Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that an action taken by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) in issuing a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System/State Disposal System permit was arbitrary and capricious and that the permit did not comply with a Minnesota rule addressing wastewater discharges to groundwater, Minn. R. 7060.0600, subp. 2.At issue was the MPCA's issuance of the permit for a Poly Met Mining, Inc. project. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that the MPCA failed properly to consider whether the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) applied to future discharges from Poly Met's facility to groundwater. The Supreme Court remanded the cause, holding (1) remand was required because there were suggestions that the MPCA did not properly consider whether the permit complies with the CWA and that the MPCA did not genuinely engage in reasoned decision-making; (2) remand was required for consideration of whether a variance was available to allow the planned discharge to the unsaturated zone within the containment system; and (3) the prohibition on injecting polluted water directly to the groundwater saturated zone for long-term storage did not apply in this case. View "In the Matter of the Denial of Contested Case Hearing Requests & Issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System" on Justia Law

Three conservation groups challenged the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s approval of Jonah Energy’s development project on state and federal land in Wyoming. The project was designed to drill exploratory wells on land for which Jonah possessed development rights. The conservation groups argued the district court erred in upholding the BLM’s approval under the National Environmental Protection Act and the Federal Land Polocy and Management Act. Specifically, they contended the BLM inadequately considered the impact of the project on the sage-grouse and pronghorn antelope migration and grazing patterns. The Tenth Circuit concluded the BLM adequately collected and considered information on the sage-grouse and pronghorn, and selected a development plan that met statutory requirements. View "Western Watersheds Project, et al. v. United States Bureau of Land Management, et al." on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) orders, two utility companies argue that Attachment Z2 plainly requires utilizing the N-1 Contingency Analysis (N-1) methodology. And they assert that FERC erred in concluding that the Tariff was ambiguous, relying on extrinsic evidence to interpret that the Reservation Stack Analysis (RSA) was the appropriate methodology. Second, they claim that the Regional Operator violated the filed rate doctrine because the filed rate was unclear about how much they would be charged. Finally, Petitioners contend that their charges offend Attachment Z1 because the Regional Operator neither identified the upgrade facilities that would accommodate their requests nor provided them with an estimate of the costs of such upgrades.   The DC Circuit dismiss in part the petitions for review related to the filed rate doctrine because that issue was not exhausted at the rehearing stage below. The court otherwise denied in part the petitions for review. The court explained that FERC appropriately noted that the purpose of Attachment Z1 is to identify new transmission facilities or new upgrades to existing facilities, while Attachment Z2 is designed to calculate a customer’s obligation to pay for its use of existing Creditable Upgrades funded by others. The court explained that because the difference between Attachment Z1 and Attachment Z2 arises out of their plain texts, and FERC’s orders acknowledged that difference, FERC “would clearly have acted on [this] ground even if the other [grounds] were unavailable.” Therefore, denying the petitions for review on this issue is consistent with precedents. View "Xcel Energy Services Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Seven years ago, the Fifth Circuit court vacated d, as arbitrary and capricious, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) cost allocation scheme for electrical grid improvements in the WestConnect region, which covers utility service to much of the American West. On remand, FERC was instructed to provide a more complete justification for its orders. The petition under review asserts that the reasons FERC gave on remand remain insufficient.   The Fifth Circuit granted the petition and reversed the orders. The court explained that FERC’s orders violate the Federal Power Act as a matter of law and, alternatively, the agency has again inadequately explained its actions. The cost causation principle that binds FERC does not authorize it to force its regulated jurisdictional utilities to assume the costs of providing service to non-jurisdictional utilities. The court explained that FERC’s compliance orders cannot “satisfy its statutory mandate—except by ignoring the benefits the non-jurisdictional utilities would receive.” View "El Paso Electric v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission must ensure that the rules for funding new transmission facilities are just and reasonable. A funding regime is not just and reasonable if it makes one party foot the bill for a project with broad benefits. Old Dominion Electric Cooperative v. FERC, 898 F.3d 1254, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Here, two transmission owners and a utility company say FERC approved an unjust and unreasonable change to the transmission-funding regime in a region managed by Southwest Power Pool. The new regime, the Petitioners say, will likely force transmission owners to pay for projects that benefit the entire power grid. They petitioned for judicial review.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions for judicial review. But the Petitioners oversell the risk that the new regime will foist the costs of new projects on individual owners. For that to happen, the regime’s primary mechanisms for allocating costs would have to fail. In any case, FERC may balance the need to ensure that transmission owners bear perfectly proportional costs and benefits with other policy goals. Consolidated Edison Co. v. FERC, 45 F.4th 265, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2022). It did that here by approving a regime that allows participants in regional transmission zones to collaborate on selecting and funding new projects. View "Evergy Kansas Central, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

MSHA’s jurisdiction, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (“Commission”) held that for the list of items in Section 802(h)(1)(C) to be considered a “mine,” the items had to be located at an extraction site, or the roads appurtenant thereto.  Because neither the trucks nor the facility associated with the citations at issue were located on land covered under subsections (A)–(B), the Commission found they failed to constitute a “mine” and vacated the citations. The Commission also found that, as an independent contractor not engaged in servicing a mine at the time of the citation, KC Transport failed to qualify as an “operator” under Section 802(d) of the Mine Act. The Secretary of Labor (“the Secretary”), acting through MSHA, appealed the Commission’s decision and asked the court to uphold the two citations as an appropriate exercise of the Secretary’s jurisdiction under the Mine Act. In the Secretary’s view, subsection (C) of the “mine” definition covers KC Transport’s facility and trucks because they were “used in” mining activity.   The DC Circuit vacated and remanded the Commission’s decision, allowing the Secretary to interpret the statute’s ambiguous language. The court explained that given the Mine Act’s language, context, and the court’s binding precedent, it finds that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the “mine” and “operator” definitions. And we generally defer to the Secretary’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute—even when the Commission disagrees. But here, the Secretary’s position treats subsection (C) as 4 unambiguous and makes no meaningful effort to address the numerous practical concerns that would arise under such an interpretation. View "Secretary of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of the Town of Exeter in this action seeking injunctive and declaratory relief challenging the Town's decision to amend its zoning ordinance, which prevented Plaintiff from developing three commercial solar-field projects in Exeter, holding that Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on its allegations of error.On appeal, Plaintiff challenged several aspects of the superior court's judgment denying Plaintiff's request to enjoin enforcement of an emergency moratorium ordinance preventing review of Plaintiff's solar-field projects and to declare that Plaintiff's solar-field projects were vested pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 45-24-44. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under this Court's understanding of the relevant law, the trial court properly entered judgment in favor of the Town. View "Green Development, LLC v. Town of Exeter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Green Development, LLC (Green Development) sought interconnection with the distribution system of Narragansett Electric Company (Narragansett), a public utility. Accommodation of the increased flows of electricity required certain upgrades to the transmission system owned by Respondent-Intervenor New England Power Company d/b/a National Grid (NE Power). NE Power assigned the costs of the transmission system upgrades directly to Narragansett. The newly assigned costs were reflected in a revised transmission service agreement (TSA) that NE Power and Narragansett filed for approval by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission or FERC). Green Development protested the revised TSA. The Commission denied Green Development’s protest.  Green Development petitions for review contending that the Commission (1) erroneously concluded that Green Development’s arguments in the underlying section 205 proceeding operated as a “collateral attack” on the Complaint Order; (2) improperly applied the governing seven-factor test; (3) misinterpreted the Tariff’s definition of “direct assignment facilities”; and (4) erroneously failed to apply the filing procedures of Schedule 21-Local Service of the Tariff.   The DC Circuit denied the petitions. First, the court held that Commission has cured any purportedly erroneous ruling that Green Development’s section 205 protest constituted a collateral attack on the Complaint Order. The court rejected Green Development’s fourth claim. The court wrote that the issue with Green Development’s contention is that it presumes that the procedures in Schedule 21-Local Service are “mandatory processes” that applied to the filing of the TSA. But, the SIS and associated technical arrangements “pertain to initiating transmission service” and “do not demonstrate that Narragansett as an existing transmission customer was required to request new transmission service” under the Tariff. View "Green Development, LLC v. FERC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Ohio Power Siting Board authorizing Firelands Wind, LLC to construct, operate, and maintain a wind farm in Huron and Erie Counties, holding that the nineteen nearby residents and the Black Swamp Bird Observatory that brought this appeal (collectively, Appellants) have not established that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.On appeal, Appellants challenged the Board's determination that the wind farm satisfies the statutory requirements for constructing a major utility facility, asserting, among other things, that the project could kill birds and create excessive noise for residents near the wind farm and that the Board improperly failed to follow its administrative rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board's order was neither unlawful nor unreasonable. View "In re Application of Firelands Wind, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The First Circuit denied Petitioners' petition objecting to a permit issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and affirmed by the Environmental Appeals Board requiring General Electric Company (GE) to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls from certain portions of the Housatonic River, holding that the EPA's challenged actions were not arbitrary or capricious.On appeal, Petitioners brought three substantive challenges and also brought procedural challenges to the permit's issuance. The First Circuit denied the petition after noting that should GE's cleanup of the river not achieve the goals set out in the permit, the permit requires further measures, holding that Petitioners were not entitled to relief on their procedural and substantive legal challenges. View "Housatonic River Initiative v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law