Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Washington constitution limits municipal indebtedness to protect taxpayers from legislative and voter improvidence. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the city of Wenatchee (City) would exceed its debt limit by entering into a "contingent loan agreement" (CLA) with appellant Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District (District) to help the District finance a regional events center. The District argued that the CLA was not subject to the City's debt limit because it created a "contingent" liability, triggered only if the District is unable to make payments on the District's bonds. Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected this argument because the City was unconditionally obligated to service the District's debt if the District could not and because the risk of loss fell upon the City and its taxpayers: "[o]ur decision accordingly places the approval of the CLA in the hands of the voters." View "In re Bond Issuance of Greater Wenatchee Reg'l Events Ctr." on Justia Law

Steven Zaiser, as Chairman of the Sponsoring Committee for the Statutory Initiative Relating to the North Dakota Medical Marijuana Act, asked the Supreme Court to order Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to place an initiated measure for the Medical Marijuana Act on the November 6, 2012, general election ballot after the Secretary of State rejected 7,559 signatures on circulated petitions and decided the measure did not qualify for placement on that ballot. The Sponsoring Committee claimed that although the submitted petitions included some elector signatures forged by petition circulators, the petitions contained sufficient valid signatures to place the measure on the ballot. Because of time constraints for placing the measure on the November 6, 2012, ballot, the Supreme Court issued a dispositive order on September 19, 2012, denying the Sponsoring Committee's request for relief and stating a written opinion would be filed at a later date. Because the circulators' petitions at issue in this case included signatures forged by the circulators in violation of a mandatory constitutional provision, the Secretary of State correctly rejected those petitions in calculating the number of elector signatures necessary to place the measure on the November 6, 2012, ballot and correctly determined the remaining petitions contained insufficient signatures to place the measure on that ballot. View "Zaiser v. Jaeger" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the county board of commissioners and the county board of elections, to hold a special election before January 1, 2013 to elect a judge for the newly created county municipal court for a one-year term in 2013. The court of appeals granted the writ to compel the special election. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to granting the special election and instead held that Appellants established their entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees to conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the two part-time judgeships for the county court; (2) granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to accept the filed petitions and conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the judges of the county court; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as the court held that the pertinent legislation was unconstitutional insofar as it appointed judges of the county court to the newly created county municipal court for 2013. View "State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Appellant was appointed as the village of New Miami fiscal officer. Later the mayor discovered that Appellant failed to properly perform his duties as village fiscal officer, and the village council passed a resolution terminating Appellant's employment as fiscal officer without cause. The mayor subsequently appointed Appellee as the new village fiscal officer. Approximately three years later Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of quo warranto ousting Appellee from the office of fiscal officer and reinstating him to the office. The court of appeals denied the writ and awarded Appellee reasonable attorney fees and expenses. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment denying the writ of quo warranto and most of the challenged rulings on various motions in the case, holding that the court of appeals properly held that Appellant could not establish either that the office of village fiscal order was being unlawfully held by Appellee or that Appellant was entitled to the office; and (2) reversed the judgment awarding reasonable attorney fees and expenses, holding that the court of appeals erred in imposing sanctions under Ohio R. Civ. P. 11 without holding an evidentiary hearing. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Ebbing v. Ricketts" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned Defendants’ entitlement to trial by jury. Specifically, whether the Court’s holding in "Beauclaire v. Greenhouse" mandated that a resolution in accordance with La. R.S. 13:5015, waiving the prohibition against jury trials in suits against a political subdivision, must be passed by the political subdivision prior to a plaintiff filing suit for the political subdivision to be entitled to a trial by jury. Upon review of the applicable statutory and case law authority, the Supreme Court found that Defendants were entitled to trial by jury, and therefore reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Marcille v. Dauzat" on Justia Law

In 2006, two ballot measures were placed before Oregon voters at the polls. Measure 46 (2006) sought to amend the Oregon Constitution to permit the enactment of laws prohibiting or limiting electoral campaign "contributions and expenditures, of any type or description." Measure 47 (2006) sought to create new campaign finance statutes that would, essentially, statutorily implement the constitutional changes proposed in Measure 46. Voters rejected Measure 46 but approved Measure 47. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the examination of the operative text of Measure 47. The trial court concluded that the text at issue was severable from the ballot measure and ruled that the remaining provisions of the measure were, according to the plain text of the measure itself, dormant. The Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court also affirmed the trial court's judgment and the decision by the Court of Appeals. View "Hazell v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent George Tempel and Respondents-Appellants the State Election Commission and South Carolina Republican Party appealed a circuit court order concerning the candidacy of Respondent-Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8-13-1356(B). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8-13-1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8-131356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356(B) (Supp. 2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7-11-55. S.C. Code Ann. 7-11-55 (Supp. 2011). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Tempel v. So. Carolina Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellee brought a lawsuit challenging 11 C.F.R. 104.20(c)(9), a regulation promulgated by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), that purported to implement section 201(f)(2)(F) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 2 U.S.C. 434. The court held that appellee easily satisfied the requirements of 5 U.S.C. 702 and demonstrated his Article III standing by showing that he would be unable to obtain disclosure of information under the BCRA because of the allegedly unlawful restrictions imposed by section 104.20(c)(9). On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in holding that Congress spoke plainly when it enacted 2 U.S.C. 434(f), thus foreclosing any regulatory construction of the statute by the FEC. Moreover, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, the court did not find that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue in this case. Indeed, it was doubtful that, in enacting 2 U.S.C 434(f), Congress even anticipated the circumstances that the FEC faced when it promulgated section 104.20(c)(9). The court reversed and vacated summary judgment in favor of appellee, remanding to the district court. Upon remand, the district court shall first refer the matter to the FEC for further consideration. View "Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, et al" on Justia Law

The Constitution Party of Kansas, Curt Engelbrecht, and Mark Pickens sued the Secretary of State of Kansas, in his official capacity, alleging that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated by the Secretary's refusal, consistent with Kansas law, to keep track of Kansas voters' affiliation with the Constitution Party because the Constitution Party is not a recognized political party under Kansas law. In the district court, the parties stipulated to a Joint Statement of Facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court ruled for the Secretary, determining that Kansas's system of tracking party affiliation did not unconstitutionally burden the plaintiffs' rights. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the district court misapplied controlling Tenth Circuit precedent in evaluating their claim, and that under the proper analytical criteria, reversal is warranted. The Constitution Party did not contend that summary judgment was improper due to a lack of evidence in the record to support the Secretary's legal argument. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no merit to the Constitution Party's argument and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Constitution Party of Kansas, et al v. Kobach" on Justia Law

Earls filed nomination papers for alderman of Chicago’s 28th Ward on November 22, 2010, for an election to take place on February 22, 2011. An objector complained to the board of election commissioners that Earls and her husband, joint owners, were claiming homeowner property tax exemptions for properties other than the one in which they resided. The Municipal Code states that: “A person is not eligible for an elective municipal office if that person is in arrears in the payment of a tax or other indebtedness due to the municipality.” Earls had obtained documentation that, as of November 17, 2010, she had no outstanding debt for parking, water, administrative hearings, inspection fees, cost recovery, and tax/licensing. The Earls waived the extra exemptions and made payment to the county treasurer. The board concluded that property taxes owed because of unauthorized exemptions did not mandate ineligibility for municipal office. The trial court affirmed. The appellate court reversed on the last business day before the election, and directed that Earls’ name be removed from the ballot or that voters be given written notice that Earls had been disqualified. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, but declined to order a new election. Earls’ property taxes were owed to the county collector, not the city. View "Jackson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, City of Chicago" on Justia Law