Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Dunbarton School District (appealed a Board of Education decision which determined that Dunbarton was liable to the Goffstown School District for its proportional share of Goffstown’s obligation on a 20-year construction bond approved in 2001 for renovations to the Goffstown High School. The hearing officer reasoned that, “[b]y initiating the withdrawal study, Dunbarton would have put Goffstown on notice prior to the bond as to the potential additional financial risk on the bond without Dunbarton remaining part of the [Authorized Regional Enrollment Area] AREA.” Although the 2004 AREA plan expired June 30, 2014, “Dunbarton was clearly on notice back in 2001 that there was a twenty (20) year bond, and had the opportunity to initiate a withdrawal study at that point in time so that Goffstown would be on notice of the possible financial ramifications of Dunbarton withdrawing from the AREA.” Accordingly, the hearing officer recommended that the Board find that Dunbarton remained financially obligated with respect to the high school construction bond. The Board voted to accept the hearing officer’s report and adopted his recommendation. On appeal, Dunbarton argued that RSA chapter 195-A “envisions two possible endings to an area relationship: (1) withdrawal by one party; and (2) expiration of the area agreement. [. . .] only where an area relationship terminates . . . before the end of its term through ‘withdrawal’ that the statute imposes liability for payments on outstanding bond issues” pursuant to statute. Consequently, “[t]he Board unlawfully and unreasonably categorized Dunbarton as a ‘withdrawing’ sending district because Dunbarton never withdrew; instead, the 2004 Contract expired by its terms and with it, any further obligation for Dunbarton to pay Goffstown.” The Supreme Court agreed with Dunbarton's interpretation of RSA 195-A:14, reversed the Board's decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Appeal of Dunbarton School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging that federal student loans were fraudulently procured on their behalf when the Wilford beauty schools falsely certified that plaintiffs had an ability‐to‐benefit (ATB) from the education they received from Wilfred. Plaintiffs allege that the DOE’s refusal to temporarily suspend collection of the student loan debt of putative class members, and refusal to send them notice of their potential eligibility for a discharge, was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701. The court concluded that it has jurisdiction to review this case because plaintiffs had standing when they filed their class action complaint and this case fits into the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine for class action claims that are “inherently transitory.” On the merits, the court held that plaintiffs are entitled to judicial review because there is sufficient law to apply to the challenged agency decisions. The text of the relevant statute directs that the DOE “shall” discharge a borrower’s loan liability when a school has falsely certified a student’s ATB.  DOE’s regulations and informal agency guidance direct that the DOE “shall” temporarily suspend collection on loans and notify borrowers of their possible eligibility for a discharge when the DOE has reliable information that a borrower “may be eligible” for discharge.  Because plaintiffs' claims are judicially reviewable under the APA, the court vacated and remanded. View "Salazar v. King" on Justia Law

J.S. is the mother of M.S., a child covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). M.S. was a residential student at the Utah Schools for the Deaf and Blind (“USDB”). Believing USDB was not complying with IDEA’s procedural requirements and was not providing M.S. with free appropriate public education (FAPE), J.S. sought a due process hearing. Unsatisfied with the relief she obtained in that hearing, J.S. filed a civil action in federal court, and appealed the district court decision granting her additional limited relief. She asserts the district court erred when it: (1) delegated its authority to resolve the propriety of M.S.’s residential placement to members of the team tasked with developing M.S.’s individualized education program (“IEP”); and (2) granted her only a partial award of attorneys’ fees. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court delegated the issue of M.S.’s residential placement to her IEP team and that such delegation "[was] at odds with" 20 U.S.C. 1415. The Court remanded this case to the district court to resolve the issue of M.S.’s residential placement and reconsideration of the attorney fee award. View "M.S. v. Utah School for the Deaf" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfred Fuciarelli was a tenured faculty member at Valdosta State University (“VSU”). Fuciarelli was at one time also assistant vice president for research and a dean of the graduate school. After he complained about VSU’s “noncompliance with laws, rules and regulations,” VSU terminated Fuciarelli’s contract to serve as an assistant vice president and dean. Although Fuciarelli remained as a member of the faculty, his salary and benefits were reduced. Fuciarelli appealed his termination to the Board of Regents which affirmed VSU’s decision. Thereafter, Fuciarelli filed suit against the Board of Regents, William McKinney, individually and in his official capacity as president of VSU, and Karla Hull, individually and in her official capacity as a former acting vice president of VSU, seeking damages under both the Public Employee Whistleblower Retaliation Act, and the Taxpayer Protection Against False Claims Act (“TPAFCA”). The trial court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the public employee whistleblower retaliation claim, but granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the taxpayer retaliation claim on the ground that Fuciarelli failed to obtain the approval of the Attorney General before filing suit. The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether it correctly held that the TPAFCA did not require the Attorney General to approve taxpayer retaliation claims brought under subsection (l) of the Act. Because the plain language of the statute required the Attorney General to approve a taxpayer retaliation claim prior to filing suit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary. View "McKinney v. Fuciarelli" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Kansas Board of Education (the “Board”) adopted curriculum standards establishing performance expectations for science instruction in kindergarten through twelfth grade. Appellants, Citizens for Objective Public Education, Kansas parents, and school children (collectively, “COPE”), contended that although the standards purported to further science education, their concealed aim was to teach students to answer questions about the cause and nature of life with only nonreligious explanations. COPE also claimed two plaintiffs had standing as taxpayers who objected to their tax dollars being used to implement the Standards. The district court disagreed, and dismissed the suit without prejudice for lack of standing. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded all of COPE's theories of injury failed, and affirmed the district court's dismissal. View "COPE v. KS State Board of Education" on Justia Law

Farmington School District appealed a Board of Education (state board) decision reversing the decision of the Farmington School Board (local board) not to renew the employment contract of Demetria McKaig, a guidance counselor at Farmington High School. In November 2012, a student (Student A) and her boyfriend told McKaig and another guidance counselor that Student A was pregnant and that she wanted to terminate her pregnancy. Student A was fifteen years old at the time. McKaig suggested that Student A tell her mother about the pregnancy, but Student A refused. The principal expressed his view that the school should inform Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. McKaig disagreed, asserting that Student A had a right to keep the pregnancy confidential. McKaig spoke with Attorney Barbara Keshen of the New Hampshire Civil Liberties Union about Student A’s situation. Keshen’s opinion was that the judicial bypass law protected the confidentiality of Student A’s pregnancy and the fact that she was contemplating an abortion. McKaig relayed this opinion to Student A, and Student A made an appointment with a health center and another attorney to assist her with the judicial bypass proceedings. Meanwhile, the principal instructed the school nurse to meet with Student A to tell her that the school would inform her mother about her pregnancy. McKaig told the principal about her conversation with Keshen and urged him to contact Keshen to discuss Student A’s rights. The principal did not contact Keshen; however, Keshen contacted him. He told Keshen that the parental notification and judicial bypass laws did not prevent him from telling Student A’s mother about the pregnancy. Keshen instituted a petition for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the principal to prevent him from contacting Student A’s mother. McKaig was named as the petitioner “ON BEHALF OF [Student A]”; she was not named in her individual capacity. The TRO was ultimately granted. Months later, McKaig received a notice of nonrenewal from the superintendent; in the written statement of the reasons for non-renewal, the superintendent listed three reasons: insubordination, breach of student confidentiality, and neglect of duties. After the hearing, the local board upheld McKaig’s nonrenewal on those grounds. McKaig appealed to the state board, which found, pursuant that the local board’s decision was “clearly erroneous.” The state board reversed the local board’s decision to uphold McKaig’s nonrenewal, but it did not order McKaig’s reinstatement or any other remedy. McKaig cross-appealed the state board’s decision and argued that she was entitled to reinstatement with back pay and benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the state board’s reversal of the local board’s decision, and ordered that McKaig be reinstated to her former job. The case was remanded to the state board for further proceedings to determine whether she was entitled to additional remedies. View "Appeal of Farmington School District" on Justia Law

A school district is entitled to levy fees on new residential construction. Government Code section 66020 applies to partial refunds of fees paid, such as the refund sought by appellant. At issue in this appeal is whether Civil Code section 3287, which provides for interest when damages are awarded, applies specifically to interest on a refund for a development fee paid to the District. The court concluded that section 3287 does not apply because section 66020, subdivision (e) more specifically sets forth the interest available on the development fee refund. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that section 3287 did not apply in this case and properly sustained the school district's demurrer and dismissed the lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Merkoh Assoc., LLC v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Cathy Trimble and Ida Longmire petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in their favor on certain claims asserted against them by Crystal Lewis, individually and by and through her mother and next friend, Mary Lewis. In October 2012, Crystal was a 12th-grade student at Francis Marion High School. The school system was covered by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which generally required a school district to provide reasonable accommodations to assist any child deemed to have a "disability" as that term is defined by the Act. Crystal had a medical condition that required the Perry County public school system to provide her with certain special accommodations. Longmire was an English teacher at Francis Marion High School and also served as committee-member secretary for the school's Section 504 special-accommodations meetings. Longmire prepared an updated report of the special accommodations required by Section 504 intended to inform particular teachers of the 504 accommodations for specific students. Longmire placed a copy of the report in sealed envelopes, which were to be hand delivered to the teachers. Longmire asked Trimble, acting principal of the school, about distributing the envelopes. Trimble assigned a student office aide the task of delivering the envelopes to the teachers. Rather than delivering the envelopes as instructed, the student office aide opened one of the sealed envelopes and read about Crystal's medical condition. She shared that information about Crystal's medical condition with other students. Crystal commenced this action against Longmire, Trimble, the student office aide, the Perry County Board of Education, "Francis Marion High School," and other school administrators. In her complaint, Crystal alleged that she has faced ridicule, harassment, and bullying as a result of the dissemination of her confidential medical information. She asserted claims of negligence, wantonness, nuisance, breach of contract, and invasion of privacy against each defendant and claims of negligent hiring, training, and supervision against all the defendants except the student office aide and Longmire. Longmire and Trimble moved for a summary judgment on the ground that they were entitled to State-agent immunity as to all claims asserted against them by Crystal. The Supreme Court determined that Longmire and Trimble were entitled to State-agent immunity. The trial court was ordered to vacate its order denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Longmire and Trimble and to enter a summary judgment in their favor. View "Ex parte Trimble & Longmire" on Justia Law

The Williston Education Association ("WEA") sued the Williston Public School District No. 1 ("District") on behalf of Williston middle school teachers. The WEA claimed the District owed teachers compensation for extra classes they taught during the 2012-2013 school year. The underlying dispute was whether prime time constituted a "class period" under the terms of the Agreement. If the court interpreted "class period" to include prime time, the District would owe teachers additional compensation because they taught six or more class periods plus prime time during the 2012-2013 school year. If prime time was not a "class period," the majority of teachers only taught six class periods; the District would not owe them extra compensation. The district court interpreted "class period" to include prime time. It awarded summary judgment in favor of the WEA and ordered the District pay damages to the teachers. The District filed a timely appeal. When a trial court can reasonably draw conflicting inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred when it granted the WEA's motion for summary judgment, finding there were multiple issues of fact from which "differing reasonable inferences could be drawn." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to resolve these issues of fact. View "Williston Education Association v. Williston Public School Dist. No. 1" on Justia Law

Responding to adverse financial conditions in the Philadelphia School District, the Pennsylvania Legislature amended the School Code in the late 1990s by adding provisions to the Distress Law tailored to school districts of the first class. In this matter, the issue before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was whether legislation designed to help the Philadelphia School District recover from financial hardship violated the non-delegation rule. The Court held that Section 696(i)(3) of the School Code, 24 P.S. sec. 6-696(i)(3), was unconstitutional, violating the non-delegation rule of Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly Respondents’ actions taken pursuant to that provision were null and void, and Respondents were permanently enjoined from taking further action under the authority it conferred. View "W. Phila A.C.E. Sch. v. S.D. of Phila." on Justia Law