Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973(a), was enacted to address racial discrimination in voting. Section 2 bans any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color,” applies nationwide, and is permanent. Other sections apply to some parts of the country. Section 4 defines “covered jurisdictions” as states or political subdivisions that maintained tests or devices as prerequisites to voting and had low voter registration or turnout in the 1960s and early 1970s. Section 5 provides that no change in voting procedures can take effect in covered jurisdictions until approved by federal authorities (preclearance). The coverage formula and preclearance requirement were to expire after five years, but the Act was reauthorized. In 2006, the Act was reauthorized for an additional 25 years, but coverage still turned on whether a jurisdiction had a voting test and low registration or turnout almost 50 years ago. Shelby County, in the covered jurisdiction of Alabama, sought a declaratory judgment that sections 4(b) and 5 are facially unconstitutional. The district court upheld the Act. The D. C. Circuit affirmed. A 5-4 Supreme Court reversed, finding Section 4 unconstitutional. Its formula may not be used to require preclearance. States have broad autonomy in structuring their governments and pursuing legislative objectives; the Tenth Amendment reserves to states “the power to regulate elections.” There is a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the states. The Voting Rights Act departs from those principles by requiring states to request federal permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to enact and execute. The Act applies to only nine states (and additional counties). In 1966, the departures were justified by racial discrimination that had “infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century” so that the coverage formula was rational in practice and theory. Nearly 50 years later, “things have changed dramatically.” Voter turnout and registration rates in covered jurisdictions approach parity; blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare. Minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels. Congress, if it is to continue to divide the states, must identify jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that makes sense under current conditions. Data compiled by Congress before reauthorizing the Act did not show anything like the pervasive, rampant discrimination found in covered jurisdictions in 1965. Congress reenacted the formula based on 40-year-old facts with no logical relation to the present day. View "Shelby County v. Holder" on Justia Law

The Committee filed suit seeking a declaration that certain portions of a Montana statute making it a criminal offense for any political party to "endorse, contribute to, or make an expenditure to support or oppose a judicial candidate" in a nonpartisan judicial election, Mont. Code Ann. 13-35-231, were unconstitutional and requesting an injunction against its enforcement. The court concluded that, to the extent appellants challenged the permanent injunction against enforcement of section 13-35-231's ban on endorsements and expenditures, the court was bound to follow its published decision finding those provisions unconstitutional. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's entry of a permanent injunction as it pertains to those portions of the statute. However, the district court mistakenly entered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of section 13-35-231 in its entirety. Accordingly, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to revise the permanent injunction so that it enjoined only the statute's ban on endorsements and expenditures, and not the statute's ban on contributions. View "Sanders Cnty. Republican Cent. Comm. v. Fox, et al." on Justia Law

The National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA) requires states to accept and use a uniform federal form to register voters for federal elections, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg–4(a)(1). The form developed by the Election Assistance Commission, requires only that an applicant aver, under penalty of perjury, that he is a citizen. Arizona law required rejection of any application for registration, including the federal form, if not accompanied by documentary evidence of citizenship. The district court granted summary judgment, upholding Arizona’s requirement. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, holding that the requirement is preempted by the NVRA. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Elections Clause imposes on states the duty to prescribe the time, place, and manner of electing Representatives and Senators, but confers on Congress the power to alter those regulations or supplant them altogether. The Clause confers authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, including regulations relating to “registration.” The NVRA term “accept” implies that the form is to be accepted as sufficient and Congress, when it acts under the Clause, is always on notice that its legislation will displace some element of a state’s preexisting legal regime. While the NVRA forbids states to demand additional information beyond that required by the federal form, it does not preclude states from denying registration based on information in their possession establishing the applicant’s ineligibility. The NVRA can be read to avoid a conflict, however. The NVRA permits a state to request state-specific instructions on the federal form and a state may challenge rejection of that request. That alternative means of enforcing its constitutional power to determine voting qualifications remains open to Arizona. View "Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc." on Justia Law

IRTL challenged the constitutionality of several Iowa campaign-finance laws, an administrative rule, and two forms. The court concluded, inter alia, that IRTL lacked standing to challenge the definitions of "political committee" and "permanent organization" because it faced no credible threat or present or future prosecution; the first two sentences of Iowa Code subsection 68A.404(3), the second sentence of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the entirety of subsection 68A.404(4)(a), the first and third sentences of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), and Form Ind-Exp-O were constitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; the first and third sentences of subsection 68A.404(3)(a), the second sentence of Iowa Administrative Code rule 351-4.9(15), the entirety of subsections 68A.404(3)(a)(1) and 68A.402B(3), and Form Dr-3 were unconstitutional as applied to IRTL and groups whose major purpose was not nominating or electing candidates; and Iowa Code section 68A.503 was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Iowa Right To Life Committee v. Tooker, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Dana Meade and Appellee Tim Williamson were the candidates on the ballot in a run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. Meade was the incumbent in the race and was, at the time of the election, serving as Sheriff. Meade was declared the winner by a margin of 39 votes. Williamson contested the results of the election. After a bench trial, the trial court issued an order setting forth findings of fact and reaching the conclusion that sufficient irregularities in voting and in the election process were shown to cast doubt upon the election result. The election was declared invalid and a new election was ordered. The Supreme Court has set aside elections under two different circumstances: where the evidence showed that a sufficient number of electors voted illegally or were irregularly recorded in the contest being challenged to change or cast doubt upon the election; or where systemic irregularities in the process of the election were sufficiently egregious to cast doubt on the result. The evidence presented at trial met neither of these standards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order invalidating the August 21, 2012 run-off election in the Democratic primary for Sheriff of Baker County. View "Meade v. Williamson" on Justia Law

he issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned a recall petition against Mayor Terecia Bolt and Councilman Dennis Jenson of the town of Marcus. The petition included ten charges against the mayor, and six against the councilman. THe superior court concluded that only one charge against the mayor and one against the councilman was legally sufficient to support a recall election. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that none of the charges were factually or legally sufficient, and accordingly reversed the superior court's decision on the one remaining charge. View "In re Recall of Bolt" on Justia Law

Under the “Hyde Amendment,” a district court in criminal cases may award to a prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation expenses, if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds special circumstances, 18 U.S.C. 3006A. The district court denied such an award in a case involving four counts of conspiring and attempting to commit extortion, 18 U.S.C. 951(a) & 2 (Hobbs Act), and two counts of traveling in interstate commerce to promote and facilitate bribery, 18 U.S.C. 1952(a)(3) & 2 (Travel Act). The government alleged that Manzo, a candidate for mayor of Jersey City, sought cash payments from Dwek, an informant posing as a developer, and that, in exchange, Manzo indicated he would help Dwek with matters involving Jersey City government. The district court dismissed each Hobbs Act count because Manzo was not a public official at the time of the conduct. The Third Circuit affirmed. The court later held that receipt of something of value by an unsuccessful candidate in exchange for a promise of future official conduct does not constitute bribery under the New Jersey bribery statute and dismissed all remaining charges. The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of fees. View "United States v. Manzo" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a pre-enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the California Secretary of State. At issue were the California Elections Code sections 8066 and 8451, which mandated that circulators shall be voters in the district or political subdivision in which the candidate was to be voted on and shall serve only in that district or political subdivision. Plaintiffs alleged that the residency requirement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought to enjoin its enforcement. The court reversed and remanded the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs lacked standing, holding that plaintiffs have alleged a sufficient injury-in-fact to meet constitutional standing requirements. In light of plaintiffs' concrete plan and defendant's specific threat of enforcement, the court concluded that plaintiffs have met the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. View "Libertarian Party Los Angeles, et al v. Bowen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Roland Riemers appealed a district court order that denied his petition for a writ to require the Secretary of State to remove the Republican and Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the November 2012 general election ballot, or alternatively to place him on that ballot as the Libertarian party candidate. According to Riemers, both he and his running mate for lieutenant governor filed separate certificates of endorsement and statements of interests with the Secretary to place their names on the June 2012 primary ballot, but Richard Ames did not submit a signature page with his statement of interests. Accordingly, the Secretary placed Riemers' name on the primary ballot, but not that of his running mate Ames. Riemers received enough votes in the primary to qualify for placement on the general election ballot. The Secretary asked the Attorney General whether under North Dakota law, Riemers could be nominated for governor without an accompanying candidate for lieutenant governor. The Attorney General issued a written opinion ruling that Riemers was not nominated because the requirements for a joint ballot for governor and lieutenant governor were not satisfied. Riemers thereafter submitted sufficient signatures to the Secretary of State for certification on the November general election ballot as an independent candidate for governor, with Anthony Johns as his accompanying candidate for lieutenant governor. In September 2012, after filing matter in the district court and being informed a previous attempt to serve the petition on the Secretary of State by certified mail was insufficient under N.D.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(2), Riemers personally served an Assistant Attorney General with the petition for a writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, a writ of quo warranto, and for preventive or declaratory relief. Riemers named the Secretary of State as the respondent and asked the district court to require the Secretary of State to remove the Republican and Democratic candidates for governor and lieutenant governor from the November general election ballot for failure to file a joint certificate of endorsement for the primary election. Riemers alternatively sought an order requiring the Secretary of State to place his name on the general election ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor with Anthony Johns as the Libertarian candidate for lieutenant governor. Riemers also sought an order directing the Secretary of State to stop discriminating against minor party and independent candidates. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Riemers failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to be certified for the general election ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition for a writ to require the Secretary of State to certify his name for that ballot as the Libertarian candidate for governor. View "Riemers v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued an order remanding a proposed redistricting plan to the redistricting board with instructions to formulate a new plan in compliance with state case law. Upon remand, the board was instructed to follow a certain process so that the Court could appropriately judge whether its violations of the Alaska Constitution were absolutely necessary for compliance with federal law. The board then submitted a modified plan to the superior court that changed four of forty house districts from the original plan. The amended plan was rejected by the superior court because the board failed to follow the process mandated by the Supreme Court. The board petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the superior court's conclusion on the amended plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the board again failed to follow the process the Court ordered on remand, and affirmed the decision of the superior court and required the board to draft a new plan for the 2014 elections. View "In Re 2011 Redistricting Cases" on Justia Law