Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

A vacancy was created on the Orono City Council in November 2024 when a councilmember resigned with more than two years remaining in his term. At the time, the City of Orono did not have a special-election ordinance. The mayor appointed a replacement to fill the seat. Subsequently, in February 2025, the city council enacted a special-election ordinance and adopted a resolution to hold a special election to fill the remainder of the term.Dennis Walsh, who had appointed the replacement, petitioned the Hennepin County District Court under Minnesota Statutes section 204B.44 to quash the special election. He argued the relevant statute required the appointed councilmember to serve the remainder of the term because no special-election ordinance was in place at the time of the vacancy, and that holding a special election would improperly remove the appointee in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. The City of Orono and its city clerk opposed the petition, asserting statutory authority for their actions.The Hennepin County District Court denied Walsh’s petition, finding that the city was authorized to hold a special election and that passage of the ordinance after the vacancy did not violate the statute or constitution. Walsh sought accelerated review.The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that claims challenging the special election were properly raised under section 204B.44. Substantively, the court determined Minnesota Statutes section 412.02, subdivision 2a, permits a statutory city to enact and apply a special-election ordinance after a vacancy is filled by appointment, so long as more than two years remain in the term. Further, holding a special election in these circumstances does not constitute an unconstitutional removal of an inferior officer under article VIII, section 5, of the Minnesota Constitution. View "Walsh vs. City of Orono" on Justia Law

After the Texas Legislature passed the Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021 (“S.B.1”), a sweeping law that amended numerous aspects of the state’s election procedures, multiple groups of plaintiffs—including civil rights and voter advocacy organizations—challenged thirty-eight provisions of the law. They alleged violations of various constitutional amendments, the Voting Rights Act (VRA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, naming state officials including the Texas Secretary of State and Attorney General as defendants.In the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity and lack of standing. The district court addressed the motions on a provision-by-provision basis, concluding that the Secretary and Attorney General were sufficiently connected to the enforcement of most challenged provisions to overcome sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young, and that plaintiffs had standing to sue. It denied the motions to dismiss for the majority of the claims, although it dismissed others as moot, for lack of standing, or for failure to state a claim. The defendants appealed the denials.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction over the interlocutory sovereign immunity appeals. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the VRA claims were not barred by sovereign immunity. For the constitutional and other statutory claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court determined that the Secretary of State is a proper defendant only for those provisions she directly enforces—such as those involving the design of forms and sanctioning of registrars—and not for those enforced by other officials. Similarly, it held the Attorney General could be sued only for one provision authorizing civil penalties. The court affirmed standing for claims against provisions enforced by these officials. View "Un del Pueblo Entero v. Nelson" on Justia Law

A registered voter in Pacific County, Washington filed a recall petition against an elected county commissioner, alleging two violations of the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA) in connection with executive sessions held to discuss litigation or potential litigation following two inmate deaths at the county jail. The petition claimed the commissioner attended executive sessions on several dates without legal counsel present, as required by law, and accused her of disregarding public input and misrepresenting the decision-making process leading to the creation of a new jail services department.The Pacific County Superior Court held a sufficiency hearing and found both charges in the recall petition factually and legally sufficient, thus permitting the recall to proceed. The petitioner relied primarily on county meeting minutes and metadata from prepared statements to support the allegations, while the commissioner challenged the accuracy and reliability of the minutes and argued there was no evidence of intent to violate the law.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered the sufficiency of each charge de novo. The court found that the evidence for some meetings contradicted the allegations about the absence of legal counsel, and for others, although legal counsel was not listed in the minutes, there was no evidence of intentional violation. The petitioner’s supporting exhibits only showed the commissioner received OPMA training, not that she intended to violate the Act. Regarding the second charge, the court found the allegations lacked specific facts about the date, location, and nature of the alleged misconduct and did not cite a law or standard making the conduct unlawful.The Supreme Court of Washington held both charges in the recall petition were factually and legally insufficient and reversed the superior court’s decision. View "In re Recall of Olsen" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting electoral transparency operates a website that republishes voter registration data collected from state agencies. The group obtained New Mexico’s voter data through a third party and published it online, including information such as names, addresses, party affiliation, and voting history. After the website highlighted discrepancies in the state’s voter rolls, New Mexico’s Secretary of State publicly questioned the group’s motives and the lawfulness of its actions. The Secretary referred the group to the Attorney General for criminal investigation under state statutes that restrict the use and sharing of voter data. The group’s subsequent requests for updated voter data were denied.After the state’s refusal, the organization filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that New Mexico’s restrictions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) and violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court issued a preliminary injunction preventing prosecution, which was later stayed by the Tenth Circuit. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court found that the NVRA preempted New Mexico’s restrictions and enjoined criminal prosecution. The court rejected most of the group’s remaining constitutional claims but, following a bench trial, held that the state engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by refusing further data requests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the NVRA preempts New Mexico’s restrictions on the use and sharing of voter data, holding that state laws that prevent broad public disclosure of voter data conflict with the NVRA’s requirements. The Tenth Circuit did not reach the First Amendment claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Voter Reference Foundation v. Torrez" on Justia Law

Several months before an election, complaints were filed with the Alaska Public Offices Commission alleging that two political groups, A Stronger Alaska and the Republican Governors Association, had violated Alaska’s campaign finance laws by coordinating with a gubernatorial campaign and failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The Commission initiated expedited proceedings, held hearings where officials from the groups testified, and then chose not to make a final determination on the alleged violations. Instead, the Commission remanded the matters to its staff for further investigation on a regular, non-expedited basis. The Commission’s staff subsequently issued administrative subpoenas seeking documents and communications from the groups, but the groups refused to comply.The Commission sought judicial enforcement of its subpoenas in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District. The groups opposed enforcement, arguing that the subpoenas were unnecessary because the Commission already had relevant testimony, that further investigation was barred by res judicata, and that the process violated their due process rights. They also challenged the constitutionality of the statutory scheme authorizing the expedited process. The superior court rejected all of these arguments, granted summary judgment in favor of the Commission, and ordered enforcement of the subpoenas.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that the subpoenas were not unreasonable or oppressive simply because prior testimony had been given, as documentary evidence could still be relevant. The court also held that res judicata did not apply because the Commission had not issued a final decision on the merits, and that the process did not violate substantive due process or result in an absurd or unconstitutional statutory scheme. The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment to the Commission. View "Republican Governors Association v. Hebdon" on Justia Law

The Institute for Free Speech (IFS), a nonprofit organization that provides pro bono legal services for First Amendment litigation, sought to represent a Texas politician and a political committee in challenging a Texas election law. This law requires political advertising signs to include a government-prescribed notice. IFS refrained from entering into representation agreements due to fear of prosecution under the Texas Election Code, which prohibits corporations from making political contributions, including in-kind contributions such as pro bono legal services.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed IFS's complaint for lack of Article III standing, concluding that IFS's claims were not ripe and that qualified immunity barred the individual-capacity claims. The district court assumed IFS had standing but found that the claims were not ripe because the prospective clients did not yet qualify as a candidate and a political committee. The court also concluded that sovereign immunity did not bar the official-capacity claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that IFS had standing to pursue its claims. The court found that IFS had demonstrated a serious intent to engage in constitutionally protected conduct, that its proposed conduct would violate Texas law, and that there was a substantial threat of enforcement. The court also concluded that IFS's claims were ripe for adjudication, as the prospective clients qualified as a candidate and a political committee under Texas law.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the case for lack of standing and ripeness. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the individual-capacity claims based on qualified immunity, as the right to provide pro bono legal services in this context was not clearly established. The court also affirmed that the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity applied, allowing the official-capacity claims to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Institute for Free Speech v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Seven petitions were filed with the Lucas County Board of Elections to recall the mayor and six members of the Maumee city council under R.C. 705.92. The board found the petitions valid and certified the recall questions for a special primary election. The City of Maumee and a citizen, Glenn Rambo, protested, arguing that the city’s charter does not provide for recall, R.C. 705.92 does not apply to the city, and the petitions did not comply with the statute. The board denied the protests.The relators sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot and a writ of mandamus to order the board to grant their protests. The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. The court found that Maumee’s charter allows for the removal of elected officials as provided by the Constitution or laws of Ohio, but R.C. 705.92 does not apply to Maumee because it was not adopted under R.C. 705.03. The court held that the board erred in deeming R.C. 705.92 applicable to Maumee.The Supreme Court of Ohio granted the writ of prohibition, preventing the board from placing the recall questions on the ballot, and denied the writ of mandamus as moot. The court concluded that the recall procedure in R.C. 705.92 is not generally applicable to municipalities and can only be adopted as part of a statutory plan of government under R.C. 705.03, which Maumee did not do. View "State ex rel. Maumee v. Lucas County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

A group called Idahoans United for Women and Families filed an original action in the Idaho Supreme Court seeking writs of certiorari and mandamus. They challenged the fiscal impact statement (FIS) and ballot titles prepared for a citizen initiative titled the “Reproductive Freedom and Privacy Act.” The group argued that the FIS and ballot titles did not comply with Idaho law and requested the court to either certify their versions or order the Idaho Division of Financial Management (DFM) and the Attorney General to prepare new ones.The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed the petition against the Secretary of State, as Idahoans United failed to specify the writ or what they sought to compel. The court partially granted the writ of mandamus against DFM, finding that the FIS did not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1812 due to a lack of a reasonable basis for its estimated fiscal impact, unclear language, and unnecessary legal terms. The court also partially granted the writ of mandamus against the Attorney General, concluding that the short ballot title did not substantially comply with Idaho Code section 34-1809 because it failed to capture all distinctive features of the initiative. However, the court found that the long ballot title substantially complied with the statutory requirements.The Idaho Supreme Court retained jurisdiction and ordered DFM to provide a new FIS and the Attorney General to provide a new short ballot title by a specified deadline. The court declined to certify the versions provided by Idahoans United and did not award attorney fees to any party. Upon submission, the court reviewed the new FIS and short ballot title, concluding that both substantially complied with the statutory requirements and certified the new short ballot title to the Idaho Secretary of State. View "Idahoans United for Women and Families v. Labrador" on Justia Law

Joanne Pearson, a Republican candidate for Madison County Election Commissioner in District Three, won the election against Walter Young, Jr., a Democratic candidate, by a vote of 5,772 to 3,917. Pearson had filed her application to qualify as a candidate in January 2024, and the Madison County Board of Supervisors approved her candidacy in February 2024. Five citizens, collectively referred to as Brown, appealed the Board’s decision, arguing that Pearson’s application was incomplete and that there was a conflict of interest with the Board’s attorney, Spence Flatgard.The Madison County Circuit Court reviewed the case and denied Brown’s motion to disqualify Flatgard, affirming the Board’s decision to approve Pearson’s candidacy. The court found that Pearson’s application, despite some incomplete areas, met the statutory requirements for the position. Brown then appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court held that the Board did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in approving Pearson’s candidacy. It found that Pearson’s application substantially complied with the statutory requirements, and any minor irregularities did not mislead the electors. The court also upheld the circuit court’s decision to deny the motion to disqualify Flatgard, finding no conflict of interest as the Board and the election commission were not adverse parties in this matter. The court concluded that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was within its discretionary power. View "Brown v. Madison County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In December 2023, Mary McDonald filed a petition to run as a Republican candidate for a seat on the Montgomery County Board of Commissioners. A protest was filed against her candidacy by Mohamed Al-Hamdani and Brenda Blausser, alleging she was not qualified due to her position in the Democratic Party and other statutory non-compliances. During the protest hearing, it was revealed that a confidential legal memorandum from the county prosecutor’s office had been leaked to the protesters. An investigation found that the board’s deputy director, Russell M. Joseph, had forwarded the memo from his board email to his personal email and then to Al-Hamdani.The Montgomery County Board of Elections initially denied a public-records request for emails related to the memo, citing attorney-client privilege and lack of access to the records. After further clarification, the board maintained its position, leading Joseph J. Platt to file an original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the board to produce the emails and to organize and maintain public records properly.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the email from the prosecutor’s office to the board and the email Joseph sent from his board email to his personal email were public records and not protected by attorney-client privilege. However, the email Joseph sent from his personal email to Al-Hamdani was not considered a public record. The court granted the writ in part, ordering the board to produce the two emails, awarded Platt $1,000 in statutory damages, court costs, and attorney fees subject to an itemized application. The court denied the writ regarding the organization and maintenance of records. View "State ex rel. Platt v Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law