Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

CREW filed a citizen complaint with the Federal Election Commission against New Models, a now-defunct non-profit entity, alleging violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act’s (FECA) registration and reporting requirements for “political committees,” 52 U.S.C. 30109(a)(1). After an initial investigation, the Commission deadlocked 2–2 on whether to proceed; an affirmative vote of four commissioners is required to initiate enforcement proceedings. With only two votes in favor of an enforcement action against New Models, the Commission dismissed CREW’s complaint. Two Commissioners explained that New Models did not qualify as a “political committee” under FECA but stated they were also declining to proceed with enforcement in an "exercise of ... prosecutorial discretion,” given the age of the activity and the fact that the organization appears no longer active.The district court granted the Commission summary judgment, reasoning that a nonenforcement decision is not subject to judicial review if the Commissioners who voted against enforcement “place[] their judgment squarely on the ground of prosecutorial discretion.” The Commission’s “legal analyses are reviewable only if they are the sole reason for the dismissal of an administrative complaint.” The D.C. Circuit affirmed. While FECA allows a private party to challenge a nonenforcement decision by the Commission if it is “contrary to law,” this decision was based in part on prosecutorial discretion and is not reviewable. View "Citizens for Responsibility v. Federal Election Committee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the circuit court's writ of mandamus and contempt orders in this case, holding that Wis. Stat. 6.50(3) does not place a positive and plain duty on the Wisconsin Elections Commission to change the registration status of eligible voters when receiving reliable information that the elector moved out of their municipality.Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus against the Commission and its commissioners to carry out the instructions set forth in section 6.50(3) and change the registration of electors who may have moved. The circuit court granted the writ and later found several commissioners in contempt after the Commission failed to comply. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the writ was erroneously granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court erred by issuing a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to carry out the requirements of section 6.50(e) because the Commission has no statutory duty, and therefore, no plain and positive duty, to carry out the requirements of the statute. View "Zignego v. Wisconsin Elections Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus compelling Secretary of State Frank LaRose to appoint Sharon Sweda to the Lorain County Board of Elections, holding that the Lorain County Democratic Party Committee did not demonstrate its entitlement to a writ of mandamus under the circumstances of this case.In rejecting the Committee's recommendation to appoint Sweda for appointment to the Lorain County Board of Elections, LaRose concluded that Sweda had not demonstrated "the judgment or adequate level of integrity necessary to ensure voter confidence." Thereafter, the Committee commenced this expedited action for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the Committee failed to prove that LaRose abused his discretion when he rejected the Committee's recommendation. View "State ex rel. Lorain County Democratic Party Executive Committee v. LaRose" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part a writ of mandamus to compel changes to ballot language for a proposed amendment to the Cincinnati City Charter, holding that Relators showed that the Hamilton County Board of Elections abused its discretion and disregarded applicable law.Relators sought to amend the Charter to require the City of Cincinnati to require the City to provide funding for affordable housing and neighborhood stabilization. The Secretary of State approved the ballot language over Relators' objection. Relators then brought this action seeking to compel the Board and Secretary of State to approve new ballot language. The Supreme Court granted the writ in part, holding (1) Relators failed to show that City Council or the Secretary of State had a clear legal duty to provide the requested relief; and (2) the Board improperly prepared and certified ballot language stating that the use of two potential funding sources for a proposed affordable housing trust fund would violate state law. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Action for Housing Now v. Hamilton County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20501(b)(1), requires states to register voters for federal elections, including “by application in person” at designated state offices. Each state must designate all offices that provide public assistance, all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities, and “other offices. ” Each designated agency must offer certain voter registration services and, in California, must assign an employee to be responsible for the agency’s compliance (Elec. Code, 2406.) California’s Secretary of State coordinates the state’s responsibilities under the Act.The plaintiffs sought additional designations. The Secretary committed to designating as voter registration agencies programs for students with disabilities at community colleges, certain county welfare departments, and the Office of Services to the Blind. The trial court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to designate as voter registration agencies state offices that administer General Assistance or General Relief programs and California Student Aid Commission Financial Aid Programs, as well as all private entities under contract to provide services on behalf of a voter registration agency. The court found that no mandatory designation duty existed as to offices administering the California Department of Education Nutrition Programs, special education offices, and Area Agencies on Aging. View "Senior Disability Action v. Weber" on Justia Law

After a political action committee and two political candidates successfully campaigned for a ballot measure in a Redondo Beach municipal election, two citizens filed suit against the committee and the candidates, claiming the candidates had controlled the committee, which had used an improper title for itself. The trial court ruled in favor of the committee and candidates, awarding them attorney fees.In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal concluded that the nonparties have standing to appeal the judgment; substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Rescue was a general purpose committee and that neither candidate controlled it; and the trial court acted beyond its authority by issuing a judgment against nonparties to the action. The court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to defendants, who were unquestionably the prevailing party. Finally, the court denied the request for sanctions because the appeal of the attorney fees was not frivolous. View "Travis v. Brand" on Justia Law

Calumet City held a referendum proposing that candidates could not seek the office of mayor while simultaneously holding an elected, paid state office. Before the outcome of the referendum was certified, Representative Jones of the 29th District of the General Assembly filed nomination papers seeking the office of mayor. The referendum was later certified as adopted. The day after certification, objectors brought suit to bar Jones from appearing on the February 2021 ballot in light of the newly passed referendum. The Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City sustained the objection and removed Jones from the ballot. The circuit court of Cook County affirmed, directing that Jones’s name appear on the ballot but that all his votes be impounded or suppressed. The appellate court summarily reversed and ordered that Jones appear on the ballot.The Illinois Supreme Court stayed the appellate court order and subsequently reversed in favor of Jones. The referendum became effective on November 24, 2020, the date the election was certified. Because Jones filed his nomination papers on November 16, 2020, he was legally qualified to run for mayor at that time. His nomination papers were not defective at that time. View "Jones v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the circuit court vacating the finding of the Arkansas Ethics Commission that Susan Weaver violated Ark. Code Ann. 7-6-228(c)(1) when a magazine published her campaign advertisement without a required disclosure during Weaver's 2018 judicial campaign, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's decision.Faulkner Lifestyle published an ad of Weaver's candidacy without statutorily required financial disclosure language. The Commission found that section 7-6-228(c)(1) did not require a culpable mental state but, if it did, Weaver violated the statute by acting negligently. The circuit court vacated the finding, holding that the Commission erred in concluding that the standard of proof for a violation of section 7-6-228(c)(1) is strict liability and that insufficient evidence supported the Commission's finding that Weaver was negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that substantial evidence did not support the Commission's conclusion. View "Arkansas Ethics Commission v. Weaver" on Justia Law

This case involved a recall petition against Thurston County, Washington, Sheriff John Snaza. Petitioner Arthur West alleged Snaza committed a recallable offense because he stated in a press release that he would not enforce an order issued by the Washington State secretary of health intended to combat the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic. Snaza appealed the trial court’s conclusion that the recall charge was factually and legally sufficient. The Washington Supreme Court concluded Snaza had discretion and his exercise of discretion (stating he would not criminally enforce the order) was not manifestly unreasonable. Therefore, the recall charge was neither factually nor legally sufficient, and the trial court's decision was reversed. View "In Re Recall of Snaza" on Justia Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council" on Justia Law