Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

This matter involved a legal challenge to the congressional redistricting map selected by the New Jersey Congressional Redistricting Commission (Commission). On December 22, 2021, a majority of the Commission’s members that included the Chair, voted in favor of the map the Democratic delegation presented. Plaintiffs, the Republican delegation to the Commission, filed an amended complaint on January 5, 2022 to challenge that map. Plaintiffs filed their complaint directly with the New Jersey Supreme Court, pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. The Supreme Court observed it had no role in the outcome of the redistricting process unless the map is "unlawful." The Supreme Court found none of plaintiffs' arguments asserted the plan was unlawful or the result of "invidious discrimination." Because plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to support a claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice was granted. View "In the Matter of Establishment of Congressional Districts by the New Jersey Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Petitioners showed beyond a reasonable doubt that the General Assembly-district plan adopted by the Ohio Redistricting Commission on January 22, 2022 violated Ohio Const. Art. XI, 6(A) and (B) and ordered the Commission to adopt a new plan.On January 12, 2022, the Supreme Court held that the General Assembly-district plan adopted by the Commission in September 2021 was invalid and that the Commission had not drawn a district plan that met neither of the standards set forth in sections 6(A) and 6(B) and ordered the Commission to adopt a new plan. On January 22, the Commission adopted a new plan. The Supreme Court again ordered the Commission to be reconstituted and to adopt yet a newer plan, holding that the new plan violated sections 6(A) and 6(B). View "League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant West Valley Water District (District) appealed the entry of a stipulated judgment in favor of plaintiff-respondent County of San Bernardino (County) ordering that the District conduct its elections on a statewide general election date starting in November 2022. The sole issue on appeal was whether the District was authorized pursuant to Elections Code section 140521 to designate the statewide primary election date starting in June 2022 for its elections, or whether the District was required to hold its election on a statewide general election date starting in November 2022. The Court of Appeal concluded the District had to hold its election on the statewide general election date starting in November 2022. View "County of San Bernardino v. West Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review centered on the amount of reimbursement that counties were entitled to from the State for costs associated with purchasing, installing, and operating additional ballot boxes. In order to answer that question, the Court first had to consider the relationship between RCW 29A.40.170 (the ballot box statute), RCW 29A.04.430 (the reimbursement statute, or "Section 430"), and RCW 43.135.060 (the unfunded mandate statute). The Supreme Court held Section 430 controlled over the unfunded mandate statute and provided reimbursement only of the State’s proportional share for the costs of compliance with the ballot box statute. Further, the Court held that the 2020 amendment of Section 430 did not violate article II, section 37 of the Washington Constitution and that respondents Snohomish, Kittitas, and Whitman Counties could not claim any vested right that would require the Court to invalidate the retroactive effect of Section 430. The Court therefore reversed the order granting partial summary judgment and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Wash. State Ass'n of Counties v. Washington" on Justia Law

In 1973, the Oxnard city council received an initiative petition. Instead of proceeding on that petition, the City ordered the questions placed on the ballot. The majority of voters voted to have an elected mayor with a two-year term. In 2019, the city council adopted a resolution placing Measure B on the March 2020 ballot, seeking to amend the Oxnard City Code to extend the mayor’s term to four years and to establish a limit of three terms for city council members. Two weeks later, Starr delivered an initiative petition, seeking to extend the mayor’s term to four years but prohibiting a person from indefinitely alternating between mayor and council member without a break. The Ventura County Elections Division certified the signatures on Starr’s petition. Instead of placing Starr’s initiative on the ballot, the City exercised its option under Elections Code section 9215(a) to adopt the initiative as an ordinance without alteration.The court of appeal ordered the city to place the initiative on the ballot. The city’s action was a nullity under section 9217: “No ordinance that is either proposed by initiative petition and adopted by the vote of the legislative body of the city without submission to the voters, or adopted by the voters, shall be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people, unless provision is otherwise made in the original ordinance.” View "Starr v. Chaparro" on Justia Law

Oakland citizens submitted a petition for a ballot initiative to approve a parcel tax to fund programs for early childhood education and college readiness. Measure AA appeared on the November 2018 ballot. The official ballot materials prepared by the City Attorney stated that a two-thirds vote was necessary for it to pass. The City Auditor’s analysis likewise stated the measure would go into effect “if adopted by two-thirds of voters”; 62.47 percent voted in favor of Measure AA. The City Council declared that the measure had passed (Elec. Code, 15400), indicating that uncertainty had arisen whether a majority or two-thirds vote was necessary. Opponents filed a reverse-validation action (Code Civ. Proc. 863), arguing that Measure AA had not received two-thirds of the vote required by Propositions 13 and 218. The trial court ruled in favor of the objectors.The court of appeal reversed. A citizen initiative imposing a special parcel tax is enacted when it receives a majority of the vote. Measure AA cannot be invalidated on the basis of the ballot materials’ voting-threshold statements because the statements did not concern the measure’s substantive features, were not alleged to be intentionally misleading, and cannot override the law governing the applicable voting threshold. View "Jobs & Housing Coalition v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

The question in this case was whether the Secretary of State was required to count the signatures on an initiative petition of voters whose registration was deemed “inactive.” Plaintiffs were supporters of Initiative Petition 50 (2016) (IP 50) who sought to qualify that initiative for the 2016 ballot. After the secretary subtracted the signatures of voters with inactive registration, the petition did not have enough signatures to be placed on the ballot. Plaintiffs brought this action challenging the secretary’s exclusion of those signatures. Plaintiffs argued that voters with inactive registration could sign initiative petitions because, even if their registration was inactive, they were still registered, and therefore remain “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The secretary responded that those voters could not sign initiative petitions because voters with inactive registration were not “registered * * * in the manner provided by law,” and they therefore were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded, like the secretary, that because voters whose registrations were inactive were not eligible to vote, they were not “qualified voters” within the meaning of Article IV, section 1. Accordingly, the Court held that their signatures on initiative petitions could not be counted, and that the secretary properly excluded them when determining the number of signatures submitted in support of IP 50. View "Whitehead v. Fagan" on Justia Law

Zena Collins Stephens appealed both the court of appeals’ denial of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus and its reversal of the district court’s decision to quash Count I of the indictment. Stephens was elected to the position of sheriff of Jefferson County, Texas in 2016. While investigating someone else, the FBI uncovered information regarding potential campaign-finance violations concerning Stephens. The FBI then turned this information over to the Texas Rangers. The Rangers’ investigation concluded Stephens received individual cash campaign contributions in excess of $100. A grand jury indicted Stephens on three counts: Count I: tampering with a government record in violation of Texas Penal Code section 37.10 “by reporting a $5,000.00 individual cash contribution in the political contributions of $50.00 or less section of said Report;” iIn Counts II and III, unlawfully making or accepting a contribution in violation of Texas Election Code section 253.033(a) by accepting cash contributions in excess of $100 from two different individuals. On appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Stephens asked: could the Texas Legislature delegate to the Attorney General, a member of the executive department, the prosecution of election-law violations in district and inferior courts? To this, the Court answered "no:" because Texas Election Code section 273.021 delegated to the Attorney General a power more properly assigned to the judicial department, the statute was unconstitutional. Therefore, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to dismiss the indictment. View "Texas v. Stephens" on Justia Law

In 1992, Michigan voters, wanting to amend Michigan’s Constitution to establish term limits for state legislators, state executives, and members of Congress, got a petition on the ballot; 58.8% of voters approved the measure. Term limits became part of the Michigan Constitution (six years in Michigan’s House of Representatives; eight years in the Michigan Senate). Some voters sued, arguing that the term limits violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Sixth Circuit upheld the term limits. About 20 years later, a bipartisan group of veteran legislators challenged the term-limit provision, making many of the same ballot-access and freedom-of-association claims, and citing two procedural provisions of the Michigan Constitution.The district court granted Michigan summary judgment. After determining that it had jurisdiction because the legislators raise claims under the Federal Constitution, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Precedent bars their claims as voters. Voters have no fundamental right to “vote for a specific candidate or even a particular class of candidates.” As candidates, the legislators hold no greater protection than the voters they wish to represent. Candidates do not have a fundamental right to run for office. Michigan has several legitimate government interests in enacting term limits, including its sovereign interest in structuring its government as it sees fit. View "Kowall v. Benson" on Justia Law

In an original proceeding filed to the Colorado Supreme Court, at issue were the final legislative redistricting plans for the Colorado Senate and House of Representatives, adopted and submitted to the Court by the Colorado Independent Legislative Redistricting Commission (the “Commission”). Under article V, section 48.3, the Court's jurisdiction was limited to whether the Plans complied with the criteria listed in section 48.1 of article V, and the Court had to approve those Plans unless the it concluded the Commission abused its discretion in applying or failing to apply those criteria in light of the record before it. Finding no such abuse of discretion here, the Colorado Court approved the Plans and ordered the Commission to file those Plans with the Colorado Secretary of State as required by article V, section 48.3(5). View "In re Colo. Indep. Legis. Redistricting Comm'n" on Justia Law