Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Delaware Supreme Court
Smith v. Delaware State University
Plaintiff-Appellant Stephanie Smith appealed a Superior Court's award of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellee Delaware State University ("DSU") on her claims of wrongful termination under the Delaware Whistleblowers' Protection Act, of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and of common law defamation. Plaintiff raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that the Superior Court erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that she was constructively discharged from DSU, sufficient to support a claim under the Act; (2) that the Superior Court erred in failing to consider whether a threat to worsen her working environment could give rise to a claim under the Act; (3) that the Superior Court erred by granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's defamation claim based on her failure to produce any evidence of damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court recognized that a constructive discharge could give rise to a Whistleblower Act claim, but concluded that the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment based on the facts alleged in this case. Because Plaintiff's defamation claim was governed by New York law, it was barred by New York's one-year statute of limitations. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DSU.
Progressive Northern Insurance Co. v. Mohr
Plaintiff-Appellee William Mohr was struck in Delaware as a pedestrian by a car insured in Delaware. He recovered the minimum $15,000 coverage limit from the carrier that insured the striking car. Plaintiff also sought to recover from Defendant-Appellant Progressive Northern Insurance Company which sold an automobile insurance policy to Plaintiff's mother. Under the policy, Plaintiff's mother was the named insured, and Plaintiff was a member of her household. The Progressive policy, by its terms, did not cover Plaintiff as a pedestrian. The superior court held nonetheless that Plaintiff was entitled to recover under Progressive's policy because insofar as it denied PIP coverage, the policy conflicted with the Delaware automobile insurance statute which mandated such coverage. Progressive appealed. The court ordered Progressive to pay the difference between the amount Plaintiff recovered from the striking-car's policy and PIP limit of his mother's policy. Finding no error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.
One-Pie Investments, LLC v. Jackson
A monition action was brought by the City against defendant for the collection of taxes and charges. The real property was sold at a sheriff's sale to the successful third-party bidder, One-Pie. After confirmation, One-Pie filed a petition for tax deed. The Superior Court confirmed a Commissioner's order denying the petition, because defendant had successfully redeemed the property. One-Pie raised three claims on appeal, contending that the Superior Court erred by: (i) determining that the property had been redeemed properly; (ii) determining that One-Pie lacked standing; and (iii) allowing defendant to use One-Pie's funds for redemption. The court found no merit in the appeal and affirmed the judgment.
Delaware Board of Nursing v. Gillespie
The Board appealed from a Superior Court decision reversing the Board's decision to suspend the nursing licenses of appellee. The Board suspended appellee's licenses for two years based upon a finding that she failed to report child sexual abuse as required by state statute. The Board contended that it did not err in finding that appellee committed the violations at issue and the Board submitted that its decision finding a violation of the applicable provisions was supported by substantial evidence. Appellee argued that the Board's appeal was barred by a conflict of interest. The court concluded that the Board's contentions were without merit. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed and the court need not reach the conflict of interest issue.
Dept. of Health & Social Servs v. Jain
The Delaware Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) appealed from a Superior Court order reversing a DHSS Administrative Hearing Officer's decision to place Madhu Jain on the Adult Abuse Registry for three years, because Jain had "neglected" a patient as defined by 11 Del. C. 8564(a)(8) and 16 Del. C. 1131(9). On appeal, DHSS claimed that the Superior Court erroneously concluded that DHSS had failed to show that Jain neglected the patient within the meaning of the two statutes because Jain's conduct breached basic, fundamental nursing standards. The court held that the facts did not support a finding that Jain committed an act of neglect, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. Therefore, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.
Sullivan v. Mayor & Council of The Town of Elsmere
Appellant appealed a termination decision by appellees (collectively, "Panel") after the Panel unanimously voted at a public hearing to terminate appellant's employment as Chief of Police. At issue was whether the Superior Court erred in holding that the votes of the remaining Panel members could cure the Panel's unlawful failure to recuse a biased member; whether the Superior Court erred in affirming the Panel's failure to provide appellant with the protections of Chapter 48 of the Police Department's rules and Regulations; and whether the Superior Court erred in concluding that the Panel provided appellant with sufficient notice of the grounds for the charges against him at the public hearing. The court held that appellant's testimony established a prima facie case of bias by a Councilman and the Panel's failure to recuse him could not be cured by votes of the remaining Panel members. Therefore, appellant's due process rights were violated. The court also held that because this ground for reversal was independently sufficient, the court declined to address appellant's other arguments. Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Anderson v. State
The State of Delaware ("State") filed an habitual driving offender petition in the Court of Common Pleas against respondent under Chapter 28 of Title 21 of the Delaware Vehicle Code. Hours after declaring respondent an habitual offender, the Court of Common Pleas, sua sponte, vacated its earlier judgment, holding that the State's exercise of prosecutorial discretion in respondent's case was inconsistent with the State's prosecution of other habitual driving offender petitions heard that same day. At issue was whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in vacating its earlier order declaring respondent an habitual driving offender. The court held that the Court of Common Pleas had no legal basis to conclude that respondent was not an habitual driving offender where the statutory requirements for habitual driving offender status had all been established. The court also held that the Court of Common Pleas erred in finding the State's refusal to offer a continuance to respondent constituted a legal "wrong" where the state was not required to request a continuance in each and every habitual driving offender prosecution. The court further held that the Court of Common Pleas erroneously relied on Court of Common Pleas Civil Rules 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6) as a basis to remedy the State's "misrepresentations." The court finally held that nothing in Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 11 suggested that the trial court could vacate an earlier order, thereby resulting in a dismissal of the proceeding, as sanction for a party's alleged violation of that rule.