Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal in this case centered on the potential effects on the territory of school systems and the ownership of school property stemming from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. In 1950, the Georgia General Assembly passed a local constitutional amendment addressing these issues (1950 LCA). In 1950, the independent school system of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City’s municipal government, not a separate political entity. In 1973, however, the General Assembly separated APS from the City’s municipal government by enacting separate charters for the two entities and removing most educational powers and responsibilities from the City government. In 2015, the City initiated this case by filing a declaratory judgment action in which it sought guidance on whether: (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without also expanding the boundaries of APS to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of APS after the City annexed new property. The City argued that HB 1620 (the pertinent legislation) did not properly continue the 1950 LCA, and, as a result, it stood repealed. The Fulton County School District (“FCS”) intervened, then the City moved for summary judgment, APS moved for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and FCS moved to dismiss the City’s action. The trial court entered a final order denying the City’s motion, granting APS’s motion, and granting FCS’s motion, treating all of them as summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the trial court determined that: (1) the City’s declaratory action, in part, was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (2) the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City appealed the trial court’s ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued, and APS has cross-appealed to contend that the trial court erred by not finding that the City’s declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. Because this matter was not ripe for consideration at the time that the trial court considered the City’s action, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s opinion. View "City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys." on Justia Law

Graviss has worked in education since 1978. In 2008, she became a pre-school special needs teacher at Kingsolver Elementary, part of Fort Knox Schools. Kingsolver’s principal, McClain, issued Graviss a reprimand based on an “inappropriate interaction with a student” and “failure to follow directives,” asserting that Graviss and her aide had physically carried a misbehaving pre-school student and Graviss had emailed concerns to the director of special education, although McClain had directed Graviss to “bring all issues directly to [her].” The union filed a grievance. Subsequently, one of Graviss’s students had an episode, repeatedly flailing his arms, kicking, and screaming. While the other students were out at recess, Graviss employed physical restraint to subdue the child. After an investigation, McClain submitted a Family Advocacy Program Department of Defense Education Activity Serious Incident Report and Alleged Child Abuse Report to the Family Advocacy Program (child protective services for the military). McClain forwarded the Report to her direct supervisor, who was later the decision-maker in Graviss’s termination. An arbitrator concluded that that Graviss's termination promoted the efficiency of the service and was reasonable. The Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that Graviss’s due process rights were violated by improper ex parte communication between a supervisor and the deciding official. That communication contained new information that the supervisor wanted Graviss terminated for insubordination. View "Federal Education Association v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the use of educational interventionists to assist elementary and middle school students in Monongalia County who need educational support beyond that provided by the regular classroom teacher. The interventionists utilized by the Monongalia County Board of Education (MCBOE) were obtained through a contract it has with its Regional Education Service Agency (RESA), were required to be certified teachers, and were employees of the West Virginia Board of Education. The circuit court concluded that an interventionist met the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” and, therefore, must be directly hired by MCBOE. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory definition of “classroom teacher” is not intended to include within its meaning an “interventionist”; and (2) a county board of education may contract with its RESA to provide interventionist services to county students. View "Monongalia County Board of Education v. American Federation of Teachers" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of statutory interpretation of the scope of the geographic restrictions of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, as amended by the Legislature in 2002. Specifically, the issue was whether the comprehensive statutory scheme governing charter schools permitted an authorized charter school to locate a resource center outside the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district but within the same county. The 2002 amendments generally required charter schools to operate within the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district, with limited exceptions. One such exception was for a resource center, meeting space, or other satellite facility located in an adjacent county, provided certain conditions were met. Shasta Secondary Home School (SSHS) operated a nonclassroom-based charter school, providing educational support for students who are home schooled. SSHS operates two resource centers in Redding which provide educational services, labs, a meeting place for the student and his or her facilitator, work spaces, and some optional classes. In 2013, SSHS opened a third resource center in a room at the East Cottonwood Elementary School- within Shasta County, but outside the boundaries of the Shasta Union High School District. Instead, it was within the boundaries of plaintiff Anderson Union High School District (AUHSD). AUHSD brought suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, contending the location of this resource center violated the Charter Schools Act, as well as the charter of SSHS. AUHSD claimed it was harmed by the location of the resource center because it had lost funding when students within its district chose to go to SSHS. The trial court denied both injunctive and declaratory relief, finding the geographic and site limitations of the Charter Schools Act did not apply to resource centers. The Court of Appeals concluded the language of the Charter Schools Act did not support that interpretation, and reversed. View "Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home Sch." on Justia Law

Jon Krakauer, a journalist and resident of Colorado, published a book chronicling instances of alleged sexual misconduct on or near the Missoula campus of the University of Montana. This case involved Krakauer’s request for release of certain student records related to one instance of allegations of sexual assault. The Commissioner of Higher Education denied Krakauer’s request, and Krakauer filed a petition in the district court citing the right to know under the Montana Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment to Krakauer and ordered the Commissioner to make available for inspection the requested records. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA) and state statute provide an exception for release of information pursuant to a lawfully issued court order; and (2) the records at issue in this case appear to fall under the “personally identifiable information” protection granted by FERPA. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Krakauer v. Comm’n of Higher Educ." on Justia Law

The State of Alabama Board of Education ("SBOE") and several of its executive directors petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss claims filed against them by respondent Sharper Adams and numerous employees of the Birmingham Board of Education (BBOE). Petitioners sought to have all claims dismissed with prejudice on immunity grounds. The BBOE failed to submit a financial-recovery plan to the SBOE by an April 2, 2012, deadline, and its minimum-reserve fund remained underfunded. Once complete, the financial-recovery plan included, among other things, a reduction in force ("RIF"), which required that the jobs of the respondents, among others, be eliminated. The circuit court determined that petitioners had violated the respondents' federal due-process rights by depriving them of their property interest without due process of law because, the circuit court concluded, the petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Students First Act ("the SFA"). Specifically, the circuit court concluded that the SFA, a state law, required that the respondents receive notice of the fact that the implementation of the RIF would result in the termination of their employment positions with the BBOE and that the petitioners failed to give the respondents such notice. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the respondents' federal due-process rights had been violated. After review, the Supreme Court granted petitioners' petition in part, and denied it in part. The Court granted the petition with regard to claims against the individual administrators in their official capacities, finding they were entitled to immunity. The Court denied the petition with regard to claims agains the SBOE. View "Ex parte State of Alabama Board of Education et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two high-profile medical researchers that held faculty appointments at Harvard Medical School and were intimately involved with a research laboratory at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, were investigated for alleged research misconduct. Responding to allegations that Plaintiffs used manipulated research data in articles reporting on studies supported by government funds, Harvard and Brigham triggered a unique federal statutory and regulatory scheme. Without awaiting the outcome of the administrative proceedings, Plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the institutional defendants, alleging, inter alia, tortious interference with business relations, invasion of privacy, and unfair and deceptive business practices. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that the suit was premature because Plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. The First Circuit affirmed as modified, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the doctrine of administrative exhaustion; but (2) on remand, the district court is directed to convert its order of dismissal to an order staying the case pending the timely resolution of administrative proceedings. View "Anversa v. Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

New Public School District #8 appealed a judgment affirming the State Board of Public School Education's decision approving annexation of certain real properties to the Williston School District. New Public School District argued the State Board erred in approving the petition for annexation because the property to be annexed was not contiguous to the Williston School District before the petition was heard. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "New Public Sch. Dist. #8 v. North Dakota Bd. of Public Sch. Edu." on Justia Law

When Jane Doe was in second grade, she began receiving special education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act based on her deficiency in reading fluency. More than six years later, an administrative hearing officer determined that Jane was no longer eligible to receive special education. The district court affirmed. The First Circuit vacated and remanded the case, holding (1) the district court erred in relying on evidence of Jane’s overall academic performance without regard to how it reflected her reading fluency skills; and (2) the district court did not make an independent judgment as to the additional evidence submitted by Jane’s parents and afforded excessive deference to the hearing officer’s determinations in weighing the relevant reading fluency measures. View "Mr. & Mrs. Doe v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

A School District expelled Student for six weeks after finding a pocketknife in a purse in her locker. The Commissioner of the Department of Education affirmed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) Student did not willfully violate the District’s weapons policy when she unintentionally carried the pocketknife to school, and (2) the pocketknife’s presence in Student’s locker did not bring Student or others into danger. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record did not support the conclusion that Student deliberately and intentionally violated the District’s weapons policy; and (2) the record did not contain substantial evidence that Student exposed anyone to actual or even probable harm. View "In re Expulsion of A.D. from United S. Central Pub. Schs." on Justia Law