Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Albert Ugas and Daniel Fishburn filed a recall petition against Respondent Pierce County Prosecutor Mark Lindquist, charging him with misfeasance and/or malfeasance and breach of his oath of office. Petitioners alleged that Mr. Lindquist failed to investigate alleged corruption and falsification of records by a former county assessor-treasurer. Additionally, Petitioners contended that Mr. Lindquist obstructed justice by deterring law enforcement from investigating the assessor-treasurer. The lower court dismissed Petitioners' affidavit of prejudice and held that the recall petition was legally and factually insufficient. The court awarded Mr. Lindquist $50,000 in attorney fees for Petitioners' intentionally filing a frivolous recall petition in bad faith. Petitioners argued on appeal that their recall petition was legally and factually sufficient and that they should not have been ordered to pay attorney fees. Upon review of the petition and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Plaintiffs Leroy Bandy and David Russell appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of the City of Birmingham. In 2009, Plaintiffs challenged the results of the City Council and Board of Education elections on the basis that a change in a local ordinance governing the election was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs argued that only the legislature could make changes to the local laws pertaining to elections. Plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the swearing in of the newly elected council members. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the City had the authority to change its election procedure by ordinance rather than through the state legislature. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly entered its judgment in favor of the City. The Court affirmed the trial courtâs decision.

In Fall 2010, former employees and representatives of the Town of Coulee filed a petition to recall Mayor Rick Heiberg. Of eleven charges, only two were found by the courts to be factually and legally sufficient to support a recall election. On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was determined that the two surviving claims against the mayor were not legally sufficient to support a recall. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the recall petition.

The Clerk of the McDowell County Commission appealed an order of the Circuit Court of McDowell County pertaining to mandamus proceedings. The Commission was directed to reimburse the attorney fees of A. Ray Bailey who was the prevailing party in an election contest. The Commission argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the Commission to pay Mr. Bailey's fees when the Commission was not a party to the election contest. Furthermore, The Commission argued that there was no statutory authority to support the award. Upon review of the arguments and law governing this matter, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order directing payment of attorney fees by the Commission.

The criminal prosecution of the Appellees in this case arose from conduct that allegedly occurred during the election recount of the November, 2004 presidential election. Appellee Jacqueline Maiden was the coordinator for the elections board, and Appellees Kathleen Dreamer and Rosie Grier were the manager and assistant manager, respectively, of the board's Ballot Department. Maiden was in charge of preparing the board's staff for the recount, and Dreamer and Grier were involved in organizing and conducting the recount. In December, 2004, the board met and certified the recount results. During that meeting, information was disclosed that suggested that personnel might not have conducted the recount in accordance with Ohio law. The board did not launch an investigation and did not refer the matter to the prosecutor. In August, 2005, a grand jury was convened, and indicted Dreamer and Grier on election-law violations regarding the recount. The elections board agreed that it would pay the legal fees and expenses of Dreamer, Maiden and Grier in all matters related to their criminal cases if they were not convicted of criminal conduct. In January, 2007, a jury tried Dreamer, Maiden and Grier. Grier was found not guilty on all charges, and the charges against Dreamer and Maiden were eventually dismissed. In 2009, Appellees filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the prosecutor and commissioners to appoint an independent counsel and to order the commissioners to pay for their legal expenses. The appellate court granted Appellees' the writ, but the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the writ was available to "county officers" under the applicable state law under which Appellees sought relief. Appellees were "employees" and not "officers." Accordingly, the Court held that the appellate court erred by granting Appellees the writ of mandamus.

Former Governor Jennifer Granholm appointed Defendant Judge Hugh Clarke to the district court. The Attorney General claimed that Defendant was not entitled to hold office beyond January 1, 2011, and brought a quo warranto action to oust him. The Supreme Court found that Defendant is entitled under state law to hold the office of district judge until January 1, 2013. The Court dismissed the Attorney Generalâs quo warranto action.

Appellant appealed the trail court's dismissal of her action contesting the outcome of the August 10, 2010 Stewart County primary election in which she was an unsuccessful candidate. Appellant filed the election contest on August 18, the general election took place on November 2, and the candidate who defeated appellant in the primary was certified as the winner of the election. The court held that appellant's appeal was moot where an election contest challenging the results of a primary election became moot after the general election had taken place and where appellant did not quickly seek statutorily-sanctioned supersedeas and/or an expedited appeal.

Appellants, three Minnesota corporations seeking to advance their respective social and commercial interests, filed suit to enjoin Minnesota election laws on independent expenditures and corporate contributions to candidates and political parties and moved for a preliminary injunction. At issue was whether the district court erred in failing to grant a preliminary injunction because appellants failed to show a likelihood of success. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request for an injunction where appellants were unlikely to prevail on the issue of whether Minnesota functionally retained a ban on corporate independent expenditures; appellants were unlikely to prevail on their claim of improper tailoring; and appellants were unlikely to prevail on the direct-contribution issue or the independent-expenditure issue.

Robin Farris filed six charges against the Pierce County Assessor-Treasurer Dale Washam. Ms. Farris charged that Mr. Washam violated whistleblower protections, retaliated against his employees, grossly wasted public funds, failed to cooperate with discrimination and retaliation investigations, and violated his oath of office. Ms. Farris appeared pro se, and there were technical flaws with the filing of her six charges against Mr. Washam. Through the course of the proceedings, Ms. Farris amended her charges to comply with the courtâs rules of pleading. Mr. Washam contended that there was no statutory authority to allow the recall charges to be amended, and because the original filing was fatally flawed, the Supreme Court should dismiss the entire recall effort. On March 3, 2011, the Supreme Court entered a brief order that affirmed the lower courtâs decision to allow the recall effort to proceed. The Courtâs May 12, 2011 order set forth the reasons for its March decision. The Court affirmed the trial court in all aspects.

Appellants brought an action against appellee, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of South Dakota, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments related to appellants' efforts to place a candidate for governor on the 2010 ballot in South Dakota and challenged the constitutionality of two statutory provisions related to that process. At issue was whether appellants had standing to challenge S.D. Codified Laws 12-5-3(9), which permitted only in-state residents to circulate the petitions at issue ("Count II"), and whether the court erred in failing to strike it down as unconstitutional. The court held that all appellants lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statute and vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss Count II without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.