" on Justia Law

The defendant, Darnell Tyree-Peppers, was on supervised release after pleading guilty to stealing a firearm from a federally licensed dealer. During his supervised release, his probation officer filed a petition to modify the conditions of his supervision due to alleged violations. Later, the probation officer filed a petition for his arrest and revocation of supervision based on three alleged violations of his supervision conditions. The district court issued the requested warrant. The probation officer later submitted an amended petition alleging that Tyree-Peppers had been arrested by state police officers on charges of first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery, potentially violating the condition that he not commit another federal, state, or local crime.The district court for the District of Kansas did not conduct the hearing on the petition until after the expiration of Tyree-Peppers' supervised release term. The court granted the petition in part and ordered an additional one year of supervised release. Tyree-Peppers challenged the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke his supervised release, arguing that the delay in the revocation proceedings was not “reasonably necessary for the adjudication,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i).The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed with Tyree-Peppers. The court found that the delay was attributable to an ongoing state prosecution of Tyree-Peppers on the very serious charge of first-degree murder. The outcome of that proceeding was directly related to the question of whether Tyree-Peppers violated the condition of his supervised release forbidding him from committing a state crime. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tyree-Peppers" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Katherine Harris, who was convicted for aggravated DUI. While driving with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) twice the legal limit, Harris crashed into a deputy sheriff and his patrol vehicle, causing severe injuries to the deputy. Before trial, Harris requested public funds to hire her own experts, a toxicologist and an accident reconstructionist, to counter the State’s evidence. However, her blood sample, which she had not requested to be preserved, had been destroyed according to routine procedure nine months after testing. The judge denied her requests for expert funding, finding them broad and theoretical, and Harris failed to articulate concrete reasons how these proposed independent experts would specifically assist her defense.In Mississippi, the discretion to grant or deny an indigent defendant funds to retain an independent expert lies with the trial court. The court found that Harris failed to articulate how her own experts would actually assist her defense. Furthermore, the State’s case did not rely exclusively on these two experts and her BAC. The State called additional witnesses who established the patrol car was clearly visible with its blue lights flashing, and multiple other vehicles successfully passed the patrol car before Harris slammed into it. Witnesses also testified Harris smelled like alcohol, failed a field sobriety test, admitted she had been drinking, and tested positive for alcohol on a portable breathalyzer at the scene.The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Harris’s conviction and sentence, discerning no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial of Harris’s request for expert funds. Based on the overwhelming evidence supporting Harris’s aggravated DUI conviction, the judge’s discretionary denial, even if erroneous, was not so prejudicial as to render her trial fundamentally unfair. View "Harris v. State of Mississippi" on Justia Law

The case involves Roland Black, who was convicted of attempting to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, specifically furanyl fentanyl. Law enforcement intercepted a package addressed to Black, believing it contained narcotics. After obtaining a warrant, they found the substance, replaced it with sham narcotics, and delivered the package to Black's residence. Black was arrested after the package was opened and he was found with luminescent powder from the sham narcotics on his hands.Prior to his trial, Black had unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment and suppress all evidence derived from the seizure of the package. He argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package and requested an evidentiary hearing to resolve related factual disputes. The district court denied these motions, ruling that the totality of the circumstances supported the officers' reasonable suspicion determination.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Black appealed his conviction, raising four arguments. He contended that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction about his requisite mens rea was erroneous, the jury’s verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence, and the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the court’s treatment of furanyl fentanyl as an analogue of fentanyl.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. It found that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize the package, the jury instruction accurately stated the law, the jury’s verdict was supported by more than sufficient evidence, and Black's motion to dismiss argument was foreclosed by precedent. View "USA v. Black" on Justia Law

Mario Giannini and Robert Czernek were involved in a series of fraudulent schemes in Bloomingdale Township, Illinois. Giannini worked for Bulldog Earth Movers, a contractor owned by his girlfriend, Debra Fazio. Czernek, the Township's Highway Commissioner, approved inflated invoices from Bulldog, and the excess funds were split between Czernek and Bulldog. Giannini, Czernek, and Fazio were indicted on counts of wire and honest services fraud. Czernek cooperated with the government and pleaded guilty, while Giannini and Fazio proceeded to trial. However, Fazio was acquitted on all counts after the government's case-in-chief.The district court had previously denied Giannini's motion for a mistrial based on the government's late disclosure of investigating agents' notes regarding an inculpatory statement he made to Czernek. Giannini also argued that the court erred in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct in closing arguments, despite her acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial, as the late disclosure of the agents' notes did not sufficiently prejudice Giannini. The court also found no error in allowing the prosecutors to discuss Fazio's conduct, as it was highly relevant to the charges against Giannini. The court concluded that even if it was error to allow the comments, it was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against Giannini. View "United States v. Giannini" on Justia Law