Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Cathy Ritzert had worked as a teacher for more than twenty years. She worked for the Air Academy High School, part of the Academy School District No. 20. A student's parents complained about Ritzert, and the District placed her on administrative leave, telling her they would recommend dismissal unless she resigned. Ritzert refused. Several months passed without the District making good on its threat to fire her. Ritzert eventually took a new job teaching special needs students in a neighboring district, claiming she did this to mitigate her damages. She still wanted the District to prove it had a legitimate basis for terminating her, so she again refused to quit. The District responded by ordering Ritzert to report to work as a floating substitute. When Ritzert did not comply, the District initiated formal dismissal proceedings, claiming in part that her refusal to return to work constituted insubordination. A hearing officer recommended that Ritzert be retained, finding in part that the District's insubordination allegation was pretextual and unreasonable under the circumstances. The Board dismissed Ritzert for insubordination anyway, making no comment about the complaint that triggered placing her on leave in the first place. Upon review of this matter, the Colorado Supreme Court held that under the Teacher Employment, Compensation and Dismissal Act of 1990 (TECDA), the School Board's order must be fully warranted by the hearing officer's evidentiary findings of fact. Because the Board here "abdicated" that responsibility here, the Court concluded that its decision to dismiss Ritzert for insubordination on the facts of this case was arbitrary and capricious. The Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded this case to the Board to reinstate Ritzert. View "Ritzert v. Board of Education" on Justia Law

During the 2011-2012 school year, Plaintiff was a continuing contract teacher who worked for the Laramie County School District No. One. In spring of 2012, the District Superintendent gave Plaintiff notice that he proposed that Kinstler be terminated. On September 4, 2012, a hearing officer recommended that the District accept the Superintendent’s proposal. On September 17, 2012, the District’s Board of Trustees voted to accept the recommendation. Kinstler was paid his normal salary from August 15, 2012, the date he would have started to work, through the date that the Board acted on the recommendation to terminate him. Kinstler subsequently sued the District, asserting that the District failed to pay him the salary and value of benefits allegedly owed him for the 2012-2013 academic year. The district court partially granted Kinstler’s motion for summary judgment and entered an order with respect to his salary and benefits claim. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the award, holding that because Kinstler’s termination was effective at the end of the 2011-2012 school year, he had no statutory right to compensation following that date. View "Laramie County Sch. Dist. v. Kinstler" on Justia Law

Petitioners - four residents of the Westwood Valley Addition to Sioux Falls, which is a part of the Tea Area School District (TASD) - submitted a petition to the Tea Area School Board requesting that the TASD’s boundary be changed to exclude their residences, which would instead be annexed by the Sioux Falls School District. After a publicly noticed meeting at which none of Petitioners appeared, either personally or through counsel, the Board denied the petition. One petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) the Board’s denial of the petition for a minor boundary change was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. View "Schaefer v. Tea Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of allegations that AKC, a child with autism, suffered abuse at school by her special-education teacher, Vickie Cantrell. AKC’s parents, Ted and Bella Carroll, filed suit in federal district court against Cantrell, the school district, and others, seeking damages under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and a variety of state-law theories. The district court dismissed the Carrolls’ federal claims, concluding the Carrolls had not exhausted their administrative remedies before filing suit as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the IDEA). The district court then dismissed the Carrolls’ complaint, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims. The Carrolls appealed. The single issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in determining the Carrolls’ federal claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement. Because the Court concluded the Carrolls’ complaint alleged educational injuries that could have been redressed to some degree by the IDEA’s administrative remedies, it agreed with the district court that exhaustion of those remedies was required before the Carrolls could file suit. View "Carroll v. Lawton Independent School" on Justia Law

In 2014, the Arkansas State Board of Education (State Board) classified six schools within the Little Rock School District as being in academic distress. In 2015, the State Board voted to immediately remove all members of the District’s board of directors and to direct the commissioner of education to assume the authority of the Board of Directors for the governance of the District. Appellees, three former members of the District board of directors and a parent whose children attend school in the District - filed an amended complaint for declaratory relief, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus, and injunctive relief, alleging that the State Board’s actions were unconstitutional, ultra vires, arbitrary, capricious, and wantonly injurious. Appellants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant subsequently filed this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Appellees’ complaint, holding (1) the allegations in the complaint did not establish a sovereign-immunity exception; but (2) Appellees failed to establish in their complaint that the State Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith in assuming control of the District. View "Key v. Curry" on Justia Law

Brenda Franks was a former nontenured employee of the Choctaw County Public School System. Before the 2008-2009 school year, Franks had been employed as a full-time counselor in the school system for three years when her contract was not renewed. For the 2008-2009 school year, Franks was offered and accepted a part-time, temporary position as a vocational counselor starting in February 2009. She signed an employment contract acknowledging that the position was temporary. She also signed a "Letter of Understanding Concerning Temporary Employment." Franks worked pursuant to the contract for five months. The superintendent notified Franks, in writing, of her intention to recommend that the School Board members cancel the contract because of a "justifiable decrease in jobs in the system." The Board members approved the recommendation to cancel the contract. Franks did not contest the cancellation. In July 2010, the Board members posted a vacancy for a business-education teacher. Franks applied for the position, but was not hired. Franks sued the Board and Superintendent, asserting that the Board members had terminated her employment based on a reduction in force ("RIF"), but that she was entitled to be hired for the teaching position pursuant to the RIF policy. Franks sought to be instated to that position, with backpay, interest, and restoration of progress toward tenure. However, Franks died prior to the conclusion of this suit. Petitioners Ronald Hampton, Darry Phillips, Wayne Taylor, Isaac Johnson, and Sharon Sheppard, the individual members of the Choctaw County Board of Education, and Sue Moore, the superintendent of the Choctaw County Public School System sought an order compelling the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its denial of their summary-judgment motion and to enter summary judgment in their favor on the ground that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims because of plaintiff's death and the petitioners' immunity. The Supreme Court concluded that the superintendent and the Board members demonstrated immunity and established a clear legal right to a summary judgment on the claims asserted against them in their official capacities. Therefore, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued a writ directing the Choctaw Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' summary-judgment motion and to enter a summary judgment on all the claims asserted against the superintendent and the Board members. View "Ex parte Ronald Hampton, et al." on Justia Law

In this case, J.M. did not comply with certain conditions of the Government Claims Act (Government Code, section 810 et seq.): he did not present a claim with the board of the Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) within six months of the date on which his causes of action accrued, as required by sections 945.4 and 911.2. He retained counsel, who presented an application under section 911.4 to present a late claim on the ground J.M. was a minor. The District did not act on the application, and, as a consequence, under the express language of section 911.6, subdivision (c), his application was deemed denied by operation of law. Still represented by counsel, J.M. filed a petition under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement. The superior court denied his petition as untimely because it was not filed within six months of the date on which his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M. appealed the superior court’s order denying his petition for relief under section 946.6. "The plain, unambiguous language of sections 911.6 and 946.6 compel[led]" the Court of Appeal to affirm: J.M.’s application to present a late claim was made under section 911.6, subdivision (b)(2) on the ground that he was a minor at the time he was required to present a claim. Because the District did not act, under the plain language of section 911.6(c), J.M.’s application was deemed denied by operation of law on the 45th day after it was presented. "When an application is denied by operation of law under section 911.6(c), a claimant can challenge that denial only by petition to the superior court under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement." J.M. filed his petition to the superior court more than six months after his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M.’s petition therefore was untimely, and the superior court did not err by denying it. View "J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Education Code (47605.8) authorizes the State Board of Education (Board) to grant (or deny) an application for a “state charter school” and directs the Board to adopt regulations. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs both quasi-judicial proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings by an agency. The Education Code refers to the APA section concerning adjudicatory proceedings. The Board claimed that the reference was an error and that, in directing the Board to “implement” the statute, the Legislature intended to refer to APA rule-making provisions. The California School Boards Association argued—and the trial court agreed—that the statutory language is plain and cannot be disregarded. The court of appeal reversed. The statute governs approval or denial of a charter school application, which is a quasi-legislative function—requiring consideration of policy questions and the opportunity for public input—and is fundamentally at odds with adjudicatory procedures. Legislative directives to adopt regulations for the implementation of a statute invariably call for a rule-making process pursuant to the APA’s adjudicatory provisions, so the reference is a complete anomaly. The use of an adjudicatory proceeding to approve or deny state charters would be inconsistent with all other like provisions in the Charter School Act, none of which entail quasi-judicial proceedings. View "Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Crystal Lake South High School is surrounded by land zoned “R-2 residential single family,” and constitutes a legal, nonconforming use. The campus is owned by District 155. In 2013, the District’s Board decided to replace the bleachers at the Crystal Lake South football stadium after a failed structural inspection. The plan involved relocating new, larger, home bleachers to be adjacent to residential property and closer to the property line than existing bleachers. The McHenry County Regional Superintendent of Schools approved the plans and issued a building permit under the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/3-14.20. The District began work without notifying the city of Crystal Lake or seeking a building permit, zoning approval, or storm water management approval. The city ordered the Board to stop construction until it obtained a special-use permit, a stormwater permit, and zoning variances. The Board disregarded the order and proceeded with construction. Owners of adjoining residential properties sought to privately enforce the zoning restrictions under the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS 5/11-13-15. The Board sought declaratory judgment. The circuit court awarded the city summary judgment. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a school district is subject to, and its school board must comply with, local governmental zoning and storm water restrictions. View "Gurba v. Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 155" on Justia Law

In 2013, Froid Elementary School District No. 65 petitioned the Roosevelt County Superintendent of Schools to transfer territory from the Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to the Froid School District. Poplar opposed the transfer. The deputy superintendent appointed for the purpose of hearing and deciding the petition approved the territory transfer. Poplar appealed. The district court awarded summary judgment to Poplar and vacated the order transferring territory to Froid on the basis that the territory transfer statute required statements to be made under oath and that the deputy superintendent’s failure to administrator oaths was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Poplar failed to preserve its statutory issue concerning the necessity of sworn testimony and it was error for the district court to reach the merits of the question. Remanded. View "In re Petition to Transfer Territory from Poplar Elementary Sch. to Froid Elementary Sch." on Justia Law