Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

An individual asserted interests in six oil leases that were proposed for inclusion in an oil exploration and development unit on Alaska’s North Slope. The Alaska Division of Oil and Gas initially approved two of these leases for unit inclusion but later reversed its position and denied inclusion for all six. During the administrative appeal process, the leases expired because the lessees failed to pay the required rental payments, as mandated by a Department of Natural Resources (DNR) regulation. The individual did not pay the rent necessary to reinstate the leases, and the Division confirmed their termination.The individual appealed both the termination of the leases and the denial of their inclusion in the unit to the Commissioner of Natural Resources. The Commissioner affirmed the terminations and denied the inclusion request. Separate appeals were filed in the Alaska Superior Court: one challenging the lease terminations (raising the validity of the rent-during-appeal regulation) and one challenging the denial of unit inclusion (alleging agency overreach, unreasonableness, and due process violations). The Superior Court affirmed the termination of five leases and remanded the sixth for further proceedings regarding its production capabilities. It also affirmed the denial of unit inclusion, finding no violation of due process or agency overreach.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that the DNR regulation requiring rental payments during the pendency of an appeal is constitutional and a reasonable exercise of DNR’s authority. Because the lessees failed to pay rent, the terminations of five leases were affirmed, rendering the unitization appeal for those leases moot. The dispute over the sixth lease was found to remain live, but the Commissioner’s denial of its inclusion in the unit was affirmed as neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor a violation of due process. The award of attorney’s fees against the appellant was also affirmed. View "Donkel v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A natural gas company operating in multiple states applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for permission to build new pipeline facilities and abandon some existing ones, requesting that the costs of these improvements be included in future customer rates. The company’s customers, a group of retail natural gas distributors, challenged the application, arguing that less costly alternatives existed, that the improvements were not justified by customer needs, and that FERC should not pre-determine the rate treatment for the project. The core dispute arose when the customers requested access to specific pipeline flow data, designated as sensitive Critical Energy Infrastructure Information, which was withheld from the public docket. FERC eventually released the requested data, but the customers claimed that the delay impaired their ability to participate meaningfully in the proceedings.FERC granted the company’s application, issuing a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity and permitting facility abandonment. The Commission found that the evidence, including flow data, demonstrated the necessity of the project and justified the proposed rate treatment, noting that objections to rates could be addressed in future proceedings. The customers filed a rehearing request, alleging that FERC’s decision was premature and unsupported by substantial evidence due to delayed data access. FERC denied rehearing, later provided the requested data, and solicited comments, but the customers maintained that the timing was inadequate and refused to comment.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the consolidated petitions. The court found the customers had standing, the case was not moot, and limited its review to arguments raised in the rehearing request. Applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, the court held that FERC’s procedures and consideration of the record, including flow data, were sufficient and did not violate due process. The petitions for review were denied. View "East Tennessee Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

Venture Global CP2 LNG and Venture Global CP Express sought authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal and an 85-mile pipeline in Louisiana. FERC’s review included extensive environmental analysis in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), resulting in an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and a Supplemental EIS (SEIS). Both assessments concluded that, with recommended mitigation measures, the project’s environmental impacts, including those on air quality and the commercial fishing industry, would not be significant.Individuals and advocacy groups challenged FERC’s authorization, raising eleven alleged errors under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) and NEPA. After FERC’s initial order in 2024, the challengers sought rehearing. FERC partially granted rehearing to address concerns raised by recent D.C. Circuit decisions and directed additional environmental review, which led to the SEIS. The SEIS found no exceedances of relevant air quality standards for the terminal and compressor station. FERC reaffirmed its authorization in 2025, and subsequent rehearing requests were denied. The challengers then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that FERC’s interpretation and application of the NGA was lawful and not arbitrary, emphasizing the presumption in favor of terminal authorization under Section 3, absent an affirmative showing of inconsistency with the public interest. The court found FERC’s NEPA analysis reasonable, deferring to FERC’s use of established air quality standards and its reliance on expert agency data. The court also upheld FERC’s treatment of cumulative impacts and harm to commercial fisheries as sufficiently addressed and explained. The petitions for review were denied in full. View "For a Better Bayou v. FERC" on Justia Law

LUMA Energy, LLC and LUMA Energy ServCo, LLC entered into a long-term contract to operate and maintain Puerto Rico’s electric power transmission and distribution system, previously managed by the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), a Title III debtor under PROMESA. The agreement included a liability waiver provision, which was subsequently approved with modifications by the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (PREB). After LUMA invoked the waiver to deny numerous consumer claims, the Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs (DACO) brought suit in Puerto Rico’s courts against LUMA, PREPA, and PREB, challenging the constitutionality of the waiver. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico accepted the case for review.While the DACO action was pending, LUMA, without participation from PREPA or the Financial Oversight and Management Board (the Board), sought an order from the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (acting as the Title III court) to enforce the automatic bankruptcy stay and halt the DACO litigation. The Title III court denied LUMA’s motion, finding the police and regulatory power exception to the automatic stay applicable because DACO’s action was an exercise of governmental authority to protect consumers. LUMA appealed this order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The main holding was that LUMA lacked statutory standing to appeal the Title III court’s denial of its motion to enforce the automatic stay. The First Circuit clarified that LUMA was not a “person aggrieved” for purposes of appellate standing under the Bankruptcy Code as incorporated by PROMESA, because LUMA did not show it suffered a direct and adverse pecuniary injury of the type the automatic stay is meant to prevent. Accordingly, the First Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. View "LUMA Energy LLC v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Consumer Affairs" on Justia Law

Several states challenged a federal agency’s attempt to set new energy efficiency standards for consumer cooking appliances, including gas stoves. The Department of Energy (DOE) had initially tried to implement these standards through the standard notice-and-comment rulemaking process, but after facing substantial opposition, including critical comments from industry groups and states, it abandoned that effort. Subsequently, the DOE used a “Direct Final Rule” (DFR) process to impose similar standards, bypassing the usual public comment period by relying on a joint statement from selected stakeholders. The new rule included a ban on certain power supplies and set limits on annual energy consumption for appliances.After the DFR was published, the DOE solicited public comments as required by statute. Several states, led by Nebraska, Utah, and Montana, submitted timely adverse comments on the last day of the comment period, arguing that the joint statement did not fairly represent all stakeholders, particularly states opposed to the rule. They also asserted that the DOE failed to properly consider the impact on product reliability and lifespan. The DOE later issued a notice confirming it would not withdraw the DFR, despite these objections.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court first held that it had authority to review the petition, determining that the rule became “prescribed” for purposes of judicial review only when the DOE confirmed its adherence to the DFR after considering comments. On the merits, the Fifth Circuit found that the DOE failed to meet statutory requirements for using the DFR process, especially by excluding key stakeholders and not adequately addressing concerns about reliability and economic justification. The court granted the states’ petition for review, set aside the rule, and remanded the matter to the DOE for further proceedings. View "State of Mississippi v. DOE" on Justia Law

Four electric transmission facilities located in the Sunflower Zone of central and western Kansas had their costs primarily allocated to local customers under the existing regional cost allocation method, known as the Highway/Byway framework. Over time, due to the growth of wind generation in the Sunflower Zone, these facilities increasingly served customers outside the local zone, transmitting surplus wind-generated electricity to other areas within the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) region. SPP, the regional transmission organization, determined that these facilities were functioning more like regional “Highway” facilities, which typically have their costs spread across the entire SPP region, rather than “Byway” facilities, whose costs are mostly local.SPP initially attempted to institute a process that would allow for waivers from the voltage-based cost allocation on a facility-by-facility basis, but the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) rejected these proposals due to concerns over discretion and transparency. Subsequently, SPP made a more targeted filing under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act, seeking prospective reclassification of the four facilities as Highway assets based on specific studies and criteria. FERC approved this reclassification, finding that the facilities primarily benefited customers outside the Sunflower Zone, and reaffirmed its decision on rehearing.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed FERC’s orders under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. The court held that FERC’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and was adequately reasoned. The court found that FERC was not required to conduct zone-by-zone benefit analysis or adhere strictly to the existing allocation method when evidence showed that the facilities’ benefits were primarily regional. The court denied the petitions for review and upheld FERC’s orders. View "City Utilities of Springfield, Missouri v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case centers on reforms to the process by which new energy generators, particularly renewable energy sources, connect to the nation’s power grid. At the end of 2023, a significant backlog existed, with about 2,600 gigawatts of proposed generation and storage capacity awaiting interconnection studies, mainly from solar, wind, and energy storage projects. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) determined that delays and inefficiencies in the existing interconnection process were creating unjust and unreasonable conditions in wholesale energy markets, hindering timely development and competition.FERC responded by issuing Order 2023, acting under its remedial authority in Section 206 of the Federal Power Act. Order 2023 mandated nationwide reforms for transmission providers, replacing the prior serial study model with a clustered study approach, requiring more substantial deposits, imposing withdrawal fines, establishing firm study deadlines, and implementing automatic late fees for missed deadlines. FERC also standardized affected-system study procedures and adopted energy-service modeling as the default. Following thirty-two rehearing and clarification requests, FERC issued Order 2023-A, reaffirming its findings and adjustments.Petitioners challenged three major aspects: the withdrawal fines, study deadlines backed by late fees, and the energy-service modeling requirement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FERC acted within its statutory authority, reasonably explained its reforms, and provided adequate process and safeguards. The court denied all petitions, holding that FERC’s nationwide interconnection regime and rulemaking under Order 2023 were lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not unduly discriminate or violate constitutional protections. The court also affirmed that FERC reasonably balanced competing interests and that its reforms were supported by substantial evidence. View "Advanced Energy United v. FERC" on Justia Law

A non-profit river conservation and recreation organization, whose members include kayakers and canoers in Missouri, sought to intervene out of time in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) license surrender proceeding for the Niangua Hydroelectric Project in Missouri. The project, completed in 1930, impounded the Niangua River and created Lake Niangua. After decades of operation and relicensing, the licensee decided not to pursue relicensing, proposing to decommission the project but leave the dam in place. The organization argued its members would be directly affected and that its participation would represent public interest, but it missed the intervention deadline due to lack of awareness of the proceeding.FERC denied the organization’s unopposed motion to intervene out of time, finding it failed to demonstrate good cause for late filing under its procedural rules. FERC also denied rehearing, reiterating that lack of awareness of a publicly noticed proceeding did not constitute good cause and that, per its precedent, failure to show good cause was sufficient to deny intervention without considering other factors. The Commission subsequently approved the license surrender with the dam left in place, rejecting the organization’s comments.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. It held that FERC did not err in interpreting its rule to require a late intervenor to show good cause for the late filing, but concluded that FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously by inconsistently applying its precedent on late intervention without providing a reasoned explanation. The court vacated FERC’s orders and remanded the case for reconsideration and a reasoned explanation consistent with FERC’s precedent. View "American Whitewater v. FERC" on Justia Law

At an oil and gas wellsite in Texas, a contractor, TCP Specialists, LLC, provided wireline services alongside other companies that managed the well’s pressure and equipment. During a maintenance operation, a pressurized pipe ruptured while the well was being depressurized, causing fatal injuries to two workers and serious injury to a TCP employee. Although TCP did not control the depressurization or supply the faulty pipe, its employees were standing near the wellhead at the time of the accident. The Department of Labor alleged that TCP exposed its employees to known hazards by not establishing a buffer zone around the well during depressurization.An administrative law judge (ALJ) of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission held a hearing and found that TCP had violated the General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The ALJ determined that TCP had control over its employees’ proximity to the hazard and that a buffer zone would have been a feasible and effective abatement measure. The ALJ concluded that TCP failed to implement adequate safety policies and upheld the citation, imposing a penalty. The full Commission declined to review the ALJ’s decision, making it a final order.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed TCP’s petition and denied it. The court held that the hazard was properly defined by reference to the physical agents (the frac stack and pressurized piping) and that TCP had control over its employees’ exposure to that hazard. The court found substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s conclusions regarding the feasibility and effectiveness of a buffer zone, and rejected TCP’s constitutional and procedural arguments. The order upholding the citation and penalty was affirmed. View "TCP Specialists, LLC v. Secretary of Labor" on Justia Law

SWN Production Company, LLC sought to drill multiple horizontal natural gas wells on a 301-acre tract within the City of Weirton, West Virginia. The City required a conditional use permit for oil and gas extraction under its zoning ordinance. SWN applied for such a permit, and the City’s Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) held hearings where community members raised concerns about traffic, noise, and the effect on local development. The BZA denied SWN’s application, citing incompatibility with the City’s comprehensive development plan and other adverse impacts. Afterward, SWN obtained a drilling permit from the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).SWN filed two actions in the Circuit Court of Brooke County: a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the BZA’s decision and a complaint seeking a declaration that the City’s zoning ordinance was preempted by state law, especially the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act. The circuit court rejected SWN’s preemption argument and affirmed the BZA’s denial of the permit. SWN appealed both rulings to the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia (ICA). The ICA reversed the circuit court on the preemption issue, finding the City’s ordinance conflicted with state law, but dismissed SWN’s appeal of the certiorari ruling for lack of jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed both appeals. It held that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the City’s zoning ordinance and the state’s environmental statutes; rather, any overlap was incidental and not preempted. The Court reversed the ICA’s decision on preemption and reinstated the circuit court’s order dismissing SWN’s facial preemption challenge. Regarding the certiorari appeal, the Court affirmed the ICA’s dismissal, holding that the ICA lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review extraordinary remedies such as certiorari. View "City of Weirton v. SWN Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law