Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified questions to the Georgia Supreme Court about the constitutionality of OCGA 20-2-73, which enumerates the circumstances for the suspension and removal of members of local boards of education. Georgia law does not require that local school systems be accredited, but it permits school systems to seek accreditation from certain private accrediting agencies. The DeKalb County School District was accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools ("SACS"), a private accrediting agency. In December 2012, SACS placed the DeKalb School District on "accredited probation" for reasons related to the governance of the DeKalb County Board of Education, which endangered the DeKalb School District's accreditation. After hearings, members of the DeKalb Board who were serving at the time SACS put the DeKalb School District on probation were suspended, and six replacements were appointed. In the meantime, Dr. Eugene Walker, the chair of the DeKalb Board and one of the suspended members, filed suit in the federal district court, alleging OCGA 20-2-73 violated both the United States and Georgia Constitutions, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court denied preliminary injunctive relief to Walker, finding that Walker had failed to show a substantial likelihood that he would prevail on his claim that the statute violated the United States Constitution. As to the Georgia Constitution, the District Court certified the question to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Georgia Court concluded that OCGA 20-2-73 did not violate the Georgia Constitution. Accordingly, the Court answered the District Court's questions in the negative. View "Dekalb Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Georgia State Bd. of Education" on Justia Law

Defendant was selected by the City of Bridgeport Board of Education to serve as its acting superintendent of schools. Because Defendant was not certified as a school superintendent in Connecticut, Defendant completed an independent study course, and the Commissioner of Education granted a waiver of certification for Defendant pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 10-157(b). Plaintiffs sought a writ of quo warranto that would remove Defendant from his office as acting superintendent. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, concluding that because Defendant did not complete a school leadership program required by section 10-157(b), he was not entitled to a waiver of certification. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a quo warranto action may not be utilized to avoid that administrative process by mounting a collateral attack on an administrative agency's decision to issue a waiver that renders a public officer qualified to hold his position. Remanded. View "Lopez v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The Bessemer City Board of Education and Davis Middle School petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the petitioners' motion to dismiss the claim filed against them by John Doe, a minor, by and through his next friend, W.A. ("Doe"), and to enter an order dismissing with prejudice the claim against petitioners. The matter stemmed from a claim of negligence Doe raised against the school; Doe claimed he had been sexually abused by an unidentified person as a result of the negligence of petitioners. The Circuit Court denied petitioners motion based on qualified immunity grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found that petitioners demonstrated they were entitled to absolute immunity from Doe's action against them. Therefore the Court granted their petition and issued the writ. View "Ex parte Bessemer City Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stephen Dichiara, Jr. appealed a superior court order that granted summary judgment to defendants Sanborn Regional School District and Robert Ficker on municipal immunity grounds. Plaintiff tried out for the high school basketball team; Ficker was the team's coach. At the tryout, plaintiff played in a 'loose ball' drill when he collided with another player and suffered substantial injury to his arm. Plaintiff sued for negligence and respondeat superior liability of the school district. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court misinterpreted the applicable statute when it held that a municipality is only liable for negligence arising out of the ownership, occupation, maintenance or operation of a motor vehicle or premises. Essentially, the plaintiff maintained that, under RSA 507-B:2, a governmental unit is liable for bodily injuries “caused by its fault or by fault attributable to it,” regardless of any connection to a motor vehicle or premises. While most personal injury actions are unlikely to involve a nexus with a premises or vehicle, there are circumstances under which a plaintiff could recover for a personal injury under RSA 507-B:2. This case did not fall within that exception. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment. View "Dichiara, Jr. v. Sanborn Regional High School" on Justia Law

A student athlete asked for a permanent injunction against the Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Association (OSSAA) to block it from enforcing its sanctions against the athlete following its determination that the student athlete, school, and others violated the OSSAA's rules and policies. The athlete appealed, challenging the applicable standard of review and alleging that the OSSAA's actions were arbitrary and capricious. In 2012, the OSSAA received a copy of a newspaper article concerning the school's successes attracting the attention of college football recruiters. Based on comments made in the article, the OSSAA became concerned that the school might have violated what the OSSAA considered to be its long-standing prohibition on member schools paying for their student-athletes to attend individual athletic camps. The OSSAA notified the school of its concerns and asked for confirmation as to whether it had paid for selected students to attend individual camps. The OSSAA alleges it received no response prior. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court applied the incorrect standard of review, and that under any standard, the OSSAA's actions were arbitrary and capricious. View "Scott v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Atlanta Independent School System (APS) and the Atlanta Board of Education deducted a $38.6 million unfunded pension liability expense before calculating the amount of local revenue funds to be distributed to start-up charter schools within APS. The stated purpose for the change in funding was APSÕs need to pay down a large, unfunded pension liability for current and former APS employees that has been accruing since the 1980s. In response, start-up charter schools filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel appellants4 to distribute local revenue to the start-up charter schools without any deduction for APSÕs unfunded pension liability. The trial court granted the requested mandamus relief, finding the statutory funding formula set out by statute did not authorize appellants to subtract the $38.6 million from its calculation of local revenue. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of mandamus relief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Atlanta Independent School System v. Atlanta Neighborhood Charter School, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the respondents in this case. The case was dismissed after respondents moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), SCRCP. Because the Supreme Court found issues of fact raised by the complaint that needed to be resolved before the constitutionality of 2009 Act No. 99 could be determined, the case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. "The circuit court and respondents [relied] on a single sentence found in 'Bradley v. Cherokee School Dist. No. One,' [470 S.E.2d 570 (1996)]: A law that is special only in the sense that it imposes a lawful tax limited in application and incidence to persons or property within a certain school district does not contravene the provisions of Article III, section 34(IX)." In this case, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's complaint centered on an impact fee, not a tax, and one that is placed on only some persons and not others. Moreover, since 'Bradley' was decided, the Court clarified that all challenges to education-related special legislation were subject to the test set forth in 'Kizer v. Clark,'(600 S.E.2d 529 (2004)). The Supreme Court found that appellants' complaint alleged facts which, if resolved in their favor, would result in a declaration that the Act is unconstitutional. The order granting respondents' Rule 12(c) motion was therefore reversed. View "Home Builders Association v. School District No. 2 of Dorchester County" on Justia Law

Public school students with diabetes who cannot self-administer insulin are entitled under federal law to have it administered to them during the school day at no cost. In 2007, the State Department of Education (Department) issued a legal advisory authorizing unlicensed school personnel to administer insulin. The American Nurses Association and other trade organizations representing registered and school nurses (collectively, Nurses) challenged the document by filing this action seeking declaratory relief and a writ of mandate, asserting that the Department's advice condoned the unauthorized practice of nursing. The superior court declared the advisory invalid to the extent it authorized unlicensed school personnel to administer insulin. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that California law expressly permits trained, unlicensed school personnel to administer prescription medications such as insulin in accordance with the written statements of a student's treating physician and parents and expressly exempts persons who thus carry out physicians' medical orders from laws prohibiting the unauthorized practice of nursing. View "Am. Nurses Ass'n v. Torlakson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs ("Parents") filed suit against Educators seeking a declaratory judgment that the Arkansas Public School Choice Act of 1989, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-206(f)(1), violated the Equal Protection Clause and an injunction transferring their children to another school district. The court concluded that Parents' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot because the Arkansas General Assembly enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013, Ark. Code Ann. 6-18-1901 et seq., which repealed the 1989 Act in its entirety. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss. View "Teague, et al. v. Arkansas Board of Education, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the District alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 706 and 794a. Plaintiffs' claims involved disputes with the District over the manner in which the District implemented individualized education programs. The court concluded that plaintiffs were required to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400-1491, before filing their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims in the district court. Further, the futility, inadequate remedy, and contrary to law exceptions were not applicable in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant summary judgment in favor of the District. View "J.B., et al. v. Avilla R-XIII School District" on Justia Law