Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Senator Jim Wilson filed suit in an attempt to have the State Senate Redistricting Act of 2011 declared invalid after the Supreme Court rejected his attempt to have the Act declared unconstitutional. In an earlier case, the Senator attached the Act as invalid because it "failed to create Senate districts which as nearly as possible preserve[d] the factors of 'compactness, political units, historical precedents, economic and political interests.'" In his petition in this case, he made "verbatim the same allegations as he did in [his earlier case]." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court properly dismissed Senator Wilson's petition because he failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because his claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion having been adjudicated against him in "Wilson I." The Court affirmed the district court's dismissal.

Petitioners Jann Carson, David Fidanque, Roey Thorpe and Cynthia Pappas sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot initiative petition 22 (2012), arguing that the title did not satisfy the requirements of state law. "Initiative Petition 22" would amend the Oregon Constitution to create a new provision to "recognize personal 'right to life' (undefined) that begins at fertilization [and] prohibits all abortions [and] certain contraceptives." Petitioners contended that the ballot title was deficient in a number of respects pertaining to the caption, the "yes" and "no" vote result statements and the summary. The Supreme Court found that reference to the "full legal rights of a person" in the "no" vote result statement was too vague to substantially comply with state law. Furthermore, "the use of the phrase in the summary pose[d] the same problems and for that reason, the summary must be referred to the Attorney General to more accurately describe the current state of the law." The Court found that there appeared to be no dispute that adoption of the measure would have the effect of prohibiting certain fertility treatments. The Court therefore referred the ballot measure back to the Attorney General for further modification.

In 2010, Oklahoma voters approved a state constitutional amendment that would prevent state courts from considering or using Sharia law. Members of the state election board asked the Tenth Circuit to review whether a federal district court abused its discretion when it granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the Board from certifying the result. Plaintiff Muneer Awad sued the Election Board to prevent the certification of ballot title "SQ 755" from the November 2, 2010 election. Plaintiff is an American citizen residing in Oklahoma, and is the executive director of the Oklahoma Chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Plaintiff alleged that SQ 755 violated his rights under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. He objected to the amendment's singling out his religion for negative treatment. The district court granted a temporary restraining order on November 9, 2010. On November 22, 2010, the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and granted a preliminary injunction one week later. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Board argued that Plaintiff's claims were not justiciable, and even if Plaintiff's Establishment or Free Exercise claims were justiciable, each failed to meet preliminary injunction requirements. Upon careful consideration of the district court record and the constitutional questions posed by the parties' briefs, the Tenth Circuit held that Plaintiff's claims were justiciable and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction based on those claims.

Appellants, the Libertarian party and three candidates, challenged the constitutionality of North Dakota Century Code 16.1-11-36, contending that the statute as applied to them violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause because it prevented appellants' names from appearing on the 2010 general election ballot despite their winning the party's primary. The court held that the burden imposed by the statute was not undue or excessive and the state had a compelling interest in having a minimum vote requirement before a candidate could appear on the general election ballot. Therefore, the court held that N.D.C.C. 16.1-11-36 was not unconstitutional on First or Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Furthermore, because the law applied equally to all candidates and did not result in unequal treatment, the court held that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Petitioners Gail Rasmussen and Bethanne Darby sought review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for Initiative Petition 15 (2012). If enacted, Initiative Petition 15 would add a provision to the Oregon Revised Statutes that would phase out all estate and inheritance taxes, and related taxes on intra-family property transfers that the state currently has statutory authority to collect. The proposed measure would supersede any Oregon law that purports to impose such a tax. Petitioners were electors who timely submitted written comments to the Secretary of State concerning the content of the Attorney General's draft ballot title and who therefore were entitled to seek review of the resulting certified ballot title to the Supreme Court. Petitioners challenged the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result statements. The Supreme Court reviewed the certified ballot title to determine whether it substantially complied with ORS 250.035(2) (stating requirements for ballot titles). The Court determined that the initiative warranted revision by the Attorney General, and referred the ballot back for modification.

Plaintiff brought suit against various officials arising from his name not being placed on the 2010 primary election ballot in Houston. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim. The court held that plaintiff's procedural due process claim was properly rejected where plaintiff had no property right to be a candidate. The court also held that plaintiff's substantive due process claim failed because there were no disputed facts regarding plaintiff's application containing an incorrect residential address where plaintiff made an oral admission that he did not live at the listed address. The court further held that plaintiff's Equal Protection claim was properly denied where the actions of the official at issue did not constitute intentional or purposeful discrimination. The court finally held that plaintiff failed to establish that Section 141.032(e) of the Texas Election Code was unconstitutional. Accordingly, because plaintiff filed his application for candidacy in the last hour of the last possible day, which limited his opportunity to refile a correct application, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, a group of prospective political candidates, petition circulators, and voters, appealed from the district court's order awarding summary judgment to the Board of Elections in the City of New York and upholding the State's "Party Witness Rule." The Rule, contained in New York Election Law 6-132, limited who a candidate for a political party's nomination could use to circulate so-called "designating petitions," which allowed the candidate to appear on the party primary ballot. Unless the circulator was a notary public or commissioner of deeds, the Party Witness Rule restricted designating petition circulators to "enrolled voter[s] of the same political party as the voters qualified to sign the petition," the party in whose primary the candidate sought to run. The court held that because plaintiffs were without a right to have non-party members participate in a political party's nomination process, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellant sought to intervene in a suit under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973, that was originally filed in 1996 by the League of United Latin American Citizens, District 19 (LULAC), against the city of Boerne, Texas. LULAC and the city reached a settlement agreement in 1996 and the district court entered a consent decree which provided that city council members would thereafter be elected through at-large elections with cumulative voting. In 2009, LULAC and the city filed a joint motion to reopen the case and modify the consent decree in order to switch to a single-member-district system. The district court granted that motion and appellant, a resident and registered voter of Boerne who opposed the change, filed a motion to intervene. Appellant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion on the grounds that appellant lacked standing. The court held that appellant had standing; that the case was not moot; and appellant had a right to intervene in the case under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of appellant's motion to intervene. The court also held that the district court had the power to modify the consent decree; but the district court abused its discretion in granting LULAC and the city's motion to modify because the record did not show that modifications were warranted. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded the district court's order granting the modified consent decree.

Mike Gilb, who had been appointed to fulfill a second unexpired term on the Mason City Council, took out candidate petitions for the upcoming general election for city council. Relators, registered voters and city residents, sent Respondents, the county board of elections, a letter claiming that Gilb was ineligible pursuant to the term-limit provisions of the city charter. The board considered the letter at its regular meeting, determining that there was no action for it to take at the time. Subsequently, Relators filed an expedited election action, requesting a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondents from certifying Gilb as a candidate and a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court (1) denied Relators' prohibition claim because they failed to establish their entitlement to the requested relief as (a) Respondents had not exercised or were not about to exercise quasi-judicial power, and (b) Relators did not establish that they lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge Gilb's candidacy; and (2) dismissed Relators' mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction.

On May 23, 2011, John Coble filed with the board of elections a nominating petition to run for municipal court judge at the November 8, 2011 election. On June 1, 2011, Coble withdrew his candidacy. On June 13, 2011, Coble filed a new nominating petition for the same office and the same election. On July 29, 2011, the board rejected Coble's petition and refused to certify him as a candidate for municipal court judge based on a directive issued on July 22, 2011 by the secretary of state declaring that a person who withdraws his candidacy for office cannot file a new declaration and petition for the same office at the same election. Coble subsequently filed an expedited election action for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to certify him and place his name on the November 8, 2011 election ballot. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable law by rejecting Coble's candidacy for municipal court judge due to an applicable exception in Coble's case.