Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A journalist submitted a public records request to the Delaware State Police (DSP) seeking seven categories of information about troopers, including names, ranks, salaries, employment history, résumés, lists of former officers, and demographic data. DSP denied the request in its entirety, asserting various statutory exemptions, the absence of certain records, and safety and privacy concerns. The journalist then petitioned the Chief Deputy Attorney General to review the denial, the required process for state agency FOIA disputes. The Chief Deputy found no FOIA violation, determining that disclosure of trooper identities and related information was exempt from public access due to safety risks and privacy interests.The journalist appealed to the Superior Court of Delaware. The Superior Court ordered DSP to disclose the names, ranks, and salaries of current troopers but upheld DSP’s refusal to produce employment histories, résumés, lists of former officers, and demographic data. The court also denied the journalist’s request for attorney fees and costs, reasoning that FOIA’s fee-shifting provision did not clearly apply to on-the-record appeals from administrative determinations.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware reviewed the case. It held that DSP had not met its statutory burden to justify the denial of the employment history, former officer lists, résumés (with redaction of private information), or anonymized demographic information, finding that DSP’s affidavits and representations were insufficient. The Court ordered DSP, on remand, to produce available records or submit adequate sworn statements about their existence and to provide résumés and demographic data in redacted or anonymized form. The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling that attorney fees and costs are not available for petitioners who prevail in FOIA on-the-record appeals, holding that the statute does not authorize such awards. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Vanella v. Duran" on Justia Law

A former superintendent of two state parks was investigated after a GPS device flagged his use of a state vehicle for speeding. When initially questioned, he denied being the driver and suggested another employee was responsible, later admitting he was the driver after being shown proof. He explained his actions by citing a dissociative episode related to post-traumatic stress disorder. The Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control (DNREC) first suspended him for three days pending further review but later recommended his termination, citing additional alleged misconduct, including misuse of a state vehicle for personal errands, disabling a GPS tracker, and inappropriate computer use, although some charges—like GPS disabling and computer misuse—were not substantiated.The employee contested his termination through a “dual appeal” to the Delaware Division of Human Resources (DHR) and the Merit Employee Relations Board (MERB). DHR found his appeal untimely. MERB initially dismissed the appeal on timeliness grounds, but the Superior Court of Delaware reversed, finding the appeal timely and remanded the case for a new hearing. At the second MERB hearing, a Department of Justice attorney who had previously represented DNREC now advised MERB and drafted its written decision upholding the termination, finding the employee violated policies and was untruthful. The Superior Court affirmed MERB’s decision, holding it was supported by substantial evidence and that no due process violation occurred, relying on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Bruton.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware found that procedural due process was violated when the same attorney represented both the prosecuting agency and later the adjudicatory board in the same case. The Court held that this “personal commingling of advocacy and adjudication” created an intolerable risk of bias and reversed the Superior Court’s judgment, remanding the matter for a new hearing before MERB. View "Fasano v. Delaware Department of Natural Resources and Environmental Control" on Justia Law

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Governor of Delaware issued a series of emergency orders that included restrictions on religious services. These restrictions, which were lifted by June 2020, limited in-person worship to ten people and imposed various other mandates. Over 18 months later, two religious leaders filed suit in the Court of Chancery seeking injunctive relief against these restrictions, which were no longer in effect. The Court of Chancery dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of future harm.The plaintiffs then transferred their action to the Superior Court, seeking declaratory judgment and damages for alleged violations of their constitutional rights. The Superior Court dismissed the claims, ruling that the requests for declaratory relief were not justiciable because the restrictions had been lifted and there was no ongoing controversy. Additionally, the court found that the Governor was immune from the damages claims under the State Tort Claims Act and the doctrine of qualified immunity.On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to show a reasonable apprehension of future harm, which is necessary for injunctive relief. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment were not justiciable because there was no ongoing controversy and the alleged harm could not be redressed by a declaratory judgment. Finally, the Court upheld the Superior Court's finding that the Governor was immune from damages claims, as his actions were discretionary and taken in good faith during an unprecedented public health crisis. View "In re Covid-Related Restrictions on Religious Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware considered an appeal from a decision of the Superior Court regarding the adoption of a Medicare Advantage Plan for State retirees by the State Employee Benefits Committee (SEBC). The Superior Court had found that the SEBC's decision was subject to the requirements of Delaware’s Administrative Procedures Act (APA), granted a motion to stay the implementation of the Medicare Advantage Plan, and required the State to maintain its retirees’ Medicare Supplement Plan. The Superior Court also denied the plaintiffs' application for attorneys’ fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware disagreed with the lower court's ruling. It found that the SEBC's decision to adopt a Medicare Advantage Plan was not a "regulation" as defined by the APA. The court reasoned that the decision did not meet the APA's definition of a regulation because it was not a "rule or standard," nor was it a guide for the decision of future cases. Therefore, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to stay the implementation of the plan. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Superior Court.On cross-appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the Superior Court erred by refusing to grant their application for attorneys’ fees. However, the Supreme Court found this argument moot because fee shifting is available only against a losing party in favor of a prevailing party. Since the Supreme Court reversed the decision below, fee shifting was foreclosed. View "DeMatteis v. RISE Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law

Kathleen McGuiness, an elected state official in Delaware, was indicted and tried on various criminal charges related to her conduct while in office. She was convicted of three charges and acquitted of two others. She appealed, claiming that the trial was fundamentally unfair and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Delaware held that the trial was fair and rejected most of McGuiness's arguments. However, the court agreed with McGuiness that the legal insufficiency of one of the charges resulted in a spillover of evidence that prejudiced the jury’s consideration of a closely linked charge. Therefore, the court reversed McGuiness's conviction for Official Misconduct. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the trial court's decisions and McGuiness's convictions on all other charges. View "McGuiness v. State" on Justia Law

In the State of Delaware, a lawsuit was brought by two non-profit organizations against multiple public officials, including tax collectors in Delaware's three counties. The organizations sought increased funding for Delaware’s public schools. The Court of Chancery held that the organizations were entitled to attorneys’ fees and expenses. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the Court of Chancery erred in its application of the "common benefit doctrine" and its expansion of a precedent case, Korn v. New Castle County, beyond taxpayer suits. The Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court's award of expenses, but reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court held that the litigation brought by the organizations was to compel the defendant county governments to comply with the law, a benefit that did not warrant an exception to the "American Rule" which states that each party bears its own attorneys' fees, absent certain exceptions. The Court also held that, even if this case were a taxpayer suit, it does not meet the standard set forth in Korn because there was not a quantifiable, non-speculative monetary benefit for all taxpayers. View "In re Delaware Public Schools Litigation" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware concerned an appeal by Carrah LeBoon Odell against an order from the Superior Court of the State of Delaware. The order affirmed a decision made by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (UIAB) that upheld decisions by an appeals referee concluding that Odell was liable to repay overpaid unemployment benefits totaling $7,139.Odell had originally filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after her employer, Allied Universal, reduced her hours. She later obtained a second job at Rater Labs and reported income from both employers to the Department of Labor. She received traditional unemployment benefits and Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation under the CARES Act for a period. It was later determined that Odell’s total income during the period was too high to qualify for unemployment benefits, and the benefits she received were therefore an overpayment subject to recoupment by the Department.Odell appealed the overpayment determinations, admitting that she was ineligible for traditional unemployment benefits during the period in question because her income was too high. She requested a waiver of the obligation to repay the benefits, arguing that she met the conditions for a repayment waiver established by the US Department of Labor’s instructions to states regarding processing overpayment waivers under the CARES Act.The UIAB affirmed the appeals referee’s decision. Odell then appealed to the Superior Court, which also affirmed the Board’s decision.Odell appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware, which concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. The Supreme Court ruled that Odell was liable for repayment, regardless of the cause of the overpayment. Her arguments concerning the Department’s computer system and discovery relating to that system did not establish reversible error. Furthermore, her argument that her repayment obligation should have been waived did not establish reversible error as repayment waivers were not available at the time of the proceedings below.Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Odell v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board" on Justia Law

The statute at issue in this appeal, 19 Del. C. § 2322F, provided a mechanism for employers and their workers’ compensation carriers to challenge proposed or provided health care services relating to compensable work injuries. An employer sought review of a superior court opinion reversing a decision by the Industrial Accident Board (the “IAB” or “Board”) regarding the reasonableness of a prescribed course of treatment. The IAB initially dismissed this case as moot, but the superior court reversed and remanded that decision in 2019. On remand, the IAB held that the claimant-employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment after June 2017 was unreasonable, unnecessary, and therefore not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The superior court then reversed the IAB again, holding there was no justiciable issue before the Board because the claimant employee had not submitted any medical claims to his employer for ongoing treatment. The employer argued the superior court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the IAB could not consider the compensability of an employee’s ongoing narcotics treatment until the employee submitted invoices for payment to the employer and the employer disputed those invoices in the statutory review process. Because the superior court incorrectly interpreted 19 Del. C. § 2322F with respect to the justiciability of the employer’s petition, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision, vacated the attorneys’ fees award, and reinstated the IAB’s determination. View "This and That Services Co. Inc. v. Nieves" on Justia Law

According to allegations in the complaint, for over forty years, Monsanto was the only U.S. manufacturer of polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). The federal government and states spent enormous sums cleaning up PCB environmental contamination. The State of Delaware alleged Monsanto knew that the PCBs it produced and sold to industry and to consumers would eventually be released into the environment and would cause lasting damage to public health and the State’s lands and waters. The State brought this action to hold Monsanto responsible for its cleanup costs, asserting claims for public nuisance, trespass, and unjust enrichment. A Delaware superior court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that even though the State alleged Monsanto knew for decades PCBs that were toxic and would contaminate the environment for generations, the State: (1) could not assert a public nuisance claim or trespass claim because Monsanto manufactured PCB products, which entered the environment after sale to third parties; (2) State did not have standing to bring a trespass claim because it held public lands in trust rather than outright and therefore did not have the exclusive possession of land needed to assert a trespass claim; (3) the superior court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the unjust enrichment claim as a standalone claim; and (4) the State could not use an unjust enrichment claim to recover future cleanup costs. The Delaware Supreme Court found the State pled sufficiently that even though Monsanto did not control the PCBs after sale it substantially participated in creating the public nuisance and causing the trespass by actively misleading the public and continuing to supply PCBs to industry and consumers knowing that PCBs were hazardous, would escape into the environment after sale to third parties, and would lead to widespread and lasting contamination of Delaware’s lands and waters. Further, the Supreme Court found the State alleged that it owned some land directly and therefore had exclusive possession of that land needed to assert a trespass claim. The Court affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Delaware v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Tesla Inc. appealed a Delaware superior court judgment upholding a Division of Motor Vehicles’ (“DMV”) decision denying Tesla’s application for a new dealer license. The superior court agreed with the DMV Director that the Delaware Motor Vehicle Franchising Practices Act (“Franchise Act”) prohibited Tesla, as a new motor vehicle manufacturer, from selling its electric cars directly to customers in Delaware. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, finding the Franchise Act excluded Tesla's direct sales model, where new electric cars were not sold through franchised dealers in Delaware. View "Tesla Inc. v. Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law