Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Attorney General of California drafted language for the ballot title, summary, and label for Proposition 5, a proposed amendment to the California Constitution that would allow certain local bonds to be approved by 55 percent of voters instead of the current two-thirds requirement. Jon Coupal and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association challenged the ballot label, arguing it was misleading because it did not mention the existing two-thirds approval requirement. They claimed this omission failed to inform voters of the measure's true purpose.The Superior Court of Sacramento County agreed with the challengers, finding that the ballot label did not adequately inform voters of the measure's chief purpose. The court ordered the Attorney General to revise the ballot label to include the current two-thirds approval requirement. The Attorney General then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, challenging the Superior Court's decision.The Court of Appeal concluded that the ballot label drafted by the Attorney General accurately and concisely described Proposition 5 and was not misleading. The court emphasized that the Attorney General is afforded considerable discretion in drafting ballot materials and that the label's language was factually accurate. The court found that the Superior Court failed to accord the proper discretion to the Attorney General and that there was no clear and convincing evidence that the ballot label was misleading. Consequently, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Superior Court to deny the challengers' petition and allow the Attorney General's original ballot label to be used. View "Bonta v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Stark County Board of Elections considered and voted to purchase Dominion Voting Systems equipment during four meetings. These discussions and decisions occurred in executive sessions, which are closed to the public. Look Ahead America and Merry Lynne Rini filed a complaint alleging that the board violated Ohio’s Open Meetings Act by not limiting its executive-session discussions to matters where premature disclosure would give an unfair competitive or bargaining advantage.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas upheld the board’s actions, interpreting R.C. 121.22(G)(2) to mean that the premature-disclosure clause applied only to the last-listed reason for entering executive session, not to the purchase of property. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing with the trial court’s interpretation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. The court held that the premature-disclosure clause in R.C. 121.22(G)(2) applies to all the permissible reasons listed for entering executive session, not just the last one. The court reversed the Fifth District’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial applying this interpretation. View "Look Ahead Am. v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

The case involves the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Campaign Legal Center, and the political action committee Correct the Record. The Campaign Legal Center alleged that Correct the Record coordinated with Hillary Clinton's 2016 presidential campaign and spent close to $6 million without disclosing these expenditures as contributions. Correct the Record argued that these expenditures were exempt from disclosure due to the FEC's "internet exemption," which exempts unpaid internet communications from contribution limitations and disclosure requirements.The FEC dismissed the complaint, leading to a lawsuit by the Campaign Legal Center. The district court ruled in favor of the Campaign Legal Center, finding that the FEC's dismissal was contrary to law. The FEC appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the FEC's interpretation of the "internet exemption" was contrary to the Federal Election Campaign Act's regulation of coordinated expenditures. The court also found that the FEC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in dismissing allegations of coordination between Correct the Record and the Clinton campaign. The case was remanded back to the FEC for further action consistent with the court's decision. View "Campaign Legal Center v. Federal Election Commission" on Justia Law

This case involves five ballot initiative petitions related to the classification of "app-based drivers" (drivers) as employees of delivery network companies or transportation network companies (collectively, companies). The petitions aim to ensure that drivers are not classified as employees, thereby excluding them from the rights, privileges, and protections that Massachusetts General and Special Laws confer on employees. Three of the five petitions couple this deprivation with "minimum compensation, healthcare stipends, earned paid sick time, and occupational accident insurance." The other two do not.The plaintiffs, a group of registered voters, challenged the Attorney General's certification of the petitions and the fairness and conciseness of the summaries prepared by the Attorney General. They argued that the petitions do not meet the related subjects requirement of the Massachusetts Constitution, that one of the petitions inappropriately asks voters for an exemption from the entirety of Massachusetts law, and that the three long-form versions contain prohibited "sweeteners" that are misleadingly described. They also argued that the petitions are designed to confuse by using dense and technical language.The Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk found that all five petitions share a common purpose of defining and governing the relationship between drivers and companies, and thus meet the related subjects requirement. The court also found that the Attorney General's summaries of the petitions were fair and concise, as required by the Massachusetts Constitution. The court remanded the case to the county court for entry of a declaration that the Attorney General's certifications and summaries comply with the requirements of the Massachusetts Constitution. However, the court retained jurisdiction to revisit its rulings and conclusions if the proponents seek to place more than one petition on the November ballot. View "El Koussa v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the certification of Initiative Petition 23-35, "An Act Giving Transportation Network Drivers the Option to Form a Union and Bargain Collectively" by the Attorney General. The plaintiffs argued that the petition should not have been certified as it does not meet the requirement of containing only related subjects. They contended that the provisions allowing transportation network drivers to organize and collectively bargain with transportation network companies are unrelated to its provisions subjecting the results of any collective bargaining to supervision, review, and approval by the Commonwealth's Secretary of Labor.The case was brought before the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, where the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the petition does not satisfy the related subjects requirement of art. 48, and an order enjoining the Secretary of the Commonwealth from placing the petition on the Statewide election ballot. The plaintiffs argued that the Secretary of Labor's role in the collective bargaining process is not part of the integrated scheme proposed by the petition.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument. The court concluded that the petition seeks to establish a multistep collective bargaining scheme in which the Secretary of Labor's role is an integrated component. Therefore, the subjects of the petition are related for purposes of art. 48. The court affirmed the Attorney General's certification of the petition. The court also noted that the Secretary of Labor's supervisory role is designed to anticipate and address a potential consequence of the collective bargaining process the petition seeks to create, specifically a legal challenge that the collective bargaining process would be preempted by Federal antitrust law. View "Craney v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The case involves Greater Birmingham Ministries, a multi-faith, multi-racial organization that promotes voter registration efforts in Alabama, and the Secretary of State for the State of Alabama. The organization requested electronic production of several voter lists, including records of individual felons disqualified from voting by Alabama, invoking the public disclosure provision of the National Voter Registration Act. The organization argued that the records should be produced electronically and at no cost. The Secretary of State agreed to provide an electronic version of the first list of voter records at a cost of one cent per name but refused to provide any records related to felony disqualifications, asserting that the request exceeded the scope of the Act.The district court ruled that the National Voter Registration Act entitled Greater Birmingham Ministries to both sets of records and that electronic disclosure was required in the specific circumstances of this case. The court also ruled that the Act entitled the Secretary to charge a “reasonable fee,” connected “to the actual costs he incurs in producing responsive voter records.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order. The court held that the voter records that Greater Birmingham Ministries requested are covered by the National Voter Registration Act’s public disclosure provision. However, the court ruled that the Act does not require the Secretary to turn those records over in an electronic format. Therefore, the district court’s injunction ordering the Secretary to produce the records electronically was improper. The same is true for its direction that the parties reach agreement on a reasonable fee. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of civil rights organizations, voters, and an election official who sought to challenge recent amendments to Texas's election code, alleging that these amendments violated the United States Constitution and several federal statutes. The defendant was the District Attorney for Harris County, sued in her official capacity. The district court denied the District Attorney's motion to dismiss, holding that she was not immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and that the plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims against her.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the district court should have dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional claims as barred by sovereign immunity. The court did not reach the issue of standing. The court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings.The court's decision was based on the principle of sovereign immunity, which generally protects state officials from being sued in their official capacities. However, there is an exception to this rule, known as the Ex parte Young exception, which allows federal courts to enjoin state officials from enforcing unconstitutional state statutes. The court found that the District Attorney did not have a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged laws to fall within this exception. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Attorney was immune from the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. View "Mi Familia Vota v. Ogg" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a lodging tax increase proposal in McCurtain County, Oklahoma, intended to fund a new county hospital. The Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County approved the proposal to be submitted to the voters. However, the Board did not publish the proposal in a county newspaper for four weeks before the election as required by Title 19 O.S. 2021 §383. Instead, the Board and the Hospital engaged in a three-month campaign to inform voters of the measure through various means such as radio advertisements, billboards, newspaper articles, town hall meetings, and social media posts. After the measure was approved by the voters, a lodging renter and property owner filed a lawsuit seeking to have the election declared null and void due to the lack of newspaper publication. The Hospital sought to have the election upheld.The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, granted summary judgment in favor of the Board and Hospital, and against the lodging renter and property owner. The renter and owner appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that because the county commissioners neglected to follow the statutory publication requirements, the voter-approved lodging tax increase is invalid. The court emphasized that the Legislature has mandated what constitutes adequate notice by publication and anything less than strict compliance requires the court to invalidate the election. The court also encouraged the legislature to consider revisiting and possibly updating publication requirements to be more compatible with today's methods of communication. The decision of the lower court was reversed. View "Cathey v. Board of County Commissioners for McCurtain County" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the ballot title for Legislative Referral 403 (2024) (LR 403), which was referred for voters' consideration at the upcoming November 2024 General Election. The petitioner, James Sasinowski, challenged all parts of the ballot title, asserting non-compliance with requirements set out in ORS 250.035(2). LR 403 would amend ORS chapter 254 to require "ranked choice voting" for certain elections and would permit local governments to adopt ranked-choice voting in their elections.The ballot title for LR 403 was prepared by a joint legislative committee and filed with the Secretary of State. The petitioner challenged all parts of the ballot title, arguing that the word "majority" was used inaccurately and without proper context. He contended that "majority of votes" suggests that a candidate has received the majority of total votes cast, but in operation, ranked-choice voting can produce a winner who does not receive that type of "majority" vote.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon agreed with the petitioner in part. The court found that the caption of the ballot title for LR 403 did not reasonably identify the subject matter of the measure and required modification. The court also agreed that the "yes" result statement in the ballot title for LR 403 did not substantially comply with ORS 250.035(2)(b) and required modification. However, the court disagreed with the petitioner that the "no" result statement and the summary in the ballot title for LR 403 required modification. The court concluded that the caption and "yes" result statement in the joint legislative committee’s ballot title for LR 403 required modification and referred the ballot title to the Attorney General for modification. View "Sasinowski v. Legislative Assembly" on Justia Law

This case revolves around the appointment of a general registrar of elections in Lynchburg, Virginia. The plaintiff, Christine Gibbons, was appointed as registrar in 2018 by a board consisting of two Democrats and one Republican. Her term expired in 2023, at which point the board had two Republican members and one Democratic member. The board informed Gibbons that she would have to reapply for her position. Despite reapplying, the two Republican members voted to appoint a different candidate who was a registered Republican. Gibbons sued the board and its two Republican members, alleging that the decision not to reappoint her was based on her political affiliation, which she claimed violated the First Amendment.The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that sovereign immunity barred all of Gibbons’ claims. The district court dismissed Gibbons’ claims against the board itself as barred by sovereign immunity, but denied the individual board members’ motions to dismiss. The court concluded that the board members could be sued for equitable relief in their official capacities and for damages in their personal capacities. The board members appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the appellants’ motions to dismiss. The court rejected the board members’ argument that sovereign immunity bars Gibbons’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against them in their official capacities. The court also rejected the board members’ assertion that Gibbons’ damages claims against them are barred by sovereign immunity. The court concluded that individual members of Virginia electoral boards may be sued in their official capacities for equitable relief under Ex parte Young and that Gibbons’ claims for damages against the board members in their personal capacities are not barred by sovereign immunity. View "Gibbons v. Gibbs" on Justia Law