Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

Enrique Herrera was working for Gilligan’s LLC under the supervision of Robert Phillipps when he was injured. Herrera was an alien who was not authorized to work in the United States at the time of the injury. Herrera filed a lawsuit against Gilligan’s and Phillips, alleging that Defendants were negligent and that, if that Worker’s Compensation Act applied, Phillipps’ conduct was intentional and he was therefore liable as a co-employee. The district court granted summary judgment for Gilligan’s and Phillipps, concluding primarily that there was no genuine dispute as to the material fact that Defendants reasonably believed Herrera was authorized to work in the United States, and therefore, Defendants were immune from suit pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gilligan’s had a reasonable belief that Herrera was authorized to work in the United States and whether Phillipps acted in intentional disregard of a dangerous condition when he instructed Herrera to perform his work. Remanded.View "Herrera v. Phillipps" on Justia Law

Appellee Yvonne Butler was a principal at a DeKalb County elementary school. Appellant DeKalb County School District notified appellee it would be terminating her employment for: (1) incompetency; (2) insubordination; (3) wilful neglect of duties; and (4)for other good and sufficient cause. Appellee was placed on suspension while the charges were pending. A hearing was scheduled pursuant to the Fair Dismissal Act (FDA), but the parties agreed to a continuance. The record revealed the hearing never took place. Appellant offered appellee, in lieu of termination, a contract for a classroom teaching position for the 2011- 2012 school year and required that she sign and return the contract before May 19, 2011, if she chose to accept the offer. On May 31, 2011, appellee responded to the May 11 letter by asserting that she had a right to an FDA hearing. In her May 31 response, appellee never indicated she would be accepting the offered position of classroom teacher. On June 30, 2011, upon hiring new counsel, appellee returned the signed teaching contract "under protest." In July, appellant issued appellee a separation notice indicating appellee’s employment had ended as of June 30, 2011. The following March, appellee filed this mandamus action, requesting an FDA hearing, a name-clearing hearing, and damages for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in regard to the proffered 2011-2012 teaching contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted and denied in part both parties’ motions: the decision effectively granted appellee’s petition for a writ of mandamus and held that appellee was entitled to an FDA hearing because she was a tenured employee and had been demoted from an administrator to a teacher. In addition, the trial court held that the request for a separate name-clearing hearing was moot as appellee could clear her name at the FDA hearing. Finally, the trial court denied appellee’s claim of damages for breach because it found that appellee had not timely accepted the contract to be a classroom teacher for the 2011-2012 school year. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that since appellee had earned tenure as a teacher, at the time of her suspension from the position as principal in 2010, the only right she had under the FDA was continued employment as a teacher. Therefore, the School District complied with the FDA when it offered appellee a teaching position for the 2011-2012 school year rather than insisting upon her termination. At that point, the FDA did not require any additional action by appellant. Thus, it was error for the trial court to conclude that appellant was required to hold a demotion hearing pursuant to the FDA in addition to offering appellee continued employment as a teacher. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in all other respects. View "Dekalb County Sch. Dist. v. Butler" on Justia Law

Kentucky Employers’ Mutual Insurance (KEMI) was the workers’ compensation carrier for Beacon Enterprises, Inc. at the time that Julian Hoskins was injured during the course of his employment with Four Star Transportation, Inc. (Four Star). Four Star had configured its workforce pursuant to an employee leasing arrangement with a company affiliated with Beacon Enterprises, an employee leasing company. The Workers’ Compensation Board determined that Hoskins was not covered by Beacon Enterprises’ policy with KEMI because Hoskins was not an employee of Beacon Enterprises at the time of the injury. The court of appeals upheld the Board’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.615 does not require an employee to have knowledge of his status as a leased employee or of the nature of his relationship with the employee leasing company; and (2) because the court of appeals grounded its opinion upon Hoskins’s lack of knowledge, the matter must be remanded for the court to address other issues raised by KEMI in support of the Board’s decision.View "Ky. Ininsured Employers’ Fund v. Hoskins" on Justia Law

William Curtis was injured when Michael Lemna drove a golf cart over a retaining wall during a game of golf scheduled as part of a sales meeting in Arkansas. Both Curtis and Lemna were employees of Dial Corporation headquartered in Arizona at the time of the accident. Curtis sued Lemna in Benton County Circuit Court alleging negligence. The circuit court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction until the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission could determine the applicability of Arkansas’ workers’ compensation laws. Curtis subsequently requested a hearing before the Commission. The Commission concluded that Curtis and Lemna were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the accident and that co-employee immunity was extended to Lemna acting as the employer providing a safe work environment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission had jurisdiction over this case; (2) the Commission’s decision that Curtis’s injury occurred within the scope of his employment was supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Commission’s decision that Lemna was entitled to immunity was supported by substantial evidence.View "Curtis v. Lemna" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sought compensation for injuries he sustained while employed with his employer. The employer’s insurer at the time Plaintiff filed his claim entered into a voluntary agreement on the claim and subsequently sought apportionment against Employer’s prior insurers, including Republic-Franklin Insurance Company. Republic-Franklin did not agree to its apportionment liability until just before the close of evidence. Thereafter, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner ordered Republic-Franklin to pay interest pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-299b. The Workers’ Compensation Commission affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding that the Commissioner’s order of interest was proper because (1) the Commissioner satisfied the statutory prerequisites of section 31-299b; and (2) Republic-Franklin failed to preserve its claim that the Commissioner’s order of interest was not made within a reasonable period of time as required by section 31-299b.View "Ferraro v. Ridgefield European Motors, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Gregory Malisos appealed a New Hampshire Retirement System board of trustees ruling that his legally separated spouse did not qualify for the medical subsidy benefit set forth in RSA 100-A:52, I (2013). The Supreme Court concluded that, in the absence of any limiting language in RSA 100-A:52 to the contrary, the legislature intended that an individual, although legally separated from a retiree, qualified as a spouse for purposes of eligibility for the medical subsidy benefit, until that individual's death or remarriage. "To conclude otherwise would add language to the retirement benefits statute that the legislature did not see fit to include. Had the legislature intended the term 'spouse' to exclude from retirement benefits a legally separated spouse, it could have said so. We conclude that the board erred as a matter of law." View "Petition of Gregory Malisos" on Justia Law

In 2008-2010, then-governor Schwarzenegger issued executive orders requiring the unpaid furloughs of most state employees. In 2010, the Legislature passed the budget for the 2010-2011 fiscal year, authorizing “reductions in employee compensation achieved through the collective bargaining process or through administrative actions for represented employees and a proportionate reduction for nonrepresented employees (utilizing existing authority of the administration to adjust compensation for nonrepresented employees).” The Governor then issued Executive Order No. S-15-10, applicable to most nonunion state employees, including supervisory and other exempt employees represented by PECG and CAPS, reducing their net compensation by imposing a one-day per month personal leave program. Between EO S-15-10 and the three-day-furlough previously in effect, nonunionized employees’ net compensation for 2010-2011 was reduced by 8.5 percent, equivalent to the 8.5 percent total reduction to the net compensation of employees in state bargaining units represented by SEIU. Union employees represented by CAPS and PECG, however were furloughed for three days each month throughout 2010 and into 2011 and incurred an 8.5 percent reduction in net compensation after their first furlough day in March 2011 but were subjected to two more furlough days. The trial court invalidated mandatory furloughs for employees represented by PECG and the CAPS. The appeals court affirmed. View "Prof'l Eng'rs in CA Gov't v. Brown" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was injured while performing her work duties, filed a workers’ compensation claim. Liberty Northwest (Liberty), the insurer for the claim, terminated Petitioner’s temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits after Petitioner revoked releases and authorizations she had previously signed allowing Liberty and its agents to have ex parte communications with her medical care providers. Petitioner filed an action asserting that the statutes relied upon by Liberty to terminate her medical benefits, Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-604 and Mont. Code Ann. 50-16-527, were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) determined that section 39-71-604(3), as applied in Petitioner’s case, violated Petitioner’s constitutional right of privacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that section 39-71-604(3) violated Petitioner’s right of privacy set forth in the Montana Constitution.View "Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest" on Justia Law

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination.View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

A firefighter developed prostate cancer when he was in his mid-fifties, after working for nearly 30 years. He filed a workers’ compensation claim under a new statute creating a presumption that certain diseases in firefighters, including prostate cancer, are work related when specific conditions are met. The employer contended that the firefighter could not attach the presumption of compensability because he had not strictly complied with statutory and regulatory medical examination requirements. The employer also wanted to present expert testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board heard the claim and refused to consider parts of the expert’s testimony, deciding that the firefighter was eligible for benefits because he had attached the presumption of compensability by substantially complying with the statutory requirements and the employer had not rebutted the presumption. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission agreed, but reversed the Board’s decision disallowing the expert testimony. The Commission decided that the employer could rebut the presumption through its expert’s testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. Because the employer also contended that the firefighter-presumption statute violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, the State of Alaska intervened on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the firefighter attached the presumption by substantially complying with the applicable requirements. However, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision that the employer could rebut the presumption through expert testimony that there was no known cause of prostate cancer.View "Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law