Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

South Kingstown School Committee (Committee) runs one of Rhode Island’s public school districts. Rhode Island has accepted federal funding under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Appellant, the mother of P.J., a disabled child the Committee was responsible for educating, filed a due process complaint seeking additional educational services for P.J. from the Committee. The Committee settled with Appellant pursuant to a Settlement Agreement under which the Committee agreed to perform four evaluations of P.J. After Appellant demanded ten additional evaluations, the Committee filed a due process complaint of its own. A Hearing Officer ruled against the Committee, concluding that some of the evaluations of P.J. had not been appropriate. The Committee then filed suit in federal district court. The district court reversed. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that the Settlement Agreement relieved the Committee of any obligation to perform or fund one of the evaluations; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that there was insufficient factual support for Appellant’s other evaluation request. Remanded.View "S. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Joanna S." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' request for tuition assistance for their daughter under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the State Review Officer's (SRO) decision to deny reimbursement for private schooling and the district court reversed in part and ordered the school district to reimburse plaintiffs for May 1, 2009 to May 31, 2009, and for the 2009-2010 school year. Because the court deferred to the SRO's determination that plaintiffs did not meet their obligation to demonstrate the appropriateness of their daughter's placement, plaintiffs cannot recover under the IDEA for any portion of the time she was placed at Family Foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of an order affirming the SRO's decision.View "Hardison v. Bd. of Ed. Oneonta City Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, parents of nine-year-old E.L., who has autism, initiated an administrative complaint against the school board under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. An ALJ determined that the school board violated the IDEA by failing to provide E.L. with required speech therapy but, in all other respects, she was provided an appropriate special education program. The school board appealed and the state review officer reversed the ALJ's conclusion regarding the speech therapy. Plaintiffs then filed a civil action seeking judicial review of the administrative proceedings. The court concluded that E.L. did not exhaust her administrative remedies and that the school board did not violate the IDEA where the review officer's conclusion that E.L. received the speech therapy mandated by her individualized education program is supported by the evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "E. L. v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Board of Education" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including eight South Carolina school districts, claimed that the State has failed to meet the constitutional obligation that there be a system of free public schools that affords each student the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education. The trial court held that the State's failure to address the effects of pervasive poverty on students within the plaintiffs' school districts prevented those students from receiving the required opportunity. The trial court performed a "thorough and cogent examination" of the issues of this case. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion regarding the adverse effects of poverty, the Record demonstrated that there were myriad other issues, under the State's control, working to prevent students within these districts from receiving the constitutionally required opportunity. Thus, the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and affirmed as modified.View "Abbeville County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education ask the court to recede from its opinion in Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., which held that school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state and therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court declined to read Versiglio II in a way which violates the court's prior panel precedent rule and creates interpretive problems for panels in the future; although the court recognized the principle of state sovereign immunity law in Stewart, the court did not find it determinative, and held that Alabama school boards could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity; the court's precedent does not provide a basis for it to conclude that Stewart has been abrogated; the court noted that the Alabama courts do not view state sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity as one and the same; and the Alabama Supreme Court's Ex Parte Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ. decision agrees with Stewart. The court concluded that both cases before it concern employment-related decisions and under Stewart, local school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state with respect to such decisions. Consequently, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education are not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits challenging those decisions under federal law; the district court's dismissal of the complaint in Walker (Case Nos. 13-14182 and 13-14927) is reversed; and the district court's denial of the motion of dismiss in Weaver (Case No. 13-14624) is affirmed.View "Walker, et al. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., et al." on Justia Law

The district court found that House Bill 974 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (Act 1), violated the single object requirement for legislative bills as provided for in La. Const. art. III, section 15(A). Act 1 of 2012 amended, reenacted and repealed various statutes in Title 17. Looking first at the title, and then to the body of Act 1, the Supreme Court concluded that the subject of the act is elementary and secondary education, and the object of the act was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness. After examining the numerous provisions of Act 1, the Court determined that "they all have a natural connection and are incidental and germane to that one object." In order to overturn a legislative enactment pursuant to the one-object rule, “the objections must be grave and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” In this case, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Foundation of Teachers, Nellie Joyce Meriman, and Kevin Joseph DeHart, failed to establish that such a grave and palpable conflict existed between Act 1 and the one-object rule of La. Const. art. III, section 15. Because the district court pretermitted consideration of the other constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs, i.e., that Act 1 violated due process rights pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 2, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the case was remanded for consideration of those issues.View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Education Law permits Nassau County to charge back to the Town of North Hempstead amounts the County paid on behalf of Town residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Town commenced this proceeding seeking a declaration that the County lacked authority to charge back FIT expenses to the Town. Supreme Court found that the County was entitled to collect chargebacks from the Town and that the County was entitled to offset the Town’s resulting liability by retaining the amount owed from the Town’s share of County sales tax revenue. The Appellate Division concluded that the County was required to adopt a formal resolution in order to authorize its treasurer to collect the chargebacks and that the County was not entitled to offset the amounts owed by the Town against the sales tax revenue. The Court of Appeals modified to uphold the County’s offsetting of the Town’s liability for FIT chargebacks from sales tax revenue, without requiring the issuance of a new resolution, and as so modified, affirmed.View "Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

Anita Cooper, who was employed as principal of the Oark, Arkansas schools, was removed from her duties as principal. The Superintendent of the Jasper School District No. 1 of Newton County listed nine reasons as bases for the termination. The District’s Board of Directors then terminated Cooper’s employment. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, reinstated Cooper to her position, and awarded Cooper $64,998 in damages. The Superintendent and District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants failed to comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that the contract in the case at bar created a property right in Cooper’s position as principal of the Oark schools; and (3) the circuit court’s award to Cooper was neither excessive nor amounted to an award of “double retirement.” View "Jasper Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Daniel Berman appealed a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate against the Regents of the University of California. He wanted to overturn a two-quarter suspension from the University of California San Diego (UCSD), which was imposed against him for hitting another student in the head with sufficient force to knock the other student to the ground and to cause that other student to lose consciousness, sustain a concussion and require medical attention. Berman did not challenge the factual finding he violated UCSD's Student Conduct Code, rather, he argued the Code did not authorize either the student conduct officer responsible for his case (who is also a Dean of Student Affairs) or the Council of Deans of Student Affairs to impose suspension as a sanction when the student conduct review board did not recommend suspension. The Court of Appeal reviewed the case, disagreed with Berman's arguments and affirmed the suspension.View "Berman v. Regents of UCSD" on Justia Law

After the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) learned that JM, a minor, had several unexcused absences from school, a deputy count attorney filed a petition alleging that JM was a neglected child because Mother had failed to provide adequate education for JM’s well being. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order of neglect. Mother appealed, claiming that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition because the district court was required to give her notice and counseling before the petition was filed, and she did not receive such notice or counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compulsory attendance statutes upon which Mother relied, which require school districts to give parents notice or counseling based on students’ unexcused absences, do not apply when a juvenile petition is filed by a prosecuting attorney under the Child Protection Act on the basis of a complaint from DFS alleging neglect.View "In re JM" on Justia Law