Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Rachel Johns sought the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76. She filed a declaration of candidacy with the Missouri Secretary of State, in which she stated under oath, that she “will qualify” to hold the office of state representative pursuant to the Missouri Constitution’s requirements for that office. Respondent Joshua Peters, another candidate for the Democratic party’s nomination for Missouri State Representative in the District 76, filed a petition pursuant to section 115.526, RSMo 2000, seeking to disqualify Johns as a candidate and have her name removed from any official election ballot. Peters argued that Johns could not meet the two-year durational voter registration requirement of article III, section 4 of the Missouri Constitution because she did not register to vote until February 4, 2015, which was less than two years before the general election date of November 8, 2016. Although Johns agreed that she did not meet the two-year voter registration requirement, she argued that such requirement is constitutionally invalid as applied to her. The circuit court determined that the voter registration requirement did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Johns appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed: "The State’s justification for the durational voter registration requirement’s burden on voting rights is the same as the justification it offers for the burden on Johns herself. The State’s interests in regulating the fairness of its elections and ensuring that candidates for state representative demonstrate sufficient seriousness about the electoral systems and social and civic engagement are legitimate. The two-year durational voter registration requirement is rationally related to those interests and a reasonable method of furthering them. Accordingly, article III, section 4 does not violate the First Amendment voting rights of the voters of District 76." View "Peters v. Johns" on Justia Law

Prior to a March 3, 2015 town meeting, plaintiffs submitted three separate petitions to amend the Brattleboro town charter. Among other things, the petitions sought to: (1) allow residents sixteen and older to vote at town meetings; (2) allow voters to seek a referendum on articles authorizing the Town to spend more than $2 million; (3) limit the terms of town meeting representatives;1 (4) hold the elections of town representatives and town officials in November rather than March; (5) require employers within the Town to provide two hours paid leave for employees to vote at town meetings; and (6) have the town grand juror enforce the minimum wage and function as a district attorney for the Town. An "information sheet" was prepared by the selectboard, then emailed to town meeting representatives, the media, selectboard members, town staff, and a few other persons who requested it. Among other things, the information sheet stated that: (1) setting term limits would be “anti-democratic” in that it would “ban Brattleboro residents from [t]own meeting[s] because they had attended six years in a row”; (2) moving elections from March to November “would damage the link between . . . important parts of government and leave Brattleboro out of step with the rest of Vermont”; (3) requiring employers to provide paid leave for employees to attend town meetings “would mandate Brattleboro employers to pay employees to attend town meetings in other towns and states” and would impact “Brattleboro residents [who] already face very steep property taxes”; (4) giving powers to the town grand juror, which “is essentially obsolete in this modern era,” is unnecessary “because enforcement of laws and ordinances is handled by other elected officials and clear structures”; and (5) “setting separate rules for voter review of budget items over $2 million is confusing and arbitrary.” On March 3, 2015, town voters defeated the three petitions. Plaintiffs appealed a superior court order granting the Town summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ lawsuit claiming that the town selectboard unlawfully interfered (by way of the information sheet) with an election on their petitions to amend the town charter. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daims v. Town of Brattleboro" on Justia Law

Proponents Mike Spalding and David Ottke proposed Initiative #73, which would amend article XXI of the Colorado Constitution to change the procedures leading to and the conduct of recall elections for state and local elective officials. A review and comment hearing was held before representatives of the Offices of Legislative Counsel and Legislative Legal Services. Thereafter, the proponents submitted a final version of their proposed initiative to the Secretary of State for purposes of submission to the Title Board. The Title Board conducted a hearing, concluded that the proposed initiative contained a single subject, and set a title. Petitioner Phillip Hayes filed a motion for rehearing, contending that the title comprised multiple subjects and was misleading, confusing, and inaccurate. Hayes petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court for review The Supreme Court concluded that Initiative #73 contained one subject, namely, the manner in which recall elections are triggered and conducted; however, the title set by the Title Board did not satisfy the clear title requirement because it did not alert voters to central elements of the initiative; it was misleading as to other elements; and, as all parties agreed, it unnecessarily recited existing law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Title Board and returned this measure to the Board to fix a new title. View "In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2015-2016 #73" on Justia Law

Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting (MFBH) is a Maine ballot question committee that was a proponent of November 2014 Ballot Question 1 concerning bear hunting and trapping. As early as September 2013, the Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife used agency resources to communicate with the public in opposition to Question 1. MFBH filed a complaint against the Department alleging that the Department’s campaign activities constituted an ultra vires expenditure of public funds. In November 2014, Maine voters defeated the ballot question. The Department subsequently filed a motion to dismiss MFBH’s complaint on the grounds of mootness and standing. In March 2015, the superior court dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the case is moot and that no exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. View "Mainers for Fair Bear Hunting v. Dep’t of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The Judicial Investigation Commission (JIC) requested the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus against the Putnam County Board of Ballot Commissioners (Board) to remove Troy Sexton from the May 2016 ballot as a candidate for the office of magistrate in Putnam County. The JIC based is request upon its determination that Sexton had been convicted of a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude". The Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus and directed the Board to remove Sexton as a magisterial candidate from the election ballot, holding that Sexton’s misdemeanor conviction of reporting a false emergency constituted a conviction of a “misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” such that he was not qualified to serve as a magistrate pursuant to the requirements for that office set forth in W. Va. Code 50-1-4. View "State ex rel. Judicial Investigation Comm’n v. Board of Ballot Comm’rs" on Justia Law

In 2010 the IRS began to pay unusual attention to applications for exemption from federal taxes under Internal Revenue Code 501(c) coming from groups with certain political affiliations. It used "inappropriate criteria" to identify organizations with "Tea Party’" in their names, expanded the criteria to include "Patriots and 9/12," and gave heightened scrutiny to organizations concerned with “government spending, government debt or taxes,” “lobbying to ‘make America a better place to live[,]’” or “criticiz[ing] how the country is being run[.]” The IRS used a “‘Be On the Lookout’ listing” for more than 18 months. Applicants flagged by the criteria were sent to a “team of specialists,” where they experienced significant delays and requests for unnecessary information. The IRS demanded that many groups provide names of donors; a list of issues important to the organization and its position regarding such issues; and political affiliations. After the release of the Inspector General’s report, the plaintiffs sued, citing the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Internal Revenue Code’s prohibition on the unauthorized inspection of confidential “return information,” 26 U.S.C. 6103(a), 7431. Plaintiffs sought discovery of basic information relevant to class certification. The district court ordered production of “Lookout” lists. A year later, the IRS had not complied, but sought a writ of mandamus. The Sixth Circuit denied that petition and ordered the IRS to comply. View "United States v. NorCal Tea Party Patriots" on Justia Law

Pro-se plaintiff Deborah Sumner appealed a superior court order denying her Right-to-Know Law request put to the New Hampshire Secretary of State. The order also granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Sumner sought to inspect ballots cast in the town of Jaffrey during the 2012 general election. The Secretary denied her request, citing RSA 659:95, II (Supp. 2015), which exempted ballots which have been cast from the Right-to-Know Law. On appeal, Sumner argued that RSA 659:95, II, along with RSA 660:16, II (2008) and RSA 669:33, II (2008) (collectively, “the ballot exemption statutes”), violated several articles of the New Hampshire Constitution. After review, the Supreme Court held that the ballot exemption statutes did not violate the State constitution, and, therefore, affirmed. View "Deborah Sumner v. New Hampshire Secretary of State" on Justia Law

In 2015, the Town of Grafton's three-member selectboard reviewed and discussed the 36 warrant articles to be placed on the ballot for the annual Town meeting scheduled for March 10, including 20 articles that plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. At the January 20 meeting, one selectboard member moved that the ballot include the phrase “the Selectmen do not recommend this article” relative to each of the plaintiffs’ warrant articles. The motion passed unanimously. On March 5, the plaintiffs filed their petition for injunctive and declaratory relief. The trial court held a final hearing on offers of proof and, on March 9, denied the petition, concluding that RSA 32:5, V-a authorized the Town to place recommendations on any warrant article. Plaintiff Jeremy Olson appealed a superior court order denying a petition he and co-plaintiffs, Thomas Ploszaj, Christopher Kairnes, and Howard Boucher filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Town. On appeal, Olson argued that the trial court erroneously determined that it was lawful for the Town to include on the official ballot for the annual Town meeting the phrase, “The Selectmen do not recommend this article,” below each of the plaintiffs’ 20 warrant articles, which the plaintiffs had petitioned to include on the ballot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Olson v. Town of Grafton" on Justia Law

A group of Lake and Peninsula Borough voters filed suit against two local elected officials, alleging various violations of state and local conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. The officials moved for summary judgment on the ground that the voters failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The superior court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings so that the Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC) could review several of the voters’ claims. In doing so the court relied in part on case law involving the separate doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which allowed a court to stay proceedings to give the relevant administrative agency an initial pass at the claims. The matter came before the Supreme Court, and it reverse the superior court’s order after review, finding that because the voters were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and because the order staying the proceedings could not be affirmed on independent grounds. View "Seybert v. Alsworth" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph White sought to remove Ann Johnston as mayor of the City of Stockton and to enjoin placing her name on the municipal election ballot of June 2012 for reelection as mayor. White contended Johnston was ineligible to sit as mayor and to run for reelection under section 606 of the Stockton City Charter. Because Johnston had served two terms as a council member prior to being elected mayor, White asserted she was ineligible to serve as mayor and to run for reelection. The trial court denied White’s petition for an alternative writ. Johnston’s name was placed on the June 2012 ballot, as was White’s, who also was running for mayor. Johnston received the most votes in the election and qualified for a runoff election. White did not qualify. That November, Johnston lost the general election. The trial court denied White’s petition for writ of mandate, finding section 606 was ambiguous because it did not clearly and plainly impose a cumulative term limit. It then found the City’s construction of section 606 as not imposing a cumulative limit was reasonable and not clearly erroneous in light of the official ballot pamphlet used when the voters adopted section 606 and the City’s consistent practice of not reading section 606 as imposing a cumulative limit. The City of argued, and the trial court found, the measure did not impose a cumulative limit. The Court of Appeal agreed with the City and affirmed the judgment. View "White v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law