Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted the writ of mandamus requested by Jason Stevens to compel the Fairfield County Board of Elections to issue a certificate of nomination to certify Stevens’s name for placement on the May 8, 2018 primary-election ballot as a candidate for election to the Ohio Democratic Party State Central Committee.Stevens filed a petition to appear on the May 8 primary ballot as a Democratic candidate. The Board voted to deny Stevens access to the ballot because his voting history did not show he was a member of the Democratic Party. The Supreme Court granted the relief requested by Stevens, holding that, based on the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 3513.05, Stevens satisfied the statutory requirements to stand for election to the Ohio Democratic Party state Central Committee, and the Board thus abused its discretion and acted in clear disregard of applicable legal provisions when it disallowed his candidacy. View "State ex rel. Stevens v. Fairfield County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus requested by Jonathan Heavey and Adam Hudak certifying their names to the May 8, 2018 ballot as candidates for the Democratic Party’s nominees for governor and lieutenant governor, respectively, holding that Heavey and Hudak failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, a legal right to have their names placed on the May 8 ballot.Because the county boards of elections verified the validity of only 854 signatures in Heavey and Hudak’s part-petitions, Secretary of State Jon Husted did not certify Heavey and Husted as candidates for the May 8 ballot. In their present action, Heavey and Hudak alleged that Husted and the boards disregarded applicable law by rejecting at least 146 valid signatures. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that Heavey and Hudak did not present clear and convincing evidence that they were at least 146 erroneously-rejected signatures. View "State ex rel. Heavey v. Husted" on Justia Law

Judge Persky was appointed to the superior court in 2003 and has been reelected. Dauber and others submitted a “Petition for Recall of Judge Aaron Persky” to the Registrar of Voters (Elections Code 11006, 11020-11022). Judge Persky responded that under the California Constitution, the Secretary of State was the proper official for the recall of state officers and that the petition contained an “incorrect and misleading” demand for an election to choose a successor because a vacancy would be filled by the Governor. An amended recall petition was submitted to the Registrar and approved for circulation. Judge Persky sought a temporary restraining order to compel the Registrar to withdraw its certification and refer the matter to the Secretary of State; to enjoin the petition’s circulation until the Secretary of State certified it; and to enjoin circulation while the petition contained the "misleading" statement. The court of appeal affirmed that the Registrar was the proper official to approve recall petitions for superior court judges and that the Persky recall petition was not misleading. The statutory process for recall of a “local officer” was expressly made applicable to recall of a superior court judge and is not contrary to the state constitution; it does not impermissibly distinguish between appellate courts and superior courts, including their classification as “state” or “local” officers. View "Perksy v. Bushey" on Justia Law

Judge Persky was appointed to the superior court in 2003 and has been reelected. Dauber and others submitted a “Petition for Recall of Judge Aaron Persky” to the Registrar of Voters (Elections Code 11006, 11020-11022). Judge Persky responded that under the California Constitution, the Secretary of State was the proper official for the recall of state officers and that the petition contained an “incorrect and misleading” demand for an election to choose a successor because a vacancy would be filled by the Governor. An amended recall petition was submitted to the Registrar and approved for circulation. Judge Persky sought a temporary restraining order to compel the Registrar to withdraw its certification and refer the matter to the Secretary of State; to enjoin the petition’s circulation until the Secretary of State certified it; and to enjoin circulation while the petition contained the "misleading" statement. The court of appeal affirmed that the Registrar was the proper official to approve recall petitions for superior court judges and that the Persky recall petition was not misleading. The statutory process for recall of a “local officer” was expressly made applicable to recall of a superior court judge and is not contrary to the state constitution; it does not impermissibly distinguish between appellate courts and superior courts, including their classification as “state” or “local” officers. View "Perksy v. Bushey" on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 33 (2018) (IP 33). If adopted, IP 33 would require that “government employee unions” annually report certain information to the Secretary of State, primarily how dues would be spent on union administration. Chief petitioners Schworak and Mitchell challenged the summary, while petitioners Lutz and Schwartz challenged all parts of the certified ballot title. After reviewing the petitioners’ arguments, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the proposed caption, the “no” result statement, and the summary did not substantially comply and must be modified. The “yes” result statement did substantially comply and did not require modification. View "Lutzv. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

At issue here was Utah State Bill SB54, the Utah Elections Amendments Act of 2014 (“SB54”) which reorganized the process for qualifying for a primary ballot in Utah, most importantly, by providing an alternative signature-gathering path to the primary election ballot for candidates who were unable or unwilling to gain approval from the central party nominating conventions. Prior to the passage of SB54, the Utah Republican Party (“URP”) selected its candidates for primary elections exclusively through its state nominating convention, and preferred to keep that process. In this litigation, the URP sued Utah Lieutenant Governor Spencer Cox in his official capacity (“the State”), alleging that two aspects of SB54 violated the URP’s freedom of association under the First Amendment, as applied to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The two challenged sections: (1) required parties to allow candidates to qualify for the primary ballot through either the nominating convention or by gathering signatures, or both (the “Either or Both Provision”); and (2) required candidates pursuing the primary ballot in State House and State Senate elections through a signature gathering method to collect a set number of signatures (the “Signature Requirement”). In two separate orders, the United States District Court for the District of Utah balanced the URP’s First Amendment right of association against the State’s interest in managing and regulating elections, and rejected the URP’s claims. Re-conducting that balancing de novo on appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. View "Utah Republican Party v. Cox" on Justia Law

The Town of Hayneville ("the Town") and Carol Scrushy petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Lowndes Circuit Court to vacate its July 7, 2017, order denying the Town and Scrushy's motion to dismiss what they characterized as an election contest filed by Darshini Bandy, Connie Johnson, and Justin Pouncey (referred to collectively as "the electors") and to enter an order dismissing the electors' action. After review, the Supreme Court found the circuit court had the power to enforce its prior orders and to void the May 23, 2017, special election, which, the court found, had not been ordered in strict compliance with the State's election laws. The July 7, 2017, judgment of the circuit court enforcing its prior orders concerning the August 2016 election and the special election to fill the vacant council seat in District A was a valid judgment. Accordingly, Scrushy and the Town were not entitled to the relief they sought. View "Ex parte Carol Scrushy & the Town of Hayneville." on Justia Law

Two sets of petitioners challenged the Oregon Attorney General’s certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 28 (IP 28). IP 28, if adopted, would add an exception to the constitutional protections recognized in Vannatta v. Keisling, 931 P2d 770 (1997). Petitioners challenged the caption, the “yes” and “no” result statements, and the summary. Finding revisions warranted for all elements to the ballot title, the Oregon Supreme Court referred the matter back to the Attorney General for modification. View "Markley/Lutz v. Rosenblum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Administration Hearing Commission (AHC) affirming the Missouri Ethics Commission’s (MEC) imposition of fees arising from the failure to Robin Wright-Jones and Wright-Jones for Senate (collectively, Appellants) to comply with the rules of Mo. Rev. Stat. chapter 130. The court also affirmed the judgment of the circuit court finding that Mo. Rev. Stat. 105.961.4(6) was not unconstitutional. On appeal, Appellants claimed that the monetary fees assessed by the MEC violated Mo. Const. art. I, section 31. Specifically, Appellants argued that, pursuant to section 105.961.4(6), the MEC may not assess fines for violations of state statutes, regulations, or rules. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) there was no improper delegation of authority to the MEC; (2) the AHC’s decision was supported by the record; and (3) the assessed fees were not excessive. View "Wright-Jones v. Missouri Ethics Commission" on Justia Law