Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Ascendium Education Solutions (“Ascendium”) is a Program guarantor that previously charged debt-collection costs to defaulting Program borrowers who entered loan rehabilitation agreements. Ascendium challenged the Department of Education’s Rule, 34 C.F.R. Section 682.410(b)(2)(i), under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), arguing that the Department of Education and its Secretary (collectively, the “Department”) did not have statutory authority to promulgate the Rule because the Rule conflicts with the Act. The district court ruled that Ascendium lacked standing to challenge the Rule as it applies to borrowers who enter repayment agreements. But the district court held that the Rule exceeded the Department’s authority under the Act with respect to borrowers who enter rehabilitation agreements. Both Ascendium and the Department appealed.   The DC Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part. The court concluded that Ascendium has standing to challenge the entirety of the Rule, that the Rule is consistent with the Act and therefore is lawful, and that the Rule is not arbitrary or capricious. The court explained that the Rule prohibits a guarantor from charging collection costs to a borrower who enters a repayment plan or a rehabilitation agreement during the initial default period: It implicitly deems such costs “unreasonable” under the circumstances. The court concluded that the Rule is consistent with the Act’s requirement that “reasonable” collection costs must be passed on to borrowers. Further, the court explained that the Department’s response to Ascendium’s comment adequately refuted Ascendium’s assumption that the purpose of the Rule should be to incentivize guarantors to enter rehabilitation agreements by allowing them to charge collection costs. View "Ascendium Education Solutions, Inc. v. Miguel Cardona" on Justia Law

In 2016, San Francisco voters amended their city charter to authorize voting in local school board elections by noncitizen parents and guardians of school-age children. In 2018, the Board of Supervisors enacted an ordinance implementing Proposition N, including provisions requiring the City’s Department of Elections to develop a noncitizen voter registration form for school board elections. In 2022, after multiple school board elections in which noncitizens voted, this lawsuit was brought alleging the charter amendment violated the California Constitution. The trial court granted found the effective ordinance void and unenforceableThe court of appeal reversed and awarded the city costs. Neither the plain language of the Constitution nor its history prohibits legislation expanding the electorate to noncitizens. The relevant constitutional provisions authorizing home rule permit charter cities to implement such an expansion in local school board elections. This authority is consistent with the principles underlying home rule and permits the voters of each charter city to determine whether it is good policy for their city or not. View "Lacy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

School districts may levy “qualified special taxes,” Government Code section 50079, with the approval of two-thirds of district voters. A qualified special tax must “apply uniformly to all taxpayers or all real property within the school district” (with some statutory exemptions) and not be “imposed on a particular class of property or taxpayers.” Measure A, approved in 2020 by voters in the Alameda Unified School District, authorizes a tax on improved parcels at “the rate of $0.265 per building square foot not to exceed $7,999 per parcel.” In Traiman’s action challenging Measure A, the trial court ruled that the tax was not applied uniformly and invalidated the tax. The court awarded Traiman $374,960 in attorney fees (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5).The court of appeal reversed. Measure A tax applies uniformly within the meaning of section 50079 because every nonexempt taxpayer and every improved parcel in the District is taxed using the same formula. Neither the language of the statute, case law, legislative history, nor public policy indicates that a school district cannot base a qualified special tax on building square footage with a maximum tax per parcel. View "Traiman v. Alameda Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Jessica Marie Purcell's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that Clay Johnson be removed from the Chariho Regional School Committee and ordering the Town Council of the Town of Richmond to appoint Purcell to the School Committee and denied Johnson's action in quo warranto seeking a determination that he rightfully retain his membership on the School Committee, holding that Purcell was entitled to relief.On January 19, 2023, the Town Council voted to appoint Johnson to the town's vacant seat on the School Committee to serve the remainder of Gary Ligouri's term following his resignation. Purcell brought this action seeking an order removing Johnson from the Committee and requiring the Council to appoint Purcell, as prescribed by the Town's Home Rule Charter. In response, the Town and Johnson filed an emergency quo warranto petition claiming right and title to the public office pursuant to the Chariho Act. See P.L. 1958, ch. 55, as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 286. The Supreme Court denied and dismissed Johnson's petition and granted Purcell's petition, holding that Purcell was legally entitled to the office of Chariho Regional School Committee member. View "Purcell v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Under the 1976 Migrant Education Act (Ed. Code 54442)., the State Board of Education must adopt a master plan for services to migrant children, requiring “[t]he active involvement of parents, teachers, and community representatives in the local implementation of migrant education.” The Superintendent of Public Instruction implements the plan and must establish regional parent advisory councils (RPACs) to consult with local agencies in the planning, operation, and evaluation of migrant education programs. In 2019, the Superintendent adopted regulations concerning the formation and governance of RPACs.The trial court rejected arguments that the Superintendent acted outside his statutory authority, as section 54444.2 provides migrant parents the “sole authority” to “decide on the composition of the council,” that the regulations conflict with the statute by placing impermissible restrictions on migrant parents’ authority to elect RPAC members, that the necessity of the regulations to effectuate the Act’s purpose was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the adoption violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The court of appeal concluded that the Superintendent acted within his authority in adopting the challenged regulations but violated the APA’s notice requirements when he adopted a regulation prohibiting RPAC members’ use of alternates without adequate notice to the public. The necessity of the regulations is supported by substantial evidence. The regulations are valid except for the prohibition on alternates and portions of the regulations the trial court invalidated. View "Wendz v. Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Higher Education Act governs federal financial aid, 20 U.S.C. 1070(a), and authorizes the Secretary of Education to cancel or reduce loans held by some public servants and borrowers who have died, become permanently and totally disabled, are bankrupt, or whose schools falsely certify them, close down, or fail to pay lenders. Under the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act (HEROES Act), the Secretary “may waive or modify" any statutory or regulatory provision applicable to the loan programs as the Secretary deems "necessary in connection with a war or other military operation or national emergency.” As the COVID–19 pandemic was ending, the Secretary invoked the HEROES Act to issue “waivers and modifications” reducing or eliminating most borrowers' federal student debt. States challenged the plan. The Eighth Circuit issued a nationwide preliminary injunction.The Supreme Court found that the plan exceeded the Secretary’s authority, first holding that at least Missouri had standing. The plan would cost the state's nonprofit government corporation about $44 million a year in fees.The HEROES Act allows the Secretary to “waive or modify” existing statutory or regulatory provisions but does not allow the Secretary to rewrite the Education Act to the extent of canceling $430 billion of student loan principal. The Secretary may make modest adjustments to existing provisions, not transform them. The Act includes narrowly-delineated situations that qualify a borrower for loan discharge; the Secretary has extended such discharge to nearly every borrower. The plan constitutes “effectively" a "whole new regime.” The question is not whether something should be done; it is who has the authority to do it. The basic and consequential tradeoffs inherent in mass debt cancellation are ones that Congress would likely have intended for itself. View "Biden v. Nebraska" on Justia Law

Appellants in these tandem appeals are each a parent of a disabled child. Arguing that his or her child was entitled to benefits under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i), each parent brought an administrative action against his or her local education agency and prevailed. Subsequently, each parent brought a federal action for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). In each case, the district court awarded less attorneys’ fees than the parent requested, and the parents appealed.   The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of travel-related fees in No. 21-1961 and remanded for further proceedings. The court otherwise affirmed the judgments of the district courts. The court found that it was persuaded that there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s calculation of reasonable attorneys’ fees in each case. Further, the court wrote that the district courts that declined to award prejudgment interest did not abuse their discretion because “delays in payment” may be remedied by “application of current rather than historic hourly rates.” However, the court held that the district court abused its discretion when it denied any travel-related fees to M.D.’s counsel. A district court may permissibly adjust excessive travel costs. But the district court could not “eliminate all of the hours submitted by [CLF] as travel time” by denying travel-related fees altogether. View "H.C. v. NYC DOE, et al." on Justia Law

In January 2022, plaintiffs A.S. and her husband B.S. brought a claim under the Child Sexual Abuse Accountability Act (CSAAA or “Act”) against a former high school athletic coach and a school district, alleging that the coach sexually abused A.S. between 2001 and 2005 when she was a minor. At the time plaintiffs filed suit, any previously available claims for this alleged abuse was time-barred. The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review was whether the CSAAA was unconstitutionally retrospective to the extent it created a new cause of action for conduct that predated the Act, and for which any previously available claims would be time-barred. The Supreme Court concluded that because the CSAAA created a new cause of action for child sexual abuse, the Act created a new obligation and attached a new disability with respect to past transactions or considerations to the extent it permitted victims to bring claims for which any available cause of action would have been time-barred. Therefore, the CSAAA amounted to unconstitutional retrospective legislation as applied to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Act. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. View "Aurora Public Schools v. A.S. & B.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction in the circuit court seeking to enjoin Petitioners from creating "any West Virginia Professional Charter School Board-authorized charter schools absent a voter of country residents," holding that Respondents lacked standing to seek the preliminary injunction.House Bill 2012, passed in 2021, created the West Virginia Professional Charter School Board (PCSB) tasked with authorizing and approving public charter schools. Respondents brought this action seeking to prevent the creation of public charter schools without a majority vote of the citizens of the county in which the charter schools would be located. Respondents were granted a preliminary injunction enjoining Governor James Justice and related persons from enforcing HB 2012 in the creation of PCSB-authorized charter schools. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondents lacked standing to seeking the injunction because Governor Justice lacked the ability to authorize public charter schools and because granting injunctive relief does not prevent the PCSB from authorizing public charter schools. View "Blair v. Brunett" on Justia Law

Five University System of Georgia (“USG”) professors filed suit to block a 2017 statutory amendment that removed public colleges and other public postsecondary educational institutions from the statutory definition of “school safety zone.” Before the 2017 amendment, carrying or possessing a weapon on any real property or in any building owned by or leased to any postsecondary educational institution was a misdemeanor, and the 2017 amendment decriminalized that conduct. The professors alleged that, as a result of the 2017 amendment, the Code required the Board of Regents, the USG, and USG institutions to permit persons to carry or possess weapons on the campuses of public postsecondary educational institutions, contrary to longstanding USG policies. The professors sought a declaration that the statutory amendment was unconstitutional as applied because it usurped the Board’s constitutional authority to govern, control, and manage the USG and its member institutions. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the professors’ request for declaratory relief, ruling that the trial court lacked jurisdiction on three alternative grounds, including mootness. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because the complaint showed that the Board adopted gun-carrying policies consistent with the 2017 statutory amendment, the question of whether the amendment usurped the constitutional authority of the Board to govern, control, and manage the USG and its member institutions became moot. Consequently, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the professors’ as-applied challenge, and the judgment dismissing the professors’ complaint on that basis was affirmed. View "Knox v. Georgia" on Justia Law