Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A public interest law firm, TPM, requested certain budget-request documents from the Mayor of the District of Columbia under the D.C. Freedom of Information Act (D.C. FOIA). TPM sought documents related to the budget requests of the D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) and the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE) for fiscal year 2019, as well as other related documents. The Mayor refused to produce the draft submissions, claiming they were protected by executive privilege. TPM then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia seeking the documents and their online publication.The Superior Court denied the Mayor's motion to dismiss and granted TPM's motion for summary judgment. The court ordered the Mayor to produce the requested documents and to comply with the publication requirements of D.C. Code § 2-536. The Mayor appealed, arguing that the documents were protected by executive privilege and that TPM lacked standing to enforce the publication provision.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court rejected the Mayor's claim of executive privilege, stating that the budgetary process involves overlapping responsibilities between the Mayor and the Council, and thus does not fall under the exclusive purview of the executive branch. The court also found that TPM had standing to seek enforcement of the publication provision, as the failure to disclose the documents caused a concrete and particularized injury to TPM.The court affirmed the Superior Court's order requiring the production and online publication of the requested budget documents for fiscal years 2019 to the present. However, it vacated and remanded the portion of the order requiring the publication of other documents under D.C. Code § 2-536, instructing the lower court to clarify the scope of the required publication. View "District of Columbia v. Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP" on Justia Law

A shelter providing housing to individuals experiencing homelessness terminated a client's services on an emergency basis, alleging that the client posed an imminent threat to the health or safety of others. The client, who had previously been removed from the shelter without proper notice, returned to the shelter and was involved in a confrontation with security officers. The shelter claimed the client was hostile, pushed a security officer, and made threats. The client challenged the termination, leading to an evidentiary hearing.The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) reviewed the case. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the shelter had previously attempted to terminate the client without proper notice and that the client was within his rights to be at the shelter at the time of the incident. The ALJ determined that the security officers escalated the situation by provoking the client, who only pushed the officer after being provoked. The ALJ did not credit the shelter's witness's testimony that the client made threats, finding it uncorroborated and inconsistent with video evidence.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the ALJ's decision, agreeing that the ALJ correctly applied the law and that the client's actions were not severe enough to warrant emergency termination under the Homeless Services Reform Act. The court found that the ALJ's credibility determinations were supported by substantial evidence and that the shelter's arguments regarding the client's prior misconduct were unpreserved for appeal. The court affirmed the OAH's order, rejecting the shelter's arguments. View "Catholic Charities--801 East Men's Shelter v. Byrd" on Justia Law

Dominique Robison, a bus operator for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), was suspended from her job after bringing her own bottle of urine to a scheduled drug test, which was deemed an automatic failure under WMATA’s policy. She was suspended without pay for 180 days and subsequently filed for unemployment benefits, which were initially granted by the claims examiner due to WMATA's failure to provide evidence of misconduct.WMATA appealed to the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), where an administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Robison had committed simple misconduct, not gross misconduct, and was disqualified from benefits for the first eight weeks of her unemployment. The ALJ reasoned that Robison’s violation was her first drug-related offense and that WMATA’s decision to suspend rather than terminate her undercut the severity of the offense. The ALJ did not consider WMATA’s argument that Robison was ineligible for benefits because she was merely suspended, not terminated.WMATA then appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court reviewed whether the ALJ made findings of fact on each materially contested issue, whether substantial evidence supported each finding, and whether the ALJ’s conclusions flowed rationally from its findings. The court concluded that Robison’s actions did not rise to the level of gross misconduct, as there was no direct evidence of drug use or impairment, no demonstrable impact on passenger safety or WMATA’s operations, and it was her first offense. The court also determined that Robison was "unemployed" within the meaning of the statute because she was suspended without pay and did not work during the suspension period.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the ALJ’s decision. View "WMATA v. Robison" on Justia Law

Five individuals experienced significant delays in receiving food assistance (SNAP or P-EBT), TANF, or Medicaid benefits. Each requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The ALJs directed the District of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) to provide the correct benefits to the claimants, which was eventually done. However, the ALJs also issued orders requiring DHS to correct an "unlawful policy" related to delays caused by internal computer errors or faulty programs.The ALJs' orders were based on the assumption that the delays were due to a systemic issue with DHS's computer systems. DHS representatives mentioned various reasons for the delays, including confusion, human error, and the need for IT tickets to resolve specific issues. In some cases, the delays were attributed to problems with external agencies, such as the Office of the State Superintendent of Education (OSSE). Despite these explanations, the ALJs issued broad orders for DHS to correct its policies.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the records did not support the conclusion that the delays were due to a DHS policy or systemic computer errors. The court noted that the ALJs did not hold evidentiary hearings or gather substantial evidence to support their findings. The court also found that the ALJs overstepped their authority by issuing broad injunctive relief without a demonstrated need for such measures.The court vacated the challenged orders, concluding that there was no substantial evidence of a DHS policy causing the delays and that the ALJs had not followed proper procedures in issuing their orders. The court emphasized the need for ALJs to base their decisions on substantial evidence and to consider whether broad injunctive relief is necessary. View "District of Columbia Dep't of Human Services v. Butler" on Justia Law

John T. McFarland, a Program Support Specialist with the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA), requested a reclassification of his Grade 9 position to Grade 11 in 2011. The desk audit for this request was delayed, and the initial reviewer, Peter Delate, was replaced by Lewis Norman, who completed the audit in 2013 and concluded that the Grade 9 classification was correct. McFarland appealed this decision, but the Director of the District of Columbia’s Department of Human Resources (DCHR) upheld it. McFarland then petitioned for review in Superior Court, which affirmed DCHR’s decision. McFarland appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which also affirmed the decision.In 2017, McFarland filed another petition in Superior Court, presenting new documents obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request that suggested Delate had initially supported a Grade 11 classification. The Superior Court vacated DCHR’s decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, a new specialist reviewed the entire record and concluded that McFarland’s position was correctly classified as Grade 9. McFarland again petitioned for review in Superior Court, which denied his petition and his motion for sanctions against the District of Columbia.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain McFarland’s petition for review under the Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (CMPA), as the classification decision did not involve a reduction in grade. The court also found that McFarland had not shown that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of sanctions and remanded the case for dismissal of the petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. View "McFarland v. District of Columbia, Department of Human Resources" on Justia Law

Paul Porter applied twice to register a firearm, but the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) denied his applications, citing a previous weapons offense conviction in Maryland. The Maryland records were expunged in 2020, so the full details of the case are not available. However, it is known that Porter pleaded guilty in 2009 to transporting a handgun on a highway, was initially sentenced to three years of incarceration (suspended for probation), and later had his sentence reconsidered to probation before judgment in 2015.Porter sought review of MPD's denial from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at OAH overturned MPD's decision, reasoning that under Maryland law, a discharged sentence of probation before judgment is not considered a conviction and that failing to recognize this would deny Maryland law full faith and credit.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the District to adopt Maryland's interpretation of "conviction" for firearm registration purposes. The court concluded that under District law, a sentence of probation before judgment constitutes a conviction for the purposes of firearm registration. The court emphasized that the legislative intent of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975 was to restrict firearm possession to individuals without disqualifying offenses, and allowing those with probation before judgment to register firearms would undermine this purpose.The court reversed OAH's order and upheld MPD's denial of Porter's application for a firearm registration certificate, holding that Porter "has been convicted" of a disqualifying offense under D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(2), and that subsequent discharge of probation and expungement do not alter this conclusion. View "District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department v. Porter" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Lin Luo, sought review of a final order from the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) that determined her ineligible for unemployment benefits from April 5, 2023, to June 28, 2023. Luo was terminated from her position at the American Chemical Society (ACS) and received post-termination payments under an Agreement and General Release. The OAH administrative law judge (ALJ) classified these payments as severance pay, which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits. Luo argued that the payments were settlement payments for sexual harassment claims, not severance pay.The Department of Employment Services (DOES) initially found Luo ineligible for benefits for a slightly different period. Luo appealed to OAH, where the ALJ held a hearing and excluded Luo's evidence of her harassment claims, citing the parol evidence rule. The ALJ concluded that the Agreement's language unambiguously indicated the payments were severance pay, based on Luo's years of service and lack of advance notice of termination. The ALJ also noted that the Agreement included a release of claims against ACS and found that Luo signed the Agreement without fraud, duress, or mutual mistake.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the ALJ erred in not considering parol evidence regarding the nature of the payments. The court noted that the parol evidence rule does not preclude evidence showing that factual recitals in an agreement are untrue. The court concluded that the ALJ should have considered Luo's testimony and evidence about her harassment claims to determine the parties' intent regarding the payments. The court vacated the OAH orders and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider this evidence. View "Luo v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law

Dennis Neal, a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning technician at Howard University Hospital, was injured on the job when a ladder gave way beneath him. He experienced pain and underwent spinal surgery. After attempting to return to work and experiencing further pain, he quit and sought reinstatement of his disability benefits and vocational rehabilitation services. The hospital terminated his benefits when he accepted new employment but quit after four days due to physical discomfort from long drives and job duties.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted Neal's claim for reinstatement of benefits and services, and the Compensation Review Board (CRB) affirmed. The hospital appealed, arguing that the CRB lacked substantial evidence to support its findings that Neal did not voluntarily limit his income and did not fail to cooperate with vocational rehabilitation. The hospital contended that the ALJ and CRB ignored critical testimony from witnesses.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and found that the CRB's decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that the ALJ's findings were based on credible evidence, including medical evaluations and Neal's testimony about his physical limitations and the nature of the job duties at his new employment. The court also found that Neal had cooperated with vocational rehabilitation services and had demonstrated a willingness to continue doing so.The court held that the CRB's decision flowed rationally from the facts and was supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the CRB's decision to reinstate Neal's temporary total disability benefits and vocational rehabilitation services. View "Howard University Hospital v. D.C. Department of Employment Services" on Justia Law

Innovative Institute, Inc., a postsecondary institution offering nursing assistant and home-health training programs, sought renewal of its temporary operating license from the District of Columbia Higher Education Licensure Commission. Innovative submitted a license renewal application and supplemental documents over several months. After an evidentiary hearing, the Commission denied the application, citing deficiencies such as failure to pay all applicable fees, provide updated curriculum and course syllabi, and maintain adequate student records, including immunization documentation and grade reports. Innovative had not been in good standing with the Commission for five consecutive years.The Commission's decision was reviewed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The court found that substantial evidence supported the Commission's decision. The court noted that Innovative's application was incomplete because it failed to include a $500 late fee, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. § 8122.2(d). Additionally, the court found that Innovative failed to maintain adequate student records, including grade reports and immunization documentation, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. §§ 8111 and 8117. The court also found that Innovative failed to include updated curriculum and course syllabi in its application, as required by 5A D.C.M.R. §§ 8110 and 8116.1(l).The court rejected Innovative's arguments that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, that the Hearing Officer improperly excluded admissible evidence, that Innovative had deficient notice of the second ground for denial, and that the Commission's control over the selection of the Hearing Officer conflicted with the federal Administrative Procedure Act. The court affirmed the Commission's decision and order denying Innovative's license renewal application. View "Innovative Institute v. DC Office of State Superintendent of Education" on Justia Law

The case involves Amaka Oji and Oji Fit World, LLC (OFW), who were approved as Medicaid providers by the D.C. Department of Health Care Finance (DHCF) in 2011. Between 2012 and 2015, they submitted over 24,000 claims for reimbursement for wellness services provided to Medicaid beneficiaries. Investigations by DHCF, the Office of the Inspector General for the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, and the FBI revealed that Oji and OFW regularly overbilled Medicaid, often charging for a full hour of service regardless of the actual time spent or whether the service was provided at all.The District of Columbia filed a lawsuit in April 2021 under the D.C. False Claims Act and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding that Oji and OFW had submitted false claims and falsified records. The court awarded the District $1,001,362.50 in treble damages and $497,000 in civil penalties. Oji and OFW's various procedural defenses, including claims of laches and statute of limitations, were deemed waived due to their failure to raise them in a timely manner.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the summary judgment order. However, the court remanded the case for further consideration of the damages and penalties. The appellate court found that the Superior Court had not provided sufficient explanation or analysis for the awarded amounts, making it difficult to review the decision. The appellate court emphasized the need for the trial court to explain its reasoning in detail to permit adequate appellate review. View "Oji Fit World, LLC v. District of Columbia" on Justia Law