Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

In consolidated appeals, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education ask the court to recede from its opinion in Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., which held that school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state and therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court declined to read Versiglio II in a way which violates the court's prior panel precedent rule and creates interpretive problems for panels in the future; although the court recognized the principle of state sovereign immunity law in Stewart, the court did not find it determinative, and held that Alabama school boards could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity; the court's precedent does not provide a basis for it to conclude that Stewart has been abrogated; the court noted that the Alabama courts do not view state sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity as one and the same; and the Alabama Supreme Court's Ex Parte Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ. decision agrees with Stewart. The court concluded that both cases before it concern employment-related decisions and under Stewart, local school boards in Alabama are not arms of the state with respect to such decisions. Consequently, the Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education are not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits challenging those decisions under federal law; the district court's dismissal of the complaint in Walker (Case Nos. 13-14182 and 13-14927) is reversed; and the district court's denial of the motion of dismiss in Weaver (Case No. 13-14624) is affirmed.View "Walker, et al. v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., et al." on Justia Law

The district court found that House Bill 974 of the 2012 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, which was enacted as Act 1 of 2012 (Act 1), violated the single object requirement for legislative bills as provided for in La. Const. art. III, section 15(A). Act 1 of 2012 amended, reenacted and repealed various statutes in Title 17. Looking first at the title, and then to the body of Act 1, the Supreme Court concluded that the subject of the act is elementary and secondary education, and the object of the act was improving elementary and secondary education through tenure reform and performance standards based on effectiveness. After examining the numerous provisions of Act 1, the Court determined that "they all have a natural connection and are incidental and germane to that one object." In order to overturn a legislative enactment pursuant to the one-object rule, “the objections must be grave and the conflict between the statute and the constitution palpable.” In this case, the Supreme Court found that plaintiffs the Louisiana Federation of Teachers, East Baton Rouge Federation of Teachers, Jefferson Foundation of Teachers, Nellie Joyce Meriman, and Kevin Joseph DeHart, failed to establish that such a grave and palpable conflict existed between Act 1 and the one-object rule of La. Const. art. III, section 15. Because the district court pretermitted consideration of the other constitutional arguments raised by plaintiffs, i.e., that Act 1 violated due process rights pursuant to La. Const. art. I, section 2, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the case was remanded for consideration of those issues.View "Louisiana Federation of Teachers v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the Education Law permits Nassau County to charge back to the Town of North Hempstead amounts the County paid on behalf of Town residents attending the Fashion Institute of Technology (FIT). The Town commenced this proceeding seeking a declaration that the County lacked authority to charge back FIT expenses to the Town. Supreme Court found that the County was entitled to collect chargebacks from the Town and that the County was entitled to offset the Town’s resulting liability by retaining the amount owed from the Town’s share of County sales tax revenue. The Appellate Division concluded that the County was required to adopt a formal resolution in order to authorize its treasurer to collect the chargebacks and that the County was not entitled to offset the amounts owed by the Town against the sales tax revenue. The Court of Appeals modified to uphold the County’s offsetting of the Town’s liability for FIT chargebacks from sales tax revenue, without requiring the issuance of a new resolution, and as so modified, affirmed.View "Matter of Town of N. Hempstead v. County of Nassau" on Justia Law

Anita Cooper, who was employed as principal of the Oark, Arkansas schools, was removed from her duties as principal. The Superintendent of the Jasper School District No. 1 of Newton County listed nine reasons as bases for the termination. The District’s Board of Directors then terminated Cooper’s employment. The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, reinstated Cooper to her position, and awarded Cooper $64,998 in damages. The Superintendent and District appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in finding that Defendants failed to comply with the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act; (2) the circuit court did not err in concluding that the contract in the case at bar created a property right in Cooper’s position as principal of the Oark schools; and (3) the circuit court’s award to Cooper was neither excessive nor amounted to an award of “double retirement.” View "Jasper Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Daniel Berman appealed a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate against the Regents of the University of California. He wanted to overturn a two-quarter suspension from the University of California San Diego (UCSD), which was imposed against him for hitting another student in the head with sufficient force to knock the other student to the ground and to cause that other student to lose consciousness, sustain a concussion and require medical attention. Berman did not challenge the factual finding he violated UCSD's Student Conduct Code, rather, he argued the Code did not authorize either the student conduct officer responsible for his case (who is also a Dean of Student Affairs) or the Council of Deans of Student Affairs to impose suspension as a sanction when the student conduct review board did not recommend suspension. The Court of Appeal reviewed the case, disagreed with Berman's arguments and affirmed the suspension.View "Berman v. Regents of UCSD" on Justia Law

After the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) learned that JM, a minor, had several unexcused absences from school, a deputy count attorney filed a petition alleging that JM was a neglected child because Mother had failed to provide adequate education for JM’s well being. Following a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order of neglect. Mother appealed, claiming that the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the petition because the district court was required to give her notice and counseling before the petition was filed, and she did not receive such notice or counseling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the compulsory attendance statutes upon which Mother relied, which require school districts to give parents notice or counseling based on students’ unexcused absences, do not apply when a juvenile petition is filed by a prosecuting attorney under the Child Protection Act on the basis of a complaint from DFS alleging neglect.View "In re JM" on Justia Law

D.E., now 23 years old, was a minor diagnosed with a learning disability and enrolled in school in the Central Dauphin School District. His parents claimed that while D.E. was enrolled in Central Dauphin he was deprived of a free appropriate public education (FAPE), in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400, and that he was discriminated against based upon his disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), 29 U.S.C. 794. The district court dismissed the IDEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and later granted summary judgment in Central Dauphin's favor as to the ADA and RA claims. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the ADA and RA claims, but reversed dismissal of the IDEA claim. Individuals seeking to enforce a favorable decision obtained at the administrative level are "aggrieved" for purposes of the IDEA and may properly pursue such claims in court. The court stated: "we encourage the District Court to consider any form of compensatory education proposed" in a manner consistent with the IDEA and Third Circuit precedent. View "D.E v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The Educational Rate Program, a subsidy program authorized by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, is implemented by the FCC, which established USAC, a private non-profit corporation, to administer the Program. USAC provides subsidies to eligible school districts for the cost of telecommunication services. FCC regulations require that providers offer schools the “lowest corresponding price” (LCP) for their services: the “lowest price that a service provider charges to non-residential customers who are similarly situated to a particular school, library, or library consortium for similar services.” Heath operates a business that audits telecommunications bills and was retained by Wisconsin school districts. Heath found that certain schools paid much higher rates than others for the same services. As a result, many districts did not receive the benefit of LCP and the government paid subsidies greater than they should have been. Heath informed Wisconsin Bell of the discrepancy, but it refused to provide the more favorable pricing. Heath also learned of an even lower price charged to the Wisconsin Department of Administration (DOA). Heath filed a qui tam lawsuit. The government declined to intervene. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the public disclosure bar applied and that Heath was not saved by the original source exception, because the DOA pricing was on its website. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the claim was not based on the DOA website information and that Heath was not an opportunist plaintiff who did not contribute significant information. View "Heath v. WI Bell, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the 2013-2014 school year, the Dickinson Education Association and the Dickinson Public School District conducted negotiations and developed and agreed upon a series of negotiated master agreements that contained the terms and conditions of employment between the certified staff and the District. Between December 2012 and May 2013, the Association and the Dickinson Board of Education held collaborative bargaining team meetings for purposes of formulating a negotiated agreement. The Association and the District's negotiations covered various provisions for both the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years, but the parties were ultimately unable to come to a resolution on all issues. In May 2013, after declaring an impasse, the parties sought the involvement of an education fact-finding commission. The Commission's report recommended: (1) a two-year contract; (2) that all items previously agreed to remain in the agreement; (3) the Board's final offer on salary in year one and year two of the two-year contract; and (4) the addition of one professional development day in year two of the contract. In late-July 2013, with the parties still unable to reach an agreement, the District unilaterally issued contracts based on the Commission's recommendations, containing provisions for the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years. In August 2013, the Association petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus and also filed an application for temporary restraining order and other supporting documents. The district court granted an alternate writ of mandamus, suspending the continuing contract offers made by the Board for the 2013-2014 school year, prohibiting the District from requiring the contract offers be returned until further court order, and ordering the District to execute a negotiated agreement for only the 2013-2014 school year. Later, district court issued an order quashing the alternate writ of mandamus and ordering that individual teaching contracts for the 2013-2014 school year based on the Board's final offer were due September 13, 2013. The Association's petition for writ of mandamus remained pending, and the parties agreed the issue before the court was whether the District could unilaterally issue contracts for the 2014-2015 school year based on the negotiation process. In October 2013, the district court granted the petition, concluding the unilateral offer of a two-year negotiated agreement was not lawful in North Dakota and the Association was entitled to an order of mandamus requiring the District to offer the Association a one-year negotiated agreement for the 2013-2014 school year. The District appealed. Finding no abuse of discretion or reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dickinson Education Association v. Dickinson Public School District" on Justia Law

For about forty years, 100 and 200 children residing in the Mitford Community of Fairfield County have been attending Chester County School District (CCSD) schools in the Great Falls area of Chester County. The CCSD schools are closer to the Mitford Community than are any Fairfield County School District (FCSD) schools. The Mitford students have been attending CCSD schools at no cost to the students or their families. Mitford students' attendance at CCSD schools began as a result of a Federal 1970 desegregation order, which required the all African-American Mitford Elementary School be closed, and its students be given the choice of attending CCSD's Great Falls schools. The General Assembly passed Act No. 1236, consolidating the Mitford Community into CCSD. This Act was repealed the following year based on an agreement between FCSD and CCSD respecting the Mitford Community's students' enrollment in CCSD's schools. Under this agreement, FCSD paid CCSD $25,000 per year for educational expenses. This agreement ended in the 2009-10 school year when no agreement was reached for that year or thereafter. In light of the school districts' failure to reach an agreement for payment to CCSD for the cost of educating Mitford Community's students in CCSD's schools and FCSD's refusal to continue negotiations, the General Assembly passed Act No. 294 of 2010 in order to provide for a uniform arrangement between FCSD and CCSD. Pursuant to section 59-63-485(C), CCSD has invoiced the Fairfield County Treasurer for the expenses of educating the Mitford children for the past three school years. FCSD filed suit against the Respondents seeking a declaratory judgment that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional. CCSD, the State, and FCSD filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Act No. 294. The circuit court issued an order denying FCSD's motion and granting CCSD and the State's motions for summary judgment, holding that Act No. 294 was constitutional special legislation, and FCSD appealed. In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Board of Trustees for the FCSD appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, CCSD, the Fairfield County Treasurer, and the State Department of Education. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Board of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law