Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This action stemmed from the San Bernardino County registrar of voters (ROV) initially miscalculating the number of signatures needed in support of plaintiffs and real parties in interest’s (RPI) initiative petition to repeal a special tax associated with a fire protection zone. The ROV told RPI the incorrect number, resulting in RPI incurring unnecessary costs in obtaining far more signatures than were required. Defendants and Petitioners County of San Bernadino and its ROV, Bob Page, (collectively, the County) petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the respondent trial court to vacate its order overruling the County’s demurrer and to enter an order sustaining the without leave to amend. The County contended that, when RPI requested the County to inform it of the number of signatures required for its initiative petition, the County did not owe RPI any statutory or constitutional duty to provide the information when requested. The County further argues it was immune from liability for communicating to RPI the incorrect number under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2. The Court of Appeal agreed that under Government Code sections 815 and 815.6, the County was not subject to liability because there was no breach of any statutory or constitutional duty. "[E]ven if the County owed RPI such a duty, the County was immune from liability under Government Code sections 818.8 and 822.2." The Court therefore concluded the trial court erred in overruling the County’s demurrer. View "County of San Bernardino v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The November 2020 election included three seats on the five-member East Palo Alto City Council. Seven candidates ran. Lopez came in third, with Lincoln fourth. Lincoln filed a 14-page statement of contest, alleging Lopez violated Elections Code section 18370, by “ electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place”; and section 18522, “by offering valuable consideration to voters voting” by giving away free tacos (allowing a taco truck to block a handicap parking space). City clerk Solorzano filed an answer. Eleven witnesses testified, including Lincoln and Lopez; two San Mateo County Officials; several current and former City Council members; a person present at the polling site to conduct COVID-19 testing; a Lincoln supporter; and the owner of the taco truck.The court’s 23-page statement of decision concluded that Lincoln did not prove by clear and convincing evidence or a preponderance of the evidence that Lopez committed an offense against the elective franchise. The court of appeal affirmed. “Lincoln’s argument is based on a version of the record that is contrary to all principles of appellate review—not to mention that it fails to address the significance of the trial court’s conclusions as to his two primary claims.” The court awarded Lopez costs on appeal. View "Lincoln v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, which summarily affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the results of a referendum recount conducted pursuant to Wis. Stat. 9.01, holding that Wis. Stat. 7.54 does not apply when an appeal of the result of a recount by the board of canvassers is before an appellate court.On review, Petitioners - James Sewell and George Myers - argued that the Racine Unified School District Board of Canvassers mistakenly calculated the recount's vote totals and that Sewell had an absolute right under section 7.54 to have the ballots opened and reviewed in circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Board of Canvassers' recount, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while section 7.54 appears to provide an occasion to utilize its provisions in regard to a contested election, it did not apply in this case. View "Sewell v. Racine Unified School District Board of Canvassers" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus sought by Ray Brubaker to compel the Lawrence County Board of Elections to place a local liquor option on the primary-election ballot, holding that Brubaker failed to establish that he was entitled to the writ.Brubaker filed with the Board paperwork requesting a liquor option on the May 3, 2022 primary election ballot for the Hanging Rock precinct allowing Sunday liquor sales. The Board rejected the liquor-option petition because Brubaker did not submit a Form No. 5-N. Brubaker subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus against the Board. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Board did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law. View "State ex rel. Brubaker v. Lawrence County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

In the March 2020 primary election, McHenry Township voters rejected a proposition to dissolve the township. Months later, the township’s board of trustees adopted a resolution to place a nearly identical proposition on the November 2020 general election ballot. The McHenry County Clerk refused to place the proposition on the ballot, notifying the township that the proposition violated the statutory prohibition against “the same proposition” appearing on the ballot more than once within 23 months, 10 ILCS 5/28-7.The circuit court dismissed a mandamus petition. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that, regardless of whether the proposition was prohibited from appearing on the November 2020 ballot, the clerk lacked the statutory authority to make that determination and was obligated to perform the ministerial act of placing the proposition on the ballot. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the township is no longer pursuing dissolution.Section 28-5 provides that a county clerk is authorized to give notice that the public question may not be placed on the ballot only when the question is prohibited by “the limitations of section 28-1.” The prohibition against placing the same proposition on the ballot more than once in 23 months is set forth in section 28- 7, not section 28-1. The court did not consider whether the proposition actually violated section 28-7. View "McHenry Township v. County of McHenry" on Justia Law

Sigcho-Lopez, the alderman for Chicago’s 25th Ward, filed a complaint with the Illinois State Board of Elections, alleging that his predecessor’s (Solis) campaign committee unlawfully paid Solis's personal legal fees from campaign funds. The Board dismissed Sigcho-Lopez’s complaint. On administrative review, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal.The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Legal fees incurred to pay for a public official’s criminal defense against investigations or charges of public corruption do not amount to a per se prohibited personal debt under the plain language and spirit of Election Code section 9-8.10(a)(3); whether legal defense fees amount to a personal debt that does not defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Solis was not indicted but worked with federal investigators using his official capacity to expose public corruption. Considering the evidence before the Board, its conclusion that Solis’s legal fees amounted to a proper expenditure not prohibited as “satisfaction or repayment” of personal debt but incurred “to defray the customary and reasonable expenses of an officeholder in connection with the performance of governmental and public service functions” was not clearly erroneous. View "Sigcho-Lopez v. Illinois State Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing the petitions for writs of mandamus filed by Minnesota Voters Alliance, et al. (collectively, the Alliance), holding that the Alliance failed to show the violation of a duty clearly established by law.In the mandamus petitions, the Alliance alleged that Ramsey County, Olmsted County, and other entities violated their statutory obligations for appointing members to absentee ballot board during the 2020 general election. Specifically, Alliance argued that the statutory requirements for election judges also apply to deputy county auditors. The district court dismissed the petitions, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed the Alliance's mandamus petitions. View "Minnesota Voters Alliance v. County of Ramsey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the second revised General Assembly-district plan adopted by respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission violates Ohio Const. art. XI, sections 6(A) and 6(B) and ordered the Commission to be reconstituted.In the first time this issue was before the Supreme Court, the Court held that the Commission's original plan was invalid because the Commission had not attempted to meet the standards set forth in Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B). The Commission subsequently adopted a revised plan, but the Supreme Court invalidated that plan because the Commission again had not satisfied sections 6(A) and 6(B). At issue now before the Supreme Court was the Commission's second revised plan. The Commission invalidated the plan in its entirety, holding that the second revised plan violates sections 6(A) and 6(B) and the a newly reconstituted Commission must adopt a new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution. View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. The Court of Claims struck down the geographical limitation in MCL 168.471 as well as the checkbox requirement of MCL 168.482(7); however, it ruled that the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a, was constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Department of the Attorney General sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the 15% geographic requirement, MCL 168.471, and the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a. Defendant Secretary of State sought leave to appeal in order to request that, regardless of the outcome, the decision be applied only prospectively. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the pre-circulation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively," the decision was given prospective effect only. View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan, et al. v. Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

Relator was a prospective candidate for Oregon governor. After he filed his declaration of candidacy with the Secretary of State, the secretary asked relator for additional information to substantiate that he will “have been three years next preceding his election, a resident within this State,” as required to serve as governor by Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution. Relator submitted additional materials in support of his claim that he met the constitutional eligibility requirement. Upon reviewing those materials, the secretary determined that, although relator had previously been a resident of Oregon, he had been a resident of New York since at least 2000 and he had not reestablished Oregon residency by November 2019. The secretary therefore concluded that relator did not meet the constitutional requirement, and informed him his name would not be placed on the ballot in the primary election. The next day, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Oregon Supreme Court, asking the Court to direct the secretary to reverse her determination and to instruct county officials to place relator’s name on the ballot. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) the meaning of “resident within this State,” as those words are used in Article V, section 2, of the Oregon Constitution; and (2) whether the secretary was required to conclude that relator met that legal standard. The Court concluded that “resident within,” when viewed against the legal context that surrounded the Oregon Constitution’s 1857 ratification, was best understood to refer to the legal concept of “domicile,” which required “the fact of a fixed habitation or abode in a particular place, and an intention to remain there permanently or indefinitely[.] Under that legal concept, a person can have only a single residence at a time." Further, the Court held the secretary was not required to conclude that relator was domiciled in Oregon between November 2019 and December 2020. Although relator challenged the constitutionality of the durational residency requirement in Article V, section 2, that question was not properly considered through a mandamus proceeding. The Court therefore dismissed the alternative writ and denied relator’s petition. View "Oregon ex rel Kristof v. Fagan" on Justia Law