Justia Government & Administrative Law Opinion Summaries

After the 2012 enactment of the American Energy Manufacturing Technical Corrections Act, 42 U.S.C. 6313(c)(4)), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published two final rules in 2014, aimed at improving the energy efficiency of commercial refrigeration equipment (CRE). One adopted new energy efficiency standards for CRE, 79 Fed. Reg. 17,726. The second rule, issued a month later, clarified the test procedures that DOE uses to implement those standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 22,278. Trade associations of CRE manufacturers challenged the rules. The Seventh Circuit upheld the rules, rejecting challenges to DOE’s engineering analysis, economic analysis, regulatory flexibility analysis, and assessment of the cumulative regulatory burden. The court concluded that “DOE acted in a manner worthy of deference.” The first rule was premised on an analytical model that is supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary. DOE conducted a cost‐ benefit analysis that is within its statutory authority and is supported by substantial evidence. It gave appropriate consideration to the rule’s effect on small businesses and the role of other agency regulations. DOE similarly acted within its authority, and within reason, when it promulgated the Test Procedure Rule. View "Zero Zone, Inc. v. Dep't of Energy" on Justia Law

Transco, which operates the 10,000-mile Transcontinental pipeline, extending from South Texas to New York City, sought federal approval to expand a portion of the pipeline, called the Leidy Line, which connects gas wells in Central Pennsylvania with the main pipeline. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Departments of Environmental Protection (PADEP; NJDEP) reviewed the proposal for potential water quality impacts and issued permits. Environmental groups challenged the approvals. The Third Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the petitions and that NJDEP and PADEP did not act arbitrarily in issuing the permits. To bar review of PADEP’s actions in permitting an interstate natural gas facility pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and the Clean Water Act would frustrate the purpose of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction and render superfluous the explicit exception from federal judicial review of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The court also rejected NJDEP’s arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits or the Water Quality Certifications, and even if it had jurisdiction over those authorizations, it could not reach issues regarding aspects of Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits that concern transition areas and threatened and endangered species, Letters of Interpretation, or Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits. View "Dela. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Until recently, incumbent public utilities were free to include in their tariffs and agreements “the option to construct any new transmission facilities in their particular service areas, even if the proposal for new construction came from a third party.” The Commission ordered utilities to remove rights of first refusal from their existing tariffs and agreements. In S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, the court upheld the Commission's removal mandate. Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, FERC must presume a contract rate for wholesale energy is just and reasonable and cannot set aside the rate unless it is contrary to the public interest. The Commission had reserved judgment on whether to apply this presumption to the rights of first refusal until evaluating the individual utilities’ compliance filings. The court also reserved judgment. Petitioners seek review of FERC's determination at the compliance stage, urging that the Commission erred in concluding that Mobile-Sierra does not in fact protect their rights of first refusal contained in their Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) Membership Agreement. The court held that the Commission painted with a broader brush than necessary in applying potentially applicable Supreme Court precedent, but the court denied the petition nonetheless because nothing in the Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires its extension to the anticompetitive rights of first refusal at issue here. View "Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. FERC" on Justia Law

SFPP and several shippers challenged aspects of three of FERC's orders related to filings by SFPP for cost-of-service tariffs on its pipelines. SFPP disputes FERC’s choice of data for calculating SFPP’s return on equity and the Commission’s decision to grant only a partial indexed rate for the 2009 index year. Shippers claim that FERC’s tax allowance policy for partnership pipelines, such as SFPP, is arbitrary or capricious and results in unjust and unreasonable rates. The court concluded that FERC's choice of data for assessing SFPP's real return on equity was arbitrary or capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), because the Commission provided no reasoned basis to justify its decision to rely on the September 2008 data. Therefore, the court granted SFPP's petition on this issue. The court concluded that FERC's indexing analysis was not arbitrary or capricious where FERC complied with the plain text of its regulations when it found that granting SFPP a full indexed rate adjustment would result in unjust and unreasonable rates. Finally, the court also concluded that FERC must demonstrate that there is no double recovery of taxes for partnership pipelines. Accordingly, the court granted SFPP's petition in part and denied the petition in part. The court granted Shippers' petition and vacated FERC's orders with respect to the double recovery issue, and remanded to FERC. View "United Airlines, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulations require that those deemed to be liable after a spill of hazardous materials within a specified radius of a public water supply undertake cleanup and monitoring to ensure the spill does not pose a danger to that water supply, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0801, 40.0810, 40.0993(3)(a), 40.1030(2)(e). A 2007 modification exempts "oil" from some requirements when specific conditions are met, 310 Code Mass. Regs. 40.0924(2)(b)(3)(a). Peterborough owns a now-vacant Athol property, within a protection area, where it operated a gasoline station for more than 10 years. In 1994, a release of leaded gasoline from a subterranean gasoline storage tank was detected in soil on the site. DEP required Peterborough to undertake supervised cleanup and monitoring activities. In 2008, after the oil exemption was established, Peterborough submitted a revised plan, stating that further remediation was not required because the entirety of the spill fell within the exemption's definition of "oil." DEP responded that the meaning of "oil" in the exemption does not include gasoline additives such as lead, but refers only to petroleum hydrocarbons naturally occurring in oils, so that a spill of leaded gasoline could not be completely excluded from further remediation. The trial court, on summary judgment, and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, upheld the DEP interpretation of the regulation as reasonable. View "Peterborough Oil Co., LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Sarah Vogel appealed a district court judgment dismissing without prejudice her complaint against Marathon Oil Company. Marathon operated the Elk USA 11-17H well in Mountrail County. The well began producing in 2011 and continued through at least January 2014. Vogel owned mineral interests and received royalties from the oil or gas produced and sold from the well. Vogel, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, sued Marathon seeking declaratory relief as well as money damages for failure to pay royalties on flared gas. Vogel argued her claims should not have been dismissed by the district court because she had a private right of action for violations of the statute restricting the flaring of gas produced with crude oil from an oil well, N.D.C.C. 38-08-06.4, and she was not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Vogel v. Marathon Oil Corporation" on Justia Law

The issue this interlocutory appeal presented for the Vermont Supreme Court's review centered on whether 12 V.S.A. 462 created an exemption from the general six-year limitation for Vermont’s claims against a host of defendants for generalized injury to state waters as a whole due to groundwater contamination from gasoline additives. On the basis of the statute of limitations, the trial court dismissed the State’s claims insofar as they were predicated on generalized injury to state waters as a whole. On appeal, the State argued that section 462 exempted the State’s claims from the statute of limitations, and, alternatively, that the State’s claims arising under 10 V.S.A. 1390, a statute that established a state policy that the groundwater resources of the state are held in trust for the public, were not time barred because that statute became effective less than six years before the State filed its complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vermont v. Atlantic Richfield Company, et al." on Justia Law

The PSC approved the recovery of FPL's costs incurred through its joint venture with an oil and natural gas company to engage in the acquisition, exploration, drilling, and development of natural gas wells in Oklahoma. The court agreed with appellants that the PSC lacks the authority to allow FPL to recover the capital investment and operations costs of its partnership in the Woodford gas reserves through the rates it charges consumers. Because the PSC exceeded its statutory authority when approving recovery of FPL’s costs and investment in the Woodford Project, the court reversed the judgment. View "Citizens of the State of Florida v. Art Graham, etc." on Justia Law

Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) was in the business of generating electric power in Lake Charles. In order to comply with state and federal environmental regulations, NISCO introduces limestone into its power generation process; the limestone acts as a “scrubbing agent.” The limestone chemically reacts with sulfur to make ash, which NISCO then sells to LA Ash, for a profit of roughly $6.8 million annually. LA Ash sells the ash to its customers for varying commercial purposes, including roads, construction projects, environmental remediation, etc. NISCO appealed when taxes were collected on its purchase of limestone over four tax periods. NISCO claimed its purchase of limestone was subject to the “further processing exclusion” of La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), which narrowed the scope of taxable sales. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted NISCO’s writ application to determine the taxability of the limestone. The trial court ruled in the Tax Collectors' favor. After its review, the Supreme Court found that NISCO’s by-product of ash was the appropriate end product to analyze for purposes of determining the “further processing exclusion’s” applicability to the purchase of limestone. Moreover, under a proper “purpose” test, the third prong of the three-part inquiry enunciated in "International Paper v. Bridges," (972 So.2d 1121(2008)) was satisfied, "as evidenced by NISCO’s choice of manufacturing process and technology, its contractual language utilized in its purchasing of the limestone, and its subsequent marketing and sale of the ash." Therefore the Court reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of NISCO. View "Bridges v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law

Under an Alaska Department of Revenue regulation, all appeals of oil and gas property tax valuation must be heard by the State Assessment Review Board (SARB), while appeals of oil and gas property taxability must be heard by the Department of Revenue (Revenue). Three municipalities challenged this regulation, arguing that it contradicted a statute that grants SARB exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals from Revenue’s “assessments” of oil and gas property. The superior court upheld the regulation as valid, concluding that it was a reasonable interpretation of the statute. But after its review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the regulation was inconsistent with the plain text, legislative history, and purpose of the statute; therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s judgment. View "City of Valdez v. Alaska" on Justia Law