Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Robert William Doelz was convicted of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute. In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court reversed his conviction, finding that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated due to a warrantless search, and the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. On remand, the State dropped the charge and did not pursue a retrial. Subsequently, Doelz sought compensation for his wrongful conviction under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-5004, which requires proving actual innocence among other criteria.The Shawnee District Court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, interpreting K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) to require a claimant to prove that their innocence resulted in the reversal of their conviction, dismissal of charges, or a not guilty verdict upon retrial. The court found that Doelz's conviction was reversed due to a Fourth Amendment violation, not because he did not commit the crime. Since there was no evidence explaining why the charges were dismissed, a material fact remained unresolved. At a bench trial, Doelz testified to his innocence, but the court granted the State's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Doelz failed to prove the charges were dismissed due to his innocence.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that K.S.A. 2023 Supp. 60-5004(c)(1)(C) requires a claimant to prove actual innocence and that this innocence led to the reversal, dismissal, or acquittal. The court found that the legislative intent behind the statute was to compensate only those who are factually innocent. Since Doelz did not provide evidence that the charges were dismissed because of his innocence, he did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation. View "In the Matter of the Wrongful Conviction of Doelz" on Justia Law

Amy Romero was arrested for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWUI) after being found stuck in a snowbank. Officer George Phillips of the Rawlins Police Department noticed the vehicle and, upon investigation, detected a strong odor of alcohol from Ms. Romero. During the interaction, Ms. Romero admitted to driving the vehicle and exhibited signs of intoxication. Officer Phillips placed her in the back of his patrol car to deescalate a potentially violent situation with her husband, Joseph Romero, who was also present and behaving aggressively.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) upheld the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license, concluding that Officer Phillips had reasonable suspicion to detain her for a DWUI investigation. The OAH found that the officer’s actions, including placing Ms. Romero in the patrol car and transporting her to a dry environment for field sobriety tests, were justified based on the totality of the circumstances, including the strong odor of alcohol, her admission of driving, and the need to manage her husband’s aggressive behavior.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the OAH’s decision. The Court held that Officer Phillips’ detention of Ms. Romero in the back of the patrol car did not constitute an unlawful arrest but was a reasonable investigative detention supported by substantial evidence. The Court found that the officer’s actions were necessary to ensure safety and were within the scope of a lawful investigative detention. The Court concluded that the OAH’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the detention was in accordance with constitutional protections. The decision to uphold the suspension of Ms. Romero’s driver’s license was affirmed. View "Romero v. State of Wyoming Ex Rel., Wyoming Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Jose Oliveras, serving a life sentence without parole, was found with over 600 pornographic images on a tablet provided by the prison. The images were stored on a removable SIM card. Oliveras pled guilty to an administrative violation for possession of contraband and received counseling without reprimand. However, at a subsequent classification review, his computer clearance was rescinded, citing regulations that prohibit inmates with a history of computer fraud or abuse from accessing computers.Oliveras filed a grievance with the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), arguing that his violation did not constitute "computer fraud or abuse" as defined by Penal Code section 502. The CDCR denied his grievance and appeal. Oliveras then petitioned the Del Norte County Superior Court, which denied his petition, stating that the hearing officer's decision was supported by "some evidence."The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Oliveras's conduct did not meet the criteria for "computer fraud or abuse" under Penal Code section 502. The court noted that Oliveras had permission to access the tablet and there was no evidence he used computer services without permission or for fraudulent purposes. The court concluded that the CDCR's interpretation of Oliveras's conduct as "computer fraud or abuse" was incorrect.The Court of Appeal ordered the CDCR to vacate any reference to a section 502 violation from Oliveras's record and reversed the October 2022 revocation of his computer clearance. The court directed the CDCR to remove any reference to this revocation from Oliveras's file. View "In re Oliveras" on Justia Law

Jo Ann Macrina, the former Commissioner of the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta, was charged with taking bribes from a contractor, Lohrasb “Jeff” Jafari. Macrina made several decisions that favored Jafari’s company in the bidding process for a city contract. After the contract was awarded, Macrina received $10,000 in cash, a diamond ring, and other perks from Jafari. She also went to work for Jafari’s company shortly after leaving her city position. Macrina later contacted the FBI to report possible corruption, but during interviews, she admitted to receiving gifts from Jafari, which she later retracted.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia admitted portions of a recorded conversation between Macrina and federal agents, as well as the City of Atlanta’s Code of Ethics, over Macrina’s objections. The court also declined to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction that any payments received after an official act were a gratuity and not a bribe. The jury convicted Macrina of bribery and conspiracy to commit bribery, and she was sentenced to 54 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recorded conversation and the Code of Ethics, as both were relevant to proving Macrina’s corrupt intent. The court also found that the district court’s refusal to give Macrina’s proposed jury instruction was not an abuse of discretion, as the instruction misstated the law by failing to acknowledge that a payment received after an official act can still be considered a bribe if there was an agreement to accept the payment before the act was completed. View "USA v. Macrina" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hunt arrived at the Lee County Courthouse to testify in a criminal case. Directed outside due to courtroom scheduling, Hunt re-entered and sat on a staircase. Officer Dale Acosta confronted Hunt, leading to a heated exchange. Despite Hunt's explanation of his courthouse business, Acosta arrested him for obstruction, claiming Hunt disrupted the county tax office.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas dismissed most of Hunt's claims but allowed his Fourth Amendment claim against Acosta, a failure to train or supervise claim against Mayor Jimmy Williams and Chief of Police Martin Wilson, and a Monell claim against the City of Marianna. The court denied qualified and quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta and qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson. Acosta, Williams, and Wilson appealed the denial of immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's denial of quasi-judicial immunity for Acosta's initial stop of Hunt, as Acosta acted under a judge's directive. However, the court affirmed the denial of quasi-judicial and qualified immunity for Acosta's arrest of Hunt, finding no probable cause for obstruction. The court also reversed the denial of qualified immunity for Williams and Wilson, ruling that Hunt failed to show a pattern of unconstitutional acts by Acosta that would have put them on notice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "Hunt v. Acosta" on Justia Law

Marc D. Curtis, an inmate at the North Central Correctional Complex, requested records from the Cleveland Municipal Court Clerk, Earle B. Turner, related to his criminal case. Curtis sought documents including arrest warrants, DNA search warrants, and cellphone search warrants. The clerk provided some documents but withheld others, citing that Curtis, as an inmate, could not access certain records without a judge's approval per R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Curtis filed a mandamus complaint to compel the clerk to produce the remaining records or confirm their nonexistence.The Eighth District Court of Appeals denied Curtis's writ of mandamus. The court relied on an affidavit from Ronald Tabor, the clerk’s assistant director, who stated that the clerk did not possess the requested records. The court found this affidavit sufficient to establish that the records were not in the clerk’s possession and noted that respondents are not required to create or provide access to nonexistent records.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's judgment. The court held that Curtis failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the clerk possessed the requested records. The court also denied Curtis's motion to take judicial notice of new documents and granted the clerk's motion to strike certain personal information from the record. The court concluded that the clerk had adequately demonstrated that the requested records were not in his possession, and Curtis did not rebut this evidence. View "State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner" on Justia Law

David Lesh, a social media content creator and owner of an outdoor apparel brand, posted photos on Instagram of himself snowmobiling at Keystone Resort, Colorado, during its closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States charged him with using an over-snow vehicle on National Forest Service (NFS) land off a designated route and conducting unauthorized work activity on NFS land. A magistrate judge convicted him of both counts after a bench trial.The magistrate judge found Lesh guilty of using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, taking judicial notice of a publicly available map indicating that Keystone Resort was not designated for snowmobile use. Lesh's argument that the map's undated nature failed to provide sufficient notice was not preserved for appeal. The district court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Lesh's conviction for using an over-snow vehicle on NFS land off a designated route, finding that Lesh had waived his challenge to the judicial notice of the map. However, the court reversed his conviction for unauthorized work activity under 36 C.F.R. § 261.10(c). The court held that the regulation was impermissibly vague as applied to Lesh's conduct, as it did not provide fair warning that posting images on social media could constitute a federal crime. The court also found insufficient evidence to prove that Lesh's primary purpose in posting the photos was to sell goods or services, as required by the regulation. The court concluded that Lesh was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as the maximum penalty he faced did not exceed six months of imprisonment. View "United States v. Lesh" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

Gerardo Arvizu Velador was charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting or obstructing a peace officer, and reckless driving. His counsel requested a competency evaluation, and proceedings were suspended pending this determination. While the competency evaluation was ongoing, Velador's counsel filed a motion for mental health diversion, supported by various reports and records indicating Velador's mental health issues.The trial court granted the motion for mental health diversion before determining Velador's competency, which led the People to appeal to the appellate division of the Riverside County Superior Court. The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the court had jurisdiction to grant mental health diversion even while the competency determination was pending. The appellate division reasoned that the statutes governing mental health diversion and competency did not require a competency determination before granting diversion.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case to settle the legal question. The court affirmed the appellate division's decision, holding that a trial court can grant mental health diversion under Penal Code section 1001.36 before resolving a defendant's competency to stand trial. The court found that the statutory language of section 1001.36 and the competency statutes allowed for diversion regardless of the defendant's competency status. The court also determined that the suspension of criminal proceedings under section 1368 did not preclude the trial court from considering and granting diversion. The decision emphasized that diversion could be granted to both competent and incompetent defendants, aligning with legislative intent to provide alternatives to incarceration for individuals with mental health disorders. View "People v. Velador" on Justia Law

This case involves four individuals, Joao Neves, Keith Nunes, Pablo Ortega, and Mario Monteiro, who were convicted of various crimes in Rhode Island and were serving multiple sentences, including life sentences. The issue at hand is the interpretation of a Rhode Island statute, G.L. 1956 § 13-8-13(e), which was enacted in 2021 and provides that any person sentenced for any offense committed prior to their twenty-second birthday, other than a person serving life without parole, shall be eligible for parole review after serving no fewer than twenty years' imprisonment.The state argued that the statute applies only to individuals serving a single sentence and does not require the aggregation of multiple sentences for parole eligibility. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the statute applies to "any offense," and thus requires the aggregation of multiple sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility.The trial justice agreed with the respondents and ordered that each respondent be immediately released on parole. The state appealed, arguing that the trial justice's interpretation of the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by modifying judicial sentences.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the statute mandates the aggregation of a qualified offender’s sentences, including consecutive sentences, for parole eligibility. The court also concluded that the statute, as interpreted, does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. However, the court found that the trial justice erred in ordering each respondent to be immediately released on parole, as the statute only provides a qualified offender the opportunity to appear before the parole board, not the right to be paroled. The court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgments of the lower court, and remanded the cases to the parole board for further proceedings. View "Neves v. State of Rhode Island" on Justia Law