Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

New Cingular Wireless PCS (now known as "AT&T") filed an application with the Sussex County Board of Adjustment ("the Board") for a special use exception to construct a 100-foot telecommunications cell tower on a commercially zoned property located just outside of Bethany Beach. A special use exception was required before a cell tower may be erected within 500 feet of a residential zone. The Sea Pines Village Condominium Association of Owners, along with individual residents who lived near the proposed location opposed the application. The Board ultimately denied AT&T's application. On appeal to the Superior Court, the court acknowledged in its opinion that while this appeal was pending "Bethany voted unanimously to reject AT&T's request to use [Bethany's] water tower as an antenna location" and that "Bethany was in fact unwilling to negotiate with AT&T." The trial court did not explain its reasoning for refusing to allow a collocation on the Bethany water tower. The Superior Court affirmed based on the record presented. In its written decision denying AT&T's application, the Board concluded that AT&T "had not met its burden [under the Sussex County Code] of proving that the proposed use would not affect adversely the uses of adjacent and neighboring properties." The Superior Court explained AT&T's burden with similar language. But the Sussex County Code required a lesser burden, "special use exceptions shall be granted unless the Board finds such exceptions will not substantially affect adversely the uses of adjacent and neighboring property." AT&T argued that the Board's decision should have been reversed because the Board failed to apply the correct legal standard. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS v. Sussex County Board of Adjustment" on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Claimants Cecil Palomino, Salvador Avila-Hernandez and Julio Munoz were each injured in different work-related accidents. It was not disputed that their injuries were compensable under the Worker's Compensation Act and that payments of some worker's compensation have been made. After their doctors recommended certain treatments, their employers requested determinations of whether the treatment plans fell outside of the Health Care Practice ("HCAP") Guidelines through a utilization review ("UR"). The UR panel determined that portions of their treatments were not approved for coverage. Claimants petitioned the Industrial Accident Board for review of the UR determination after the 45 day time window prescribed by Department of Labor Regulation 5.5.1. The Board dismissed the petitions as untimely. Claimants appealed to the Superior Court, which determined that the 45 day limit of Regulation 5.5.1 was invalid because it conflicted with 19 Del. C. sec 2361. The employers appealed from the Superior Court's judgment. Finding no merit to the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Christiana Care Health Services v. Palomino" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a jury verdict in favor of a racing official should have been reinstated. The racing official, who had been suspended by the Delaware Harness Racing Commission, claimed that the Commission reneged on its promise to reinstate him. The jury agreed, but the trial court later determined that the racing official's claim failed as a matter of law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the racing official's promissory estoppel claim which was accepted by the jury, subjected the Commission to liability. The trial court also held that the jury verdict was excessive and against the great weight of the evidence, thereby justifying a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of the Commission was reversed, but disagreed that the verdict was excessive and reinstated the jury's verdict. View "Harmon v. Delaware" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Chancellor correctly interpreted 15 Del. C. Sec. 3306, which allows political parties to replace candidates who become incapacitated. The Court held that under the statute, the term "incapacity" includes situations where a candidate would be practically incapable of fulfilling the duties of office in a minimally adequate way. In determining whether the standard was met, the Chancellor could consider events that occurred after the candidate withdrew. In this case, the Court concluded the withdrawing candidate was incapacitated and therefore affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. View "Sussex County Dept. of Elections, et al. v. Sussex County Republican Committee, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Broadmeadow Investment, LLC appealed a Superior Court judgment that dismissed its appeal of a Delaware Health Resources Board decision. The Board granted HealthSouth Middletown Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC a Certificate of Public Review (CPR). The Superior Court held that Broadmeadow lacked standing to appeal under 16 Del. C. section 9305(8). Broadmeadow sought the Supreme Court's review to reverse the Superior Court and remand the matter for its appeal to go forward on the merits. Upon review of Broadmeadow's arguments raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court erred by dismissing Broadmeadow’s appeal on the basis it lacked standing under 16 Del. C. section 9305: "[w]e hold that reading the entire statutory scheme in pari materia, Broadmeadow does have the right to appeal the Board’s decision." View "Broadmeadow Investment, LLC v. Delaware Health Resources Board, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Reuben Cordero appealed a Superior Court order that affirmed an order of the Industrial Accident Board dismissing his petitions against a general contractor, Gulfstream Development Corporation, and a Gulfstream subcontractor, Delaware Siding Company. On appeal, Cordero argued that the Superior Court reversibly erred in interpreting 19 Del. C. sec. 2311(a)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Cordero v. Gulfstream Development Corporation" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether a contractor's bid was responsive to the Delaware Department of Transportation's (DelDOT) Request for Proposals (RFP). The contractor's bid did not include required paint certifications. In addition, the bid reflected the contractor's plan to use new steel beams, rather than refurbish the existing ones, as required by the RFP. The contractor chose to submit a bid that did not conform to the project specifications. The Supreme Court concluded that the contractor therefore did so at its own risk. DelDOT's decision that the bid was non-responsive was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's entry of summary judgment in DelDOT's favor. View "Julian v. Delaware Dep't. of Transportation" on Justia Law

The New Castle County Sheriff sold real property encumbered with a judgment lien and a mortgage lien, in that order of priority, at a mandated sheriff’s sale. The Sheriff disbursed the proceeds to Eastern Savings Bank, the mortgage lien holder. CACH, LLC, the judgment lien holder, filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas alleging misappropriation and unjust enrichment. The Court of Common Pleas judge denied CACH’s Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Eastern’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Superior Court judge reversed. On appeal, Eastern argued that the sheriff’s sale did not discharge the judgment lien, and therefore CACH is not entitled to the sale proceeds. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no merit to Eastern’s argument and held that: (1) all nonmortgage liens are discharged at a sheriff’s sale and (2) sheriff’s sale proceeds are disbursed according to a first in time, first in line priority. Therefore, the Court affirmed. View "Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Cach, LLC" on Justia Law