Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey S. Decker, a former student of the University of Wisconsin (UW), was suspended from campus. Decker subsequently trespassed on UW property four documented times to attend UW meetings. The UW Board of Regents (Board) petitioned the circuit court for a temporary restraining order against Decker. The circuit court granted a harassment injunction against Decker based on the Board’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Decker had a legitimate purpose for his actions, which was to protest university student fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Wis. Stat. 813.125 can extend injunctive protection to institutions as well as natural persons; (2) sufficient evidence existed for the circuit court to find that Decker’s conduct constituted harassment and lacked a legitimate purpose; but (3) the injunction in this case was overbroad. Remanded to the circuit court to refine the harassment injunction and clarify its terms. View "Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents v. Decker" on Justia Law

After a hearing, the Department of Children and Families substantiated allegations that Plaintiff, an elementary school teacher, emotionally abused one of his students and recommended that Plaintiff’s name be placed on the Department’s central registry of child abuse and neglect. The trial court affirmed, ruling that the ultimate finding of the administrative hearing officer was supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court reversed and ordered the Department to remove Plaintiff’s name from the central registry. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Appellate Court (1) failed properly to credit the factual findings and legal conclusions of the administrative hearing officer; and (2) improperly concluded that the definition of “abused” found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 46b-120(3) was void for vagueness as applied to the facts of this case. View "Frank v. Dep't of Children & Families" on Justia Law

Kristin May was employed as a teacher at River Ridge High School, a public secondary school. In January 2011, May spoke with a former student, sixteen-year-old P. M., who no longer was enrolled as a student at River Ridge, and who recently had transferred to a school in the Fulton County School District. As they spoke, P. M. disclosed that she previously had a sexual relationship with Robert Morrow, a paraprofessional at River Ridge. May, however, did not make any report of the sexual abuse. When these circumstances later came to the attention of law enforcement, May was charged by accusation with a criminal violation of OCGA 19-7-5. May filed a demurrer and plea in bar, contending that the accusation charged no crime as a matter of law. When the trial court heard argument, the State and May stipulated to certain facts, namely that P. M. was no longer was a student at River Ridge when she spoke with May in 2011. Because P. M. was not then enrolled at River Ridge, May argued she had no duty under OCGA 19-7-5 (c) (1) to make a report. The trial court denied the demurrer and plea in bar, reasoning that a school teacher is required to report the abuse of any child, even one with whom the teacher has no relationship at all. After review, the Supreme Court concluded May had no legal obligation to report the sexual abuse, and the trial court erred when it sustained the accusation. View "May v. Georgia" on Justia Law

A former teacher, Terum Hopper, filed a wrongful termination action against the Jefferson County Board of Education. The Board moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hopper’s tort claims were barred by governmental immunity and that Hopper was required to pursue the administrative remedies set forth in Ky. Rev. Stat. 161.790 to challenge the termination of his employment contract. The trial court granted the summary judgment motion as to the governmental immunity claims but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claims, declaring that Hopper was entitled to file suit on these claims rather than pursue administrative remedies. The Board sought a writ prohibiting the lower court from trying Hopper’s breach of contract claims. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and that the Board had an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because Hopper filed an action in the circuit court without first exhausting the administrative remedies provided in section 161.790, the circuit court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear his claim. View "Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Hon. Brian C. Edwards" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Kentucky Board of Nursing placed the Sullivan University System’s (Spencerian) Applied Science in Nursing (ADN) program on probationary status. Spencerian filed suit, alleging that the Board’s decision was erroneous because it retroactively applied newly-enacted 2009 regulatory amendments to Spencerian. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Board. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Board improperly applied the amended administrative regulations to Spencerian’s conduct that predated the amendments. During the pendency of this appeal, Spencerian instituted numerous changes to its ADN program, which resulted in the Board placing the ADN program on full approval status. Therefore, under the circumstances, the Supreme Court dismissed the Board’s appeal as moot and vacated the rulings of the lower courts. View "Commonwealth, Ky. Bd. of Nursing v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal centered on whether the Pennsylvania School Code's compulsory school age and attendance provisions applied to children under eight years old whose parents voluntarily enrolled them in public kindergarten programs made available by school districts. The trial court and Commonwealth Court both held that once a child who meets a district's minimum entrance age is enrolled in a district's public school kindergarten program, the child is subject to compulsory school attendance, meaning continuous and consistent attendance without excessive unexcused absences. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pennsylvania v. Kerstetter" on Justia Law

After unsuccessfully seeking reimbursement from the State Commissioner of Elementary and Secondary Education, Plaintiffs, a school district and school department, filed a complaint in the superior court alleging that the Commissioner and State Treasurer were required to reimburse them for the salary, fringe benefits, and travel expenses of the directors and guidance counselors in their vocational-technical programs. The superior court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and that the Commissioner’s decision to deny Plaintiffs reimbursement was discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial. Plaintiffs subsequently sought a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that Plaintiffs did not have a clear legal right to be reimbursed for certain costs associated with the operation of their career and technical centers. View "Chariho Reg'l Sch. Dist. v. Gist" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was the interpretation of the Commonwealth Charter School Law. Pursuant to the Charter School Law, the Walter D. Palmer Leadership Learning Partners Charter School was awarded a charter for a five-year term ending June 30, 2005. In late 2004, the Charter School filed a renewal application. On March 16, 2005, the School Reform Commission of the School District of Philadelphia (“SRC”) adopted a resolution that granted, “upon signing a new Charter Agreement,” the Charter School’s request for renewal of the charter for a second five-year period commencing on September 1, 2005. The SRC denied the Charter School's request for expansion of enrollment, and granted approval "to enroll a maximum of six hundred and seventy five (675) students and serve grades kindergarten through 8." The SRC and the Charter School then entered into, as of September 1, 2005, a legally binding agreement that incorporated the SRC Resolution in its entirety and extended the charter for five years ("the 2005 Charter"). The 2005 Charter explicitly referenced and incorporated the SRC Resolution, one provision of which capped student enrollment, explicitly mandated that the Charter School comply with the SRC Resolution; and explicitly constituted a legally binding, mutual agreement of five years duration, the terms of which could not be changed absent a written agreement signed by both parties. The legally binding nature of the terms of the 2005 Charter was mandated by a provision of the Charter School Law. Notwithstanding the terms of the 2005 Charter, the Charter School consistently enrolled more than the 675 students permitted by that Charter. For the 2007-2008 school year, the Charter School’s average daily enrollment was approximately 729 students; for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the average daily enrollment was approximately 732 and 765 students, respectively. In each school year, the School District of Philadelphia provided funding for 675 students based on the 2005 Charter. In July 2010, asserting that it had been underpaid by the School District, the Charter School requested that the Pennsylvania Department of Education withhold $1,678,579 from the School District's basic education subsidy allocation as payment to the Charter School for the students it had educated in addition to the 675 students permitted by the enrollment cap for school years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009–2010. The School District objected to the withholding and a hearing was held before the Department. The Secretary of Education determined that the Charter School had agreed and legally assented to the enrollment cap when it signed the 2005 Charter, and therefore, the Charter School was not entitled to payment for students enrolled above that cap in the 2007-2008 school year. However, with regard to the school years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the Secretary determined that the enrollment cap set forth in the 2005 Charter was no longer valid because of the enactment of an amendment to the Charter School Law which had become effective on July 1, 2008 (24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d)). Based on his interpretation, the Secretary concluded that, to maintain the 2005 Charter’s enrollment cap subsequent to the effective date of the amendment, the School District was required to re-obtain the Charter School’s “legal assent” to the cap. Ultimately, the Secretary determined that the Charter School was entitled to payment by the School District for the education of all the students enrolled in the school for the years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, including those enrolled beyond the cap. The School District appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed. The School District appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed: "based on the plain text of 24 P.S. section 17-1723-A(d), we conclude that an enrollment cap is valid if agreed to by the parties as part of a written charter." View "Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia v. Dept. of Education" on Justia Law

David Alba was appointed to serve as principal of an elementary school in Cranston, Rhode Island. Alba and the Cranston School Committee subsequently entered into an employment contract. Later, after a hearing, the Committee rejected a recommendation to renew Alba’s employment contract. Alba appealed the Committee’s decision. The Commissioner of Education denied and dismissed Alba’s appeal, concluding that Alba had received all the process to which he was entitled under the contract and the School Administrators’ Rights Act. The Board of Regents affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Committee acted within its authority when it voted against the recommendation to renew Alba’s contract; and (2) the Committee’s nonrenewal of Alba’s contract did not deprive Alba of his rights under the Administrators’ Rights Act. View "Alba v. Cranston Sch. Comm." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, school committees of Woonsocket and Pawtucket and unnamed students, parents, and the superintendents from both districts, brought suit against the legislative and executive branches of Rhode Island’s state government challenging the state’s school funding formula. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Education Clause as well as violations of their substantive due process and equal protection rights because the formula failed to allocate adequate resources to less affluent communities. The superior court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prior case law as well as the separation of powers doctrine warranted dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Education Clause claim; and (2) Plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to establish potential substantive due process claims. View "Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee " on Justia Law